Frank v. Fleet Finance, Inc. of Georgia
Decision Date | 19 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. A97A0735,A97A0735 |
Citation | 489 S.E.2d 523,227 Ga.App. 543 |
Parties | , 97 FCDR 2456 FRANK et al. v. FLEET FINANCE, INC. OF GEORGIA. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parker & Day, James A. Parker, Vallerina F. Day, McDonough, for appellants.
McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, John G. Aldridge, Jr., Daniel D. Phelan, Atlanta, for appellee.
Fleet Finance, Inc. of Georgia ("Fleet Finance") filed a dispossessory action in magistrate court, alleging that John and Connie Frank are tenants at sufferance on property it owns in Henry County, Georgia ("the property"). The magistrate court issued a Writ of Possession to Fleet Finance, and the Franks appealed to the superior court. During the appeal, the Franks amended their answer to assert a counterclaim for specific performance of a residential real estate sales contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Fleet Finance and denied the Franks' motion. The Franks now appeal, and for reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). The record shows that in January 1988, the Franks purchased the property with financing from Griffin Federal Savings Bank. On October 26, 1990, the Franks obtained a second mortgage on the property from Mortgage Lenders, Inc., which transferred and assigned its promissory note and deed to secure debt on the property to Fleet Finance five days later. Griffin Federal Savings Bank subsequently foreclosed, and Fleet Finance purchased the property at the foreclosure sale held on January 5, 1993.
John Frank testified that after the foreclosure sale, Ron Hodges from Fleet Finance contacted him "to give [him] a way that [he] could keep [his] house." According to Mr. Frank, Hodges suggested that they
On May 7, 1993, the Franks entered into a purchase and sale contract with Fleet Finance. Pursuant to that contract, Fleet Finance agreed to sell the property to the Franks under the following terms: "The purchase price of [the property] shall be: One hundred ninety two thousand DOLLARS ($192,000.00) to be paid as follows: $10,000 down and Fleet to hold a 1st [mortgage] for remainder at 10.5% for 30 [years] with a balloon on the 120th payment." The contract further provided that The record shows that the sale did not close on May 31, 1993, as planned. According to Mr. Frank, he and Hodges agreed to extend the closing date and Hodges told him it was " 'not necessary to change the date on the contract.' "
Fleet Finance presented evidence that on or about June 6, 1993, it prepared and submitted a loan application for the Franks, which it rejected two days later. The Franks, however, deny that they filled out a loan application and contend that when they signed the purchase contract, Hodges stated that they did not need further approval for a loan with Fleet Finance. We note that the loan application appearing in the record is not signed by the Franks.
Mr. Frank testified that after the sale failed to close on May 31, 1993, he wrote numerous letters to Fleet Finance in an effort to obtain another closing date, but received no response. In October 1993, Mr. Frank delivered a cashier's check for $10,000 to the Fleet Finance offices. As described by Mr. Frank, he Fleet Finance placed the money in an escrow account.
In March 1994, Fleet Finance sent a $10,000 check drawn from its own account to the Franks via certified mail. The Franks never claimed the check from the post office, which returned the funds to Fleet Finance. While meeting with Mr. Frank in March 1995, a Fleet Finance representative again attempted to return the money. Mr. Frank took the $10,000 check from the representative and gave it to his attorney, who sent it to Fleet Finance's attorney.
According to the Franks, Fleet Finance ultimately informed them that it would not honor the sale contract and that they needed to obtain approved financing from another source to purchase the property. One individual who worked with the Franks at Fleet Finance testified that the contract was not valid for two reasons: "One, because the contract has expired as of May 31st, 1993, and number 2, because Mr. Frank was denied his loan with Fleet Finance."
Ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that The trial court further denied the Franks' claim for specific performance of the contract and granted Fleet Finance a Writ of Possession.
1. In their first two enumerations of error, the Franks argue that the trial court erred in granting Fleet Finance's motion for summary judgment. In particular, the Franks contend that the trial court improperly found that (1) the sales contract terminated on May 31, 1993; (2) the Franks failed to meet the conditions for closing under the contract; and (3) the Franks were tenants on the property.
(a) We agree that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fleet Finance on the contract termination issue. The trial court determined, and Fleet Finance argues, that the contract terminated as a matter of law on May 31, 1993, when the parties failed to close or extend the specified closing date in writing. We find, however, that a fact question remains as to whether the parties waived the closing deadline.
As noted above, the sale contract provided that This provision, including the "time is of the essence" clause, may be waived, and conduct before or after the closing date may show waiver. McCullough v. McCullough, 263 Ga. 794, 795(1), 439 S.E.2d 486 (1994); Edwards v. McTyre, 246 Ga. 302, 303(3), 271 S.E.2d 205 (1980). Bolton v. Barber, 233 Ga. 646, 648(2), 212 S.E.2d 766 (1975). Thus, "[w]hile the contract in the present case provided that no modification of [the closing deadline] could be made except by written agreement, ... this would not prevent a subsequent waiver of the time of performance by the conduct of the sellers." Id.
The evidence in the record raises a question of material fact regarding waiver. According to Mr. Frank, Hodges stated that they were not bound by the May 31, 1993 closing date and that it was "not necessary to change the date on the contract." The record further shows that Fleet Finance prepared, processed, and denied a loan application for the Franks in June 1993, raising an inference that Fleet Finance did not view the contract as void after May 31, 1993. In addition, Fleet Finance accepted and deposited Mr. Frank's $10,000 check in October 1993, well after the closing...
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