Frapanpina v. Garda CL Great Lakes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-CV-493 |
| Parties | JOSEPH FRAPANPINA III, on behalf of Himself and all other similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GARDA CL GREAT LAKES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joseph Frapanpina brings this collective action, claiming that his former employer, Defendant Garda CL Great Lakes, Inc., failed to pay him and other class members overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's individual claim. [51]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion.
Defendant operates a secured transportation company that provides armored vehicle transportation. [52] at ¶ 1. At its branch in Broadview, Illinois, Defendant's business includes transporting coin, currency, checks, negotiable instruments, and other valuables to and from its customers. Id. at ¶ 5.
Defendant constitutes a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) certified company and holds U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) FMCSA Number USDOT 163997. Id. at ¶ 9. This certification authorizes Defendant to operate in interstate commerce and requires it to comply with FMCSA's rules, regulations, and procedures. Id.
From 2016 through 2018, the Broadview branch operated a fleet of 65 to 70 vehicles. Id. at ¶ 13. Of those vehicles, 57 to 62 had a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,001 lbs. or more (large vehicle); the remaining 7 or 8 vehicles had a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less (small vehicle). Id. The branch also included at least 8 reserve vehicles to be used when the regular vehicles underwent repair or maintenance; these reserve vehicles were primarily large vehicles. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.
Defendant employed Plaintiff as a "driver/messenger" at its Broadview branch from about January 2016 through November 2018. Id. at ¶ 2. Drivers/messengers at the Broadview branch regularly transport coin and currency to and from Milwaukee and Indianapolis five days a week. Id. at ¶ 6. During Plaintiff's employment, Defendant could and did assign any vehicle—small or large—to any driver/messenger on any given day. Id. at ¶ 21. The record reflects that Plaintiff mostly drove small vehicles and drove large vehicles only around 10 times during his employment. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35.
In January 2019, Plaintiff filed this collective action under FLSA and IMWA, alleging that Defendant failed to pay him and other class members in accordance withthe statutes' overtime requirements. [1]. Thereafter, this Court granted the parties' request to bifurcate discovery, allowing the parties to first conduct discovery and brief summary judgment on Plaintiff's individual claims. [28]. After completing individual discovery, Defendant has moved for summary judgment. [51].
Summary judgment is proper where there is "no dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. King v. Hendricks Cty. Commissioners, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). The non-moving party bears the burden of identifying the evidence creating an issue of fact. LeDure v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 962 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2020). To satisfy that burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Barnes v. City of Centralia, Illinois, 943 F.3d 826, 832 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, a mere "scintilla of evidence" supporting the non-movant's position does not suffice; "there must be evidence onwhich the jury could reasonably find" for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that an exemption available to motor carriers like itself bars Plaintiff's overtime claims under the FLSA and the IMWL. [53]. This Court considers each claim in order below.
Subject to certain exemptions, the FLSA requires employers to provide overtime pay for employees who work more than forty hours in a given workweek. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), 213(a)-(b). Relevant here, FLSA exempts employees subject to the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA). Burlaka v. Contract Transp. Servs. LLC, 971 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)). The motor carrier exemption is rooted in safety concerns: "It is dangerous for drivers to spend too many hours behind the wheel, and 'a requirement of pay that is higher for overtime service than for regular service tends to . . . encourage employees to seek' overtime work." Id. (quoting Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 657 (1947)).
The Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction extends "over transportation by motor carrier and the procurement of that transportation, to the extent that passengers, property, or both[ ] are transported by motor carrier . . . between a place in . . . a State and a place in another State." 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A). Thus, anemployee comes within the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction if "the employee is 'subject, at any time, to be[ing] assigned to interstate trips.'" Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc., 651 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goldberg v. Faber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1961)).
Federal law, however, circumscribes the scope of the motor carrier exemption: In 2008, Congress passed the Technical Corrections Act, which amended the scope of the motor carrier exemption by designating a class of employees for which the exemption does not apply. Specifically, the TCA provides that "Section 7 of the [FLSA] . . . shall apply to a covered employee notwithstanding [the motor carrier exemption]." SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-244, § 306(a), 122 Stat. 1572, 1621 (2008). Under the TCA, a "covered employee" means an individual:
Id. § 306(a), (c). Thus, the FLSA overtime pay requirements remain applicable to drivers covered by the TCA exception, or in other words, those who operate small vehicles in interstate commerce. Id.; see also Washington v. Med-Spec. Transp., Inc.,No. 18 CV 3334, 2019 WL 2016259, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2019). With this statutory backdrop in place, this Court now moves to the facts of this case.
The parties do not dispute any material facts, including that Plaintiff worked in interstate commerce, that he served as a driver for a motor carrier, and that he drove both small and large vehicles. Their dispute, rather, centers on the single legal question of whether his work on both small and large vehicles—otherwise known as "mixed fleet" vehicles—qualifies him as a "covered employee" under the TCA exception, or alternatively, whether an employee must work exclusively on small vehicles to invoke the exception. See [53]; [57]. Plaintiff contends that the TCA's definition of "covered employee" includes someone, like him, who drove mixed-fleet vehicles. [57] at 2-6. Not surprisingly, Defendant urges an opposite interpretation of the TCA exception that encompasses employees who drove exclusively small vehicles. [53] at 14.
The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed how to categorize mixed fleet vehicles under the TCA. The two circuits that have squarely addressed the issue have adopted the position Plaintiff advocates; that is, because the plain text of the TCA provides that an employee need only work on small vehicles "in part" to qualify for the exception, drivers of mixed fleets clearly fall within the exception, and thus, are entitled to overtime pay under FLSA. Schilling v. Schmidt Baking Co., Inc., 876 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 2017) (); McMaster v. E. Armored Servs, Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2015) (). The majority of district courts have agreed with the Third and Fourth Circuits that the TCA's plain text contemplates employees who drive mixed fleet vehicles. See Noll v. Flowers Foods Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 345, 363 (D. Me. 2020); Butler v. TFS Oilfield Servs., LLC, No. SA-16-CV-01150-FB, 2019 WL 177304, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2019); Berry v. Best Transportation, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00473-JAR, 2018 WL 6830097, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2018); Leier v. Lincoln Limousine Brokerage Inc., No. 14CV3121PKCVVP, 2018 WL 276345, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2018); Garcia v. JIA Logistics, Inc., No. 16-22870-CIV, 2017 WL 2346149, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2017).
For its part, in arguing that the TCA exception covers only drivers who drive small vehicles...
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