Fowler v. State

• Decision Date: 22 May 1912
• Citation: 148 S.W. 576
• Parties: FOWLER v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

148 S.W. 576

FOWLER v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 22, 1912.

Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; Jas. W. Swayne, Judge.

Charley Fowler was convicted of crime, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Lattimore, Cummings, Doyle & Bouldin, of Ft. Worth, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

In this case appellant was indicted for assault with intent to rape; the indictment reading as follows, omitting the formal parts: "Did unlawfully make an assault in and upon the person of Cora Lee Stout, a female under the age of 15 years, and not the wife of him, the said Charley Fowler, did then and there attempt to ravish and have carnal knowledge of the said Cora Lee Stout."

1. There is a judgment in the record overruling the motion to quash the indictment; but the motion itself does not appear in the record. Looking to the motion for a new trial, in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, we find the complaint was made that the indictment attempted to charge appellant "with an attempt to commit rape," and was insufficient to charge that offense; and, further, that the indictment is insufficient to charge an "assault with intent to commit rape," and the court erred in submitting the latter offense to the jury.

This brings into review articles 608 and 640 of the Penal Code. In the cases of Brown v. State, 7 Tex. App. 569, Burney v State, 21 Tex. App. 565, 1 S. W. 458, Taylor v. State, 22 Tex. App. 529, 3 S. W. 753, 58 Am. Rep. 656, Milton v. State, 23 Tex. App. 204, 4 S. W. 574, Melton v. State, 24 Tex. App. 284, 6 S. W. 39, Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 227, 12 S. W. 601, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833, it is clearly held that these statutes create separate and distinct offenses; and by article 640 it is provided: "If it appears on the trial of an indictment for rape that the offense, though not committed, was attempted by the use of any of the means spoken of in articles 634, 635 and 636, but not such as to bring the offense within the definition of an assault with intent to commit rape, the jury may find the defendant guilty of an `attempt to commit the offense.'" Article 634 defines "force," article 635, "threats," and article 636 "fraud." So the offense denounced by article 640 must be committed by the use of force, threats, or fraud, as defined in those articles; and it is clear that the indictment, herein copied, does not charge, nor seek to charge, that offense; and the authorities quoted by appellant, showing that the indictment is insufficient to charge that offense, correctly state the law.

However, this case was not tried on the theory that the indictment charged the offense defined in article 640, and the court did not submit that offense to the jury; but it was claimed by the state that the offense charged in the indictment was an assault with intent to commit rape, as defined by article 608, and this is the offense the court submits to the jury for their determination.

Article 608 reads: "If any person shall assault a woman with intent to commit the offense of rape, he shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for any term of years not less than two." Under this article of the Code, it has been held, to charge this offense on a female under the age of consent, it is unnecessary that force, threats, or fraud were used. In the case of Moore v. State, 20 Tex. App. 275, Judge White, speaking for the court, holds: "Where the injured female is under the age of 10 years, it is neither necessary to allege in the indictment, nor to prove on trial, that the offense was committed `with or without consent and with or without the use of force, threats or fraud,' because carnal connection with a female of such tender years is per se rape under any and all circumstances, whether with her consent or not. Penal Code, art. 528. Allegations, then, of force, threats, and fraud should, in such cases, never be used. Standard precedents and prescribed forms do not contain them. 1 Whart. Prec. of Ind. 189, 190; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 481; Willson's Crim. Forms, Nos. 374, 375, pp. 167, 168; Mayo v. State, 7 Tex. App. 342; Gibson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 574; [State v. Gaul] 50 Conn. 578."

It is thus seen that in charging a violation of article 608 on a female under fifteen years it is only necessary to allege and prove that an assault was made with the intent to commit the offense of rape. In this indictment it is alleged that defendant made an assault on the female, and did then and there attempt to ravish and have carnal knowledge of the said Cora Lee Stout. In the case of Taylor v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 153, 69 S. W. 149, it is held that an indictment drawn in terms similar to this one charges an offense under article 608; and the use of the word "attempt," in lieu of the word "intent," in the indictment is held to be a sufficient compliance with the Code. Mr. Bishop, in his Procedure, says: "It seems impossible to doubt that the only distinction between an `intent' and an `attempt' to do a thing is that the former implies the purpose only, while the latter implies both the purpose and an actual effort to carry that purpose into execution." Atkinson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 424, 30 S. W. 1064; Hart v. State, 38 Tex. 383; Brown v. State, 27 Tex. App. 330, 11 S. W. 412; Witherby v. State, 39 Ala. 702; State v. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N. W. 143; Scott v. People, 141 Ill. 195, 30 N. E. 329; United States v. Barnaby (C. C.) 51 Fed. 20; State v. Evans, 27 Utah, 12, 73 Pac. 1047; Johnson v. State, 27 Neb. 687, 43 N. W. 425; State v. McGinnis, 158 Mo. 105, 59 S. W. 83. It is thus seen the allegations in the indictment are sufficient to charge an offense on a female under 15 years of age, under article 608; and the court did not err in overruling the motion to quash the indictment, and in submitting this offense to the jury in his charge. The case of Wyvias v. State, 142 S. W. 585, is not in conflict with the case of Taylor v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 153, 69 S. W. 149, nor with this holding. In the Wyvias Case, the court submitted the offense denounced by article 608, and the jury found appellant guilty of the offense defined by article 640; and, as the court submitted only the offense defined by article 608, the case was reversed. Had the conviction been under the first count in the indictment, and which was the only one submitted by the court to the jury, the conviction would have been permitted to stand. And this indictment properly charging an offense on a female under 15 years of age, under article 608, it was only necessary for the court to define what was meant by assault, and it...