Foster v. State, A93A2273
| Decision Date | 17 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. A93A2273,A93A2273 |
| Citation | 211 Ga.App. 22,437 S.E.2d 872 |
| Parties | FOSTER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rosemary E. Myers, Athens, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, Sol., for appellee.
Larry McDonald Foster appeals his conviction for shoplifting two videotapes at a K-Mart store.
Appellant asserts error in the denial of his plea in bar for lack of a speedy trial. He was arrested on June 26, 1991. In August 1991, the state court transferred the case to superior court on the basis that appellant had three prior shoplifting convictions. See OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1). In October 1991, the case was returned to state court because appellant had only two prior shoplifting convictions. No further action was taken until May 1993, when this accusation was filed. In June 1993, appellant filed this motion. Held:
1. The mere passage of time between arrest or indictment and trial does not constitute a denial of due process. Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 426 S.E.2d 852; Hughes v. State, 228 Ga. 593, 595, 187 S.E.2d 135. Under the standards in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, for determining a denial of due process for lack of speedy trial, appellant was not entitled to a dismissal of this charge.
The right to speedy trial is unique among constitutional rights because its deprivation can work to the advantage of the accused; failure to provide a speedy trial does not per se prejudice his ability to defend himself. State v. Lively, 155 Ga.App. 402, 403, 270 S.E.2d 812. The basis of the subjective balancing approach of Barker is that the defendant has some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim even though it is the State's duty to bring him to trial, and the defendant has a potential interest in either having a speedy trial or delaying any trial. Lively, supra at 404, 270 S.E.2d 812. There is no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel here, so we can assume that appellant's failure to demand a trial was beneficial to him. Washington v. State, 243 Ga. 329, 333, 253 S.E.2d 719. Appellant was not incarcerated between his 1991 arrest and this 1993 trial. He could have demanded a trial at any time but he did not. Evidently he did not want to push a trial. He contends the State's failure to try him in two years caused him great anxiety and concern, but the anxiety and concern one would feel while waiting for trial of a criminal charge is not the sort of prejudice which will win him a dismissal. As to "prejudice" generally, see Andrews v. State, 175 Ga.App. 22, 25-26, 332 S.E.2d 299. Although appellant lived under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety for two years, he obviously preferred this to going to trial for it was in his power at any time to demand one. See Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625, 628, 216 S.E.2d 839, where the defendant was anxious for four years. The denial of the motion to...
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Cornell v. State
...shoplifting alone was admissible in trial of charged offense where defendant was shoplifting with an accomplice); Foster v. State, 211 Ga.App. 22, 23(2), 437 S.E.2d 872 (1993) (prior shoplifting transaction found similar even though it involved different stores and other kinds of merchandis......
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Jackson v. State
...the similar transaction evidence was admitted for the proper purposes of showing identity and modus operandi. See Foster v. State, 211 Ga.App. 22, 23(2), 437 S.E.2d 872 (1993); see also Cridiso v. State, 200 Ga.App. 342(1), 343, 408 S.E.2d 153 2. The evidence, viewed in the light most favor......
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Obiozor v. State
...supra, we find that appellant was not deprived in this instance of his due process right to a speedy trial. Compare Foster v. State, 211 Ga.App. 22, 23, 437 S.E.2d 872 (anxiety and concern arising from incarceration will not, standing alone, create prejudice sufficient to compel a 3. (a) Ap......
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