Frank v. Eeles

• Decision Date: 04 May 1943
• Citation: 13 So.2d 216,152 Fla. 869
• Parties: FRANK et al. v. EELES et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

13 So.2d 216

152 Fla. 869

FRANK et al. v. EELES et al.

Florida Supreme Court

May 4, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Volusia County; H. B Frederick, judge.

Herbert F Fuller, of New Smyrna, for appellants.

J. U Gillespie, of New Smyrna, for appellees.

THOMAS, Justice.

The plaintiffs daughters of one William Thomas Day, deceased, joined by their husbands, prayed for a decree declaring that a resulting trust existed in certain property 'in favor of the Estate of William Thomas Day' and that the defendants--some of them were the executors of the estate of Ella B. Day; others the principal beneficiaries under her will--were trustees of said estate and held 'the title and possession of all of said property in trust for the said Estate of William Thomas Day * * *.'

The claim to this relief was founded upon the alleged history of the relationship of William Thomas Day and his wife, Ella B. Day and the manner of acquiring and handling the property involved in this litigation. These parties were married, so the bill alleges, before any of the property was acquired and at the time of the former's death title to all of it was held by the latter. William Thomas Day was the father of the plaintiffs Irene Day Frank and Corrinne Day Lambie. Although not shown in the bill, it was developed in the testimony that their mother and William Thomas Day had been divorced long ago and that he married Ella B. Day more than thirty years before his death. We are not informed what property he owned at the time of the union, but she had none. While she was untrained and earned no money during their married life, he was a locomotive engineer, steadily employed and possessed of good business judgment. During their life together an estate of modest proportions was accumulated.

In July, 1940, he died leaving a will, executed in 1931, simply providing that: 'After all my lawful debts are paid and discharged, I give and bequeath to Ella Bane Day all my property both real and personal.' Four months later Ella B. Day died and by her will, executed a few days before her death, she gave and bequeathed her estate 'except such personal things as I may have of my own, or my late husband's things that would only be cherished by my family' to 'the Palmetto Street Methodist Church in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, * * * and the Methodist Children's Home in Enterprise, Florida, * * *.' The excepted property was left to the plaintiffs Irene Day Frank and Corrinne Day Lambie and to one Mrs. Lucy Dulaney Horner.

The accumulated property consisted of real estate, money deposited in a postal savings account, household goods, an automobile, some cash and several government bonds. Most of the real estate with which we are concerned had been conveyed to her; one parcel to both creating an estate by entireties. The postal savings account bore her name as did the government bonds. She was also said to have held in her name title to the automobile and the household goods and to have had possession of a small amount of cash. It was charged that the property to which we have referred represented the bulk of his earnings and his savings since his marriage to Ella B. Day. The plaintiffs asserted that all this property was held by her for the principal purpose of convenience because of his repeated absence from home necessitated by his vocation, but that he maintained supervision over it, she, meanwhile, recognizing his ownership. Finally, it was alleged that the two had agreed that in the event he 'should first depart this life' she 'would make a Last Will and Testament wherein and whereby [she] would will, devise and bequeath the said property to the * * * daughters * * * plaintiffs herein.' Upon these representations plaintiffs charged that the property was originally held by her as trustee for her husband and that, she having died, the trust continued in their favor, defendants becoming trustees.

In short, it was the plaintiffs' theory that the resulting trust should be recognized by the court and that the provisions of the so-called 'Stepmother Act,' Chapter 18999, Laws of Florida, 1939 (found in Section 731.34, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended in 1941, F.S.A. § 731.34), should be invoked thereby securing to them their portions of the estate. The chancellor decided that support of their position was lacking and dismissed the bill of complaint.

It seems fitting at this point to define the burden undertaken by the appellants in their attempt to prevail in the chancery court. In the first place, as has been seen, they placed their hope of recovery squarely on the proposition that a resulting trust was created when, from time to time during his married life, William Thomas Day put in the name of his wife the property he and she, or as appellants insist he, acquired.

A trust of this character does not spring from a contract but 'arises by implication of law' and 'is founded on the presumed intention the parties that the one furnishing the money should have the beneficial interest, while the other held the title for convenience or for a collateral purpose.' Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Edition, Volume 5, Sections 2370 and 2372. The same author, in Section 2370, observes that: 'Where, for any reason, the legal title to property is in one person under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him to have the beneficial interest, equity will imply a trust in favor the person entitled to the beneficial interest. It must appear from the entire transaction that there is an obligation on the part the holder the legal title to hold it for the benefit someone else.'

Applying this to the present controversy, then, it was the task of the appellants to show that, without any express contract between William Thomas Day and his wife, property purchased by him was placed in her name for convenience and in such circumstances that a trust would be implied and a court of equity would place upon her the obligation to hold it for his benefit. At this point, having stated what we conceive to be the general rule, we must observe that certain presumptions obtain in the establishment of trusts of this nature. 'Generally speaking, where the purchase money of land is paid by one person, and the title is taken in the name of another, the party taking the title is presumed to hold it in trust for him who pays the purchase price. The reason given for this rule is that the party who pays the money is presumed to intend to become the owner of the property, and...