Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13284,13284
• Citation: 646 P.2d 1020,103 Idaho 249
• Parties: Edgar A. FOUCHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, Wilson Motors, Inc., ABC Corporation, DEF Corporation, GHI Corporation, JKL Corporation, and Dodge Motor Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1020

646 P.2d 1020

103 Idaho 249

Edgar A. FOUCHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, Wilson Motors, Inc., ABC Corporation, DEF Corporation, GHI Corporation, JKL Corporation, and Dodge Motor Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.

No. 13284.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 15, 1982.

Michael McLaughlin and Robert F. McLaughlin (McLaughlin Law Offices, Chartered), of Mountain Home, for appellant, cross-respondent.

John W. Barrett and Michael G. McPeek (Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Chartered) of Boise, for respondent, cross-appellant Chrysler Motors Corp.

Richard C. Mellon, Jr. (Elam, Burke, Evans, Boyd & Koontz) of Boise, for respondent, cross-appellant Wilson Motors, Inc.

BURNETT, Judge.

Edgar Fouche was injured in a collision while driving a 1972 Dodge Colt automobile manufactured in Japan for Chrysler Motors Corporation, and sold by Wilson Motors, Inc. Fouche sued Chrysler and Wilson Motors for damages, alleging that defects in the driver's seat belt and energy-absorbing steering column had increased or "enhanced" his injuries. Following presentation of Fouche's case-in-chief to a jury, the district judge granted motions for directed verdict in favor of Chrysler and Wilson Motors. The court later denied Fouche's motion for a new trial, and motions by Chrysler and Wilson Motors for award of attorney fees. Fouche has appealed the dismissal; Chrysler and Wilson Motors have cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the district court.

Fouche's appeal raises three principal issues. First, what must an injured plaintiff prove to establish a prima facie case in a "second collision" product liability suit? Second, was a prima facie case established in the instant action? Third, was certain opinion testimony properly excluded in this case? Our disposition of the main appeal makes it unnecessary to address the attorney fee question raised by the cross-appeal.

I

Our inquiry into the plaintiff's burden of proof begins with Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1973). In that case the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), imposing strict liability for "any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ...." 95 Idaho at 676, 518 P.2d at 859.

In Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976), the court outlined the general elements of proof in a strict liability action. The court held that a plaintiff need not prove a specific product defect. A prima facie case for defectiveness may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence showing (a) that the product malfunctioned; (b) that it was not abnormally used; and (c) that there were no other reasonably likely causes of the plaintiff's injury which would eliminate the defendant's liability. The "unreasonably dangerous" condition of the product may be inferred from the same direct or circumstantial evidence used to establish defectiveness. 97 Idaho at 747-49, 553 P.2d 1311-13.

The facts in Farmer took the Supreme Court to the threshold of a new dimension in product liability-the "second collision" or "crashworthiness" case. In Farmer a truck driver claimed injury resulting from a defective steering mechanism that caused him to lose control of his vehicle, and from a defectively designed air suspension seat that catapulted him about the cab interior when the truck ran off the road. Although the defective steering mechanism caused the accident, the defective seat contributed to the "second collision" in the cab that caused the driver's injury.

Our Supreme Court, adopting a line of authority emanating from Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), held:

The intended use of the truck includes within its scope the reasonably foreseeable likelihood that in the normal course of operation a truck may be involved in a collision or other accidents; it is thus the manufacturer's duty to design and manufacture its products so as to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury in the event of collision or other impact. (97 Idaho at 751, 553 P.2d at 1315.)

The Supreme Court did not explicitly decide whether a defect relating to "crashworthiness" may establish a basis for strict liability in tort. Moreover, because both product defects in Farmer were attributable to the same truck manufacturer, the Supreme Court had no occasion to decide whether to apportion the harm caused by the defects. These questions go to the heart of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a "second collision" suit. They confront us on the facts of the instant case.

At approximately 3:00 a. m., on the interstate highway between Boise and Mountain Home, Edgar Fouche drove his automobile at approximately 55 miles per hour into the rear of a stationary, unattended vehicle. He suffered a ruptured aorta-the main trunk artery descending from the chest into the abdomen-as well as trauma to his face and mouth. The aorta was surgically repaired, but evidence at trial indicated that there could be long-term secondary effects of the injury.

Fouche testified that the collision with the other vehicle caused him to strike the steering wheel and windshield of his car. He said that he was wearing a lap seat belt, but not a shoulder harness, when the accident occurred. He further testified that after the impact, he "slumped over" to the passenger's side of the vehicle. As he attempted to exit from the passenger's side, he found himself still wrapped in his seat belt, which had unreeled. The steering column, introduced as an exhibit at trial, was visibly bent. An auto mechanic testified that the type of steering column installed in Dodge Colt automobiles was capable of collapsing up to five inches, but that the column in Fouche's car had collapsed only one and one-quarter inches. The mechanic also testified about possible causes of seat belt failure. When he offered an opinion about what happened physically to Fouche during the accident, his testimony was excluded for reasons discussed more fully below.

Fouche claimed that his injuries were enhanced by malfunctions of the seat belt and of the collapsible steering column. He initially grounded his claim upon theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort. However, he dismissed the negligence count of his complaint before trial. At the close of Fouche's case-in-chief, the trial court ruled that Fouche had presented sufficient evidence of equipment malfunction to submit the issue of product defects to the jury. However, the court observed that Fouche had not proven what his injuries would have been if the seat belt and steering column had functioned properly. Therefore, the court held, Fouche had failed to make a prima facie case for enhancement of injuries. The action was dismissed.

The trial court's ruling, as to adequacy of the evidence on defects, was based upon standards enunciated in Farmer. The trial court implicitly ruled that strict liability may attach to product defects in "second collision" cases. We agree and we so hold. E.g., Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 2229, 48 L.Ed.2d 832 (1976); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064 (E.D.Pa.1969). The plaintiff's proof of such defects must follow the Farmer guidelines.

However, this case crosses the "crashworthiness" threshold that Farmer merely approached. No product defect has been blamed for the "first collision"-the impact with the stationary vehicle. Fouche has sought recovery only for injuries from which he was inadequately protected by the defective seat belt and steering column. His claim has raised a question of apportionment, with attendant implications for the plaintiff's burden of proof in this type of action.

In the seminal case of Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra, the Eighth Circuit Court said that a plaintiff making a "crashworthiness" claim should recover:

that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design. (391 F.2d at 503.)

The Restatement (Second) of Torts, at § 433A, notes that harm should be apportioned among two or more causes only where there are distinct harms or there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. In Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit grafted Larsen to the Restatement, holding that in "crashworthy" cases the manufacturer has proximately caused only an enhancement of injuries, not the accident itself; consequently, "a rational basis for apportionment exists." 540 F.2d at 774.

Section 433B(1) of the Restatement imposes on a plaintiff the burden of proving that an actor's tortious conduct caused the plaintiff's harm. But where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to produce the harm, section 433B(2) shifts the burden of proof on apportionment to each such actor. The courts are divided as to whether the general rules set forth in section 433B should be followed in "second collision" cases.

The leading opponent of section 433B has been the federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976), a majority of the court, predicting New Jersey law in a "second collision" case that gave the judges "much disquietude over the evidence," held that the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on apportionment. 537 F.2d at 736, 737. The court dismissed the Restatement approach as applicable only in single impact cases, where concurrent tortfeasors "have combined contemporaneously to cause the injuries." Id. at 738 (emphasis original). The court articulated a three-tier burden of proof...