Foster v. Kovner
Decision Date | 19 July 2007 |
Docket Number | 312. |
Citation | 840 N.Y.S.2d 328,2007 NY Slip Op 06175,44 A.D.3d 23 |
Parties | RICHARD N. FOSTER, Appellant, v. BRUCE KOVNER et al., Respondents. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
ANDRIAS, J.P.
Plaintiff alleges breach of an oral compensation agreement, breach of an oral joint venture or partnership agreement, unjust enrichment in quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty. He claims to have personally raised from various sources $800 million of the $1 billion for defendant Caxton Health Holdings (CHH) by December 31, 2004. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the March 18, 2004 letter to plaintiff from CHH, which included a list of open issues, disproved his claims, which were in any event barred by the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [1]) and were otherwise insufficient. The question is whether this alleged joint venture agreement was capable of being performed within one year.
In the decision and order appealed from, the motion court dismissed the breach of contract claims as barred by the statute of frauds, and the unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty claims as duplicative causes of action that were dependent upon oral agreements otherwise barred by the statute of frauds. As to the unjust enrichment claim, the court found that plaintiff had been compensated for his services.
In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendants breached an oral compensation agreement entered on March 11 2004, "by refusing ... his promised equity interest in CHH and ceasing payment of the $1,000,000 per year that was promised" in consideration for his work as the corporation's CEO (2006 NY Slip Op 30201[U], *8-9). In the second, plaintiff alleges that defendants breached a joint venture or partnership agreement entered on March 11, 2004 by "refusing ... his equity interest in the joint venture and ceasing payment of the promised $1,000,000 per year" (id. at *11). While the court found that the March 18, 2004 letter did not preclude these claims and that "Foster sufficiently alleges the existence of an oral agreement" it nevertheless dismissed them as barred by the statute of frauds because "full performance of its terms is not capable within a one-year period" (id. at *8, 9). The court further found that although plaintiff argues his measure of compensation was fixed and defendants' obligation of payment was thus capable of performance within one year, he admits that defendants would have to continue annual compensation payments to him for the duration of the joint venture that has already exceeded one year. Therefore, the court found, "pursuant to the oral agreement, the compensation that Foster seeks from defendants requires defendants to continue performance for a period exceeding one year and Foster's allegation of unilateral performance does not take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds" (id. at *9-10).
As to plaintiff's argument that his claim for the 10% equity should survive because it became due during the year he had performed, the court found that
(id. at *10).
Insofar as plaintiff argued that he had performed his obligations under the joint venture agreement within one year, the court found that "the complaint's allegations support the inference that his obligations under the alleged joint venture agreement were to continue beyond a one year period" inasmuch as the complaint alleges the parties had discussed that "CHH would take at least two to three years to get off the ground" and that "during the first two years of this formative stage, the enterprise would not be expected to show a profit" (id. at *11). The court further found that the complaint alleges that part of the agreement to enter into the joint venture included plaintiff's promise to "assume major responsibilities critical to the development and eventual success of CHH, in addition to managing the day-to-day operations of CHH" and that plaintiff (id. at *11-12).
Such holding, however, ignores the holding in D & N Boening v Kirsch Beverages (63 NY2d 449, 454 [1984]) that "[t]he question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the year" (emphasis added).
Further, the statute of frauds is generally inapplicable to an agreement to create a joint venture (F.S. Intertrade Off. Prods. v Babina, 199 AD2d 95, 96 [1993], lv denied 83 NY2d 757 [1994]) or partnership (Prince v O'Brien, 234 AD2d 12 [1996]; Rella v McMahon, 169 AD2d 555 [1991]). This is because, absent any definite term of duration, an oral agreement to form a partnership or joint venture for an indefinite period creates a partnership or joint venture at will (see Shandell v Katz, 95 AD2d 742, 743 [1983] [ ]; Alnwick v European Micro Holdings, Inc., 281 F Supp 2d 629, 644 [ED NY 2003] []).
Here, there was no definite duration for the joint venture. Insofar as the motion court relied on the fact that plaintiff alleged in the complaint that he, Kovner and Wilson (defendant principals of CCH) "expected that CHH would take at least two to three years to get off the ground" (2006 NY Slip Op 30201[U], *4) and that plaintiff continued to perform his duties beyond 12 months, CHH could be, and was in fact, established within one year. The complaint alleges that the oral agreement required defendants to compensate plaintiff for as long as the fund continued to exist, which tied payment to a specific event, i.e. the termination of the venture, which the parties controlled and which could have occurred within one year without either party breaching the agreement (see Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362 [1998], supra; Hydro Invs. v Trafalgar Power, 6 AD3d 882, 885 [2004] []; Zuccarini v Ziff-Davis Media, 306 AD2d 404 [2003]).
As to defendants' argument that even if the contract claims are not barred by the statute of frauds, they should be dismissed because the March 18, 2004 letter confirms the parties never agreed on the material terms and "numerous, substantive issues" remained unresolved, including "the level of ownership to be acquired" and "the full details of [Foster's] compensation," the motion court correctly held that ...
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