Frasier v. Carter

Decision Date01 February 1968
Docket NumberNo. 10000,10000
Citation92 Idaho 79,437 P.2d 32
PartiesLena FRASIER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ella W. CARTER, Executrix of the Estate of D. L. Carter, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Earl E. Reed, Nampa, for appellant.

Weeks & Davis, Nampa, for appellee.

TAYLOR, Justice.

Plaintiff (respondent) brought this action against D. L. Carter, a practicing attorney, upon the following agreement, to wit:

'D. L. CARTER

Lawyer

Room A, Washington Hotel

Phone 10 P. O. Box 107

Weiser, Idaho

May 12, 1962'

'Mrs. Lena Frasier

'Dear Lena

'This is to advise and confirm our agreement-that in the event the J. W. Frasier estate case now on appeal is not terminated so that you will receive settlement equal to your share of the estate as you would have done if your waiver had been filed in the estate in proper time, that I will make up any balance to you in payments as suits my convenience and will pay interest on your loss at 6%.

Sincerely

/s/D. L. Carter'

D. L. Carter and plaintiff were brother and sister. Plaintiff is the surviving widow of John W. Frasier who died testate March 8, 1960. Surviving him, in addition to plaintiff, were three children. The estate consisted of both separate property of deceased and community property of plaintiff and deceased. By his will Frasier devised and bequeathed all of the separate and community property to plaintiff and the three children. The specific devises and bequests to the plaintiff were more valuable than her interest in the community property. However, the specific devises and bequests were conditioned upon a waiver by the plaintiff of her interest in the community property, and the will provided that if she failed to waive her community property rights then she would receive her interest in the community property and nothing more.

D. L. Carter, as her attorney, advised plaintiff in relation to her late husband's estate. Between August 5, 1960, and February 21, 1961, there was correspondence between Carter and the attorneys representing the co-executors of Mr. Frasier's will concerning plaintiff's rights under the will. In four of such communications the attorneys for the co-executors inquired whether plaintiff would waive her interest in the community property. June 2, 1961, the attorneys for the executors wrote to plaintiff herself, enclosing a waiver for her signature, and suggesting that she consult Mr. Carter in respect thereto. No such waiver was executed by plaintiff. Decree of distribution was rendered in the probate proceedings June 8, 1961 (amended November 24, 1961). Under the decree, distribution was to be made to plaintiff of her half share of the community property in lieu of the specific devises and bequests provided for the will.

Acting on behalf of plaintiff, defendant Carter prosecuted an appeal to the district court from the decree of distribution. Following affirmance by the district court, Mr. Carter prosecuted an appeal to this court. Here the judgment was affirmed on the ground that the appeal from the probate court was not timely taken. Frasier v. Frasier, 87 Idaho 510, 394 P.2d 294 (1964). While the appeal was pending the agreement above quoted was executed by Mr. Carter.

While this action was pending, D. L. Carter died and Ella W. Carter, executrix of his estate, was substituted as defendant.

The parties stipulated that the difference in value between the community interest of the plaintiff, which she received pursuant to the decree of distribution, and the specific devises and bequests which she otherwise would have received under the will, was prima facie $19,358.62. The stipulation provided that this amount might be varied by evidence produced at trial. No such evidence was presented by either party. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for that amount plus interest at 6% from May 12, 1962. Defendant prosecutes this appeal from the judgment entered upon the verdict.

The principal ground urged for reversal is that the promise of Mr. Carter, to pay to plaintiff any loss she sustained by reason of failure to waive her community interest in the Frasier estate, was without consideration. We think consideration was sufficiently established. The promise was in writing, which is presumptive evidence of consideration, 1 and the burden of showing want of consideration sufficient to support the written promise was upon defendant. 2 Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 379 P.2d 638 (1963). On this issue of consideration defendant contends there was no evidence that Carter was acting as plaintiff's attorney. While there was no evidence of a specific agreement for a fee, the evidence presumptively shows that he was acting as plaintiff's attorney in advising her relative to her interest in her deceased husband's estate. Even so, lack of proof of a specific agreement of employment of Carter as plaintiff's attorney and the compensation to be paid therefor, was not evidence of a character, or sufficient, to overcome the presumption of consideration arising from the written promise. The correspondence between Carter and the attorneys for the co-executors indicates that the latter recognized Carter as plaintiff's attorney.

Plaintiff contends that Carter's promise to pay was supported by her forbearance from prosecuting an action against him for his negligence in failing to advise her properly respecting her interest in the Frasier estate. Waiver of, or forbearance to exercise, a right which is not utterly groundless is sufficient consideration to support a contract made in reliance thereon. McMahon v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27, 357 P.2d 374 (1960).

'Mere forbearance without any request to forbear, or circumstances from which an agreement of forbear may be implied, is not a consideration which will support a promise.' 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 103b, p. 818.

However, an agreement to forbear may be implied, and actual forbearance is some evidence of an agreement to forbear. Anglo California National Bank of San Francisco v. Far West Lunber Company, 152 Cal.App.2d 284, 313 P.2d 10 (1957); Greenfield v. Sudden Lumber Company, 18 Cal.App.2d 709, 64 P.2d 1007 (1937); Tiffany & Co., v. Spreckles, 202 Cal 778, 262 P. 742 (1927); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 103b, p. 819; cf. Sims v. Purcell, 74 Idaho 109, 257 P.2d 242 (1953). In passing we note that in a letter to counsel for the co-executors, written after decree of distribution was entered, Carter, in referring to the failure to file a waiver, said: '* * * if anyone is to blame, it is I * * *.' This indicates that he was acting in plaintiff's behalf.

Defendant urges that the judgment appealed from is defective in that it did not direct the executrix to pay the amount of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1992
    ...See Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 668 P.2d 73 (1983); DeAtley Corp. v. Otto, 95 Idaho 586, 513 P.2d 638 (1973); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968); Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967). Thus, our analysis on appeal is necessarily limited to a determi......
  • Masters v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1983
    ...Heckman Ranches, Inc., v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979); Ford v. Lord, 99 Idaho 580, 586 P.2d 270 (1978); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968). Although, as found by the trial court, "this entire case was tried by the parties and presented to the jury on the issue o......
  • Smith v. Idaho State University Federal Credit Union
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 19, 1988
    ...P.2d 1306 (1976); Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 539 P.2d 578 (1975); Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P.2d 463 (1973); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968). The trial court never ruled on the unconscionability issue because it wasn't raised in the trial court. The majority errs......
  • Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By and Through Dept. of Public Lands
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • January 4, 1979
    ...Willows v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 337, 461 P.2d 120 (1969); Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439, 444 P.2d 132 (1968); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 437 P.2d 32 (1968). This issue was not argued below and is therefore not before this court on Finally, appellants assign error to that porti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT