Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70-128,70-128
• Citation: 267 N.E.2d 405,25 Ohio St.2d 193
• Parties: , 54 O.O.2d 301 FOX, Admx., Appellant, v. MORRISON MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 193

25 Ohio St.2d 193

267 N.E.2d 405, 54 O.O.2d 301

FOX, Admx., Appellant, v. MORRISON MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Appellee.

No. 70-128.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 3, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 2125.01, which provides a right of action for death caused by a wrongful act in another state 'for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages is given by a statute of such other state,' does not require the application of that state's limitation of the amount of damages recoverable.

2. In an action brought in Ohio under R.C. 2125.01, by the Ohio administrator of the estate of an Ohio resident who was killed in a motor vehicle collision in another state, where there was no citizen or resident of that state involved in the collision, and there is no issue of liability, Ohio has all the substantial governmental interests and the law of Ohio is determinative of the damages recoverable.

Plaintiff's decedent, Harry E. Fox, an Ohio resident, was killed in a collision in Illinois between the tractor-trailer he was operating and a tractor-trailer operated by defendant's employee. Both drivers were engaged in trips which had begun, and would have ended, in Onio.

The defendant corporation, which was authorized to, and was doing business in Ohio, maintained trucking terminals in Akron, Mansfield, Warren and Cleveland. Plaintiff, Helen G. Fox, was appointed administratrix of the estate of Harry E. Fox, and brought this action on behalf of her decedent's next of kin, herself and her minor children, praying for damages in the sum of $750,000. Defendant, Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., offered to confess judgment in the amount of $30,000, the maximum amount of damages recoverable under the then existing Illinois Wrongful Death Act (Section 2, Chapter 70, Illinois statutes) and moved that the trial court rule that damages could not exceed that amount. At the close of plaintiff's opening statement the Court of Common Pleas, holding applicable the Illinois statutory limitation on the amount plaintiff could recover, entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $30,000. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A motion to certify the record having been allowed, the cause is now before this court.

Stewart & DeChant and Lawrence E. Stewart, Cleveland, for appellant.

Arter & Hadden and Smith Warder, Cleveland, for appellee.

DUNCAN, Justice.

The sole issue involved herein is whether the Ohio law or the Illinois law should be applied in determining the amount of damages recoverable. Application of the law of the place where the injuries occurred would limit plaintiff's maximum recovery to the amount entered by the trial court. Ohio law places no limit on the amount of damages recoverable in a wrongful death action.

This court has never determined whether to apply another state's limitation of the amount of recovery in a wrongful death action brought in Ohio in a case where the occurrence causing death took place in the other state. Nevertheless, this court's dedication to the rule of lex locidelicti is far too deeply engrained in our cases to be realistically denied. See Collins v. McClure (1944), 143 Ohio St. 569, 56 N.E.2d 171; Freas v. Sullivan (1936), 130 Ohio St. 486, 487, 200 N.E. 639; Lyons v. Lyons (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533; Ellis v. Garwood (1958), 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100.

Of all the criteria generally set forth for use in the determination of a 'choice of laws' (see Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Columbia L.Rev. 959), rigid adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti has consistently satisfied only two-predictability of results, and ease in the determination of which law to apply. But would rote application of lex loci delicti, with its blindness to other operable facts, consistently produce a just result in a wrongful death action where the injuries causing the death of an Ohio resident occur in another state? We think not. Therefore, in such a case the automatic application of the rule of lex loci delicti must be abandoned.

R.C. 2125.01 provides a right of action for death caused by a wrongful act in another state for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages is given by a statute of such other state. Section 19a, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, prohibits laws establishing a limitation on damages in a civil action for death caused by the wrongful act of another. Such clearly-established public policy requires compensation to the spouse, children and other next of kin for all sufficiently demonstrated pecuniary injury resulting from the death. R.C. 2125.02.

