Francis v. State

• Decision Date: 12 July 2018
• Docket Number: TTDCV175007134S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Ernest FRANCIS (Inmate #176318) v. STATE of Connecticut et al.

Ernest FRANCIS (Inmate #176318) v. STATE of Connecticut et al.

No. TTDCV175007134S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Rockville

July 12, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Gordon, J.

The self-represented plaintiff, Ernest Francis, brings this declaratory judgment action, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-29 against the defendants^[1] and seeks a declaration that Connecticut General Statutes § 54-125a(f)^[2] is unconstitutional. In his amended complaint, filed with the court on January 9, 2017, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff was eighteen years and five days old when on August 12, 1990, he committed a murder for which he was subsequently convicted and for which he is presently serving a fifty-year sentence. The plaintiff contends that he is similarly situated to the class of offenders who were under the age eighteen when they committed their crimes, but now by virtue of the recently codified General Statutes § 54-125a(f), enacted by No. 84 of the 2015 Public Acts, are eligible for parole hearings. The plaintiff invokes the United States Supreme Court cases of Roper v. Simmons, 546 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1616 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (collectively "Miller-Graham" ), which held, inter alia, that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment based upon a juvenile’s lack of development and capacity for change. To remediate this, Miller-Graham dictate that a juvenile’s sentence must reflect a consideration of their youthful qualities and factors. Subsequently, § 54-125a(f) was codified by our legislature to ameliorate the retrospective sentencing issues raised by these cases.

The plaintiff asserts that the protections and considerations raised by Miller-Graham applicable to juveniles also apply to offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five based upon their similar youthful qualities and lack of development. The plaintiff also asserts that because § 54-125a(f) only applies to those under the age of eighteen, it is unconstitutional because it discriminates against the class of offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five with no rational basis to do so. The plaintiff contends that this purported failure also discriminates against African-Americans within that same group of offenders, aged eighteen to twenty-five. From these alleged failures, the plaintiff maintains that § 54-125a(f) violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and under Article first, § § 9, and 20 of the constitution of Connecticut.

On October 27, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff lacked standing. Hence, on November 29, 2017, the plaintiff filed an objection. The matter was heard at Short Calendar on March 29, 2018.

II

DISCUSSION

"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). Specifically, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30(a), "[a] motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process."

The defendants contend that the plaintiff’s action should be dismissed for lack of standing. Specifically, the defendants assert that the plaintiff is not injured by the provisions of § 54-125a(f) because controlling authority has drawn the line for classification as a juvenile at eighteen; thus, the plaintiff is not eligible for the protections of the eighth amendment recognized by Miller-Graham. In light of this, and, because there is no guaranteed right to parole, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff lacks injury and that this matter should be dismissed for lack of standing. In objection, the plaintiff contends that he has standing because the protections of Miller-Graham extend and apply to those individuals aged eighteen to twenty-five at the time of their crime based upon their youthful qualities, and that the absence of a mechanism through which the plaintiff may seek relief from his sentence subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment.

"The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 n.6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). "If ... the plaintiff’s standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011).

"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [When] a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause ... In addition, because standing implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the issue of standing is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 125-26, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013).

The plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of § 54-125a(f). "A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Korhn, 41 Conn.App. 874, 878, 678 A.2d 492, 494, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 910, 622 A.2d 1010 (1996). Furthermore, "[o]nly members of a class whose constitutional rights are endangered by a statute may ask to have it declared unconstitutional ... One who is not injured by the operation of a law cannot be said to be deprived by it of his constitutionally protected rights ... Aside from the mere question of standing, if his attack is to be successful, a litigant must sustain the burden of proving the facts essential to his standing, that is, that the effect or impact of the challenged statute on him adversely affects a constitutionally protected right which he has. This means a right which he proves that he has under the facts of his particular case." (Citations omitted.) Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corp., 168 Conn. 43, 49-50, 357 A.2d 472, 474-75 (1975).

The plaintiff claims entitlement to the protections of the Miller-Graham line of cases. Therefore, a review of those cases is warranted. In State v. Taylor G., 315 Conn. 734, 743-44, 110 A.3d 338 (2015), our Supreme Court summarized the holdings in Roper, Graham and Miller as follows: "[A]ll three federal cases recognized that, because the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is based on the principle that punishment should be graduated and proportioned to the offender and the offense, courts must consider mitigating evidence of youth and immaturity when sentencing juvenile offenders. Thus, applying this principle, the death penalty is a disproportionate sentence for juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime; see Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 573-75; life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a disproportionate sentence for juveniles convicted of a non-homicide crime; Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011; and mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a disproportionate sentence for juveniles convicted of a homicide, although a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be deemed appropriate following consideration of the child’s age-related characteristics and the circumstances of the crime. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, [ 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455] ..." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Taylor G., supra, 743-44. Controlling authority has since held that § 54-125a(f) remediates the state and federal constitutional issues raised by Miller and Graham. See State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn.App. 744, 780-81, 164 A.3d 9, 31 (2016), cert. granted, 326 Conn. 920, 169 A.3d 793 (2017).

The constitutional protections raised by Miller and Graham are specifically limited to those individuals who are juveniles, or those under the age of eighteen, at the time they committed their offense. Miller held that only mandatory life imprisonment "for those under the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes" violates the eighth amendment. Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 465. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has specifically noted that these protections only apply to juveniles. See State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 640 n.1, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016) ("[w]e use the term juvenile offenders to refer to persons who committed a crime when they were younger than eighteen years of age"). The line for consideration as a juvenile...