Illinois, at the time of the accident herein, as revealed by the provisions of its law, apparently did not likewise evaluate the predicament of a decedent's next of kin, but made certain considerations favoring defendants in a wrongful death case, and presumably their insurers. ¹

In a wrongful death action brought in Ohio, a decision regarding damages, based upon solid Ohio public policy could be seized upon as compelling reason to abjure the law of the place of the wrong.

Although we believe that a decision made on the basis of public policy in this state would be meritorious, a decision made solely on that basis would ignore other relevant aspects of the multi-state wrongful death problem. A public policy solution founded on the policy of the forum state requires only the discovery and application of that state's policy. If application of the rule of lex loci delicti is automatic, a decision based on the discovery and application of the public policy of the forum would be semi-automatic, the application of which would appear to ignore situations wherein the public policy of more than one state may well demand consideration. Such a sutuation would arise in the case at bar if the driver of defendant's truck were an Illinois resident and if the defendant were an Illinois corporation. Resting our decision on public policy in this case might well be adequate, but would be far too shortsighted to serve as a rule of law.

Although the majority of jurisdictions having cause to review lex loci delicti have rejected its continued automatic use, ² appellee suggests that deviation from the law of the place of the wrong is so laden with trepidation because of innumerable problems with most complex and obscure solutions, that other 'choice of law' rules do more violence to fairness than the firm rules they attempt to succeed. It is claimed that the abandonment of lex loci delicti by New York courts has generated confusion. Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279; Dym v. Gordon 1965), 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792; Macey v. Rozbicki (1966), 18 N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380; Miller v. Miller (1968), 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877; Tooker v. Lopez (1969), 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394, are cases illustrative of the problems that have arisen after the demise of lex loci delicti, particularly in cases involving host-guest, multi-state tort actions.

With full appreciation of the extent of the disturbance of the placidness of choice of laws under a mechanical rule of lex loci delicti, the facts of the case at bar classically demonstrate the injustice of the automatic application of the law of the place of the injury.

By offering to confess judgment, defendant in effect admitted liability for negligence, thus removing from consideration any conflict concerning the conduct required of motorists by Illinois traffic laws.

As noted by Chief Justice Traynor in Reich v. Purcell (1967), 67 Cal.2d 551, 556, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730:

'Limitations of damages * * * have little or nothing to do with conduct. They are concerned not with how people should behave but with how survivors should be compensated. The state of the place of the wrong has little or no interest in such compensation when none of the parties reside there.'

See, also, Fabricius v. Horgen (1965), 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410; Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (1965), 121 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 350 F.2d 468; Griffith v. United Air Lines (1964), 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 797; Ingersoll v. Klein (1969), 106 Ill.App.2d 330, 245 N.E.2d 288.

We have no doubt that it an issue were involved concerning the driving conduct of the parties within the state where the accident occurred that state would have a substantial interest in the determination of that issue; therefore, in choosing the law to be applied such an interest would have to be considered.

All governmental interest in this case is Ohio's. Both the interest in fair and adequate compensation for the next of kin of an Ohio resident killed by a wrongdoer and the lawful administration of the decedent's estate are solely Ohio governmental interests. We fail to find any Illinois concern involved or disturbed.

In this case, it may be stated that there is no true conflict of laws problem, or a false conflict, since Illinois has no interest in the litigation. See Reich v. Purcell, supra (67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary, 37 Tex.L.Rev. 657. However, any theory of choice of law other than lex loci delicti calls for the evaluation of the posture of the law of more than one state. Once the process of examining the law of the place of injury, the law of the forum, and the law of any other state having an interest implemented, whether or not a conflict is found, the decision-making process is the same. Therefore, the true search in each instance is for substantial state governmental interest; only the results of the search differ. In order to determine the most substantial interest, a weighing of any conflicting governmental interests of states concerned is necessary.

A holding for appellee in this case can only be justified for the sole reason of preserving the rule of lex loci delicti, ³ a...