Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. France
Decision Date | 06 February 1894 |
Citation | 57 N.W. 959,90 Iowa 395 |
Parties | FRED MILLER BREWING COMPANY v. CHAS. DE FRANCE, Appellant |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. W. F. CONRAD, Judge.
THIS action is to recover the contract price of beer alleged to have been sold by the plaintiff, as a corporation, under the laws of Wisconsin, to the defendant, and delivered at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for shipment to Des Moines, Iowa for sale in original packages. There was a denial, and a counterclaim for money paid to plaintiff for beer sold to defendant in violation of the laws of Iowa. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Cole McVey & Cheshire for appellant.
Read & Read for appellee.
E. G Miller's testimony is by deposition, and to an interrogatory he answered as follows: There was an objection to the italicized portion of the answer, to the overruling of which the appellant complains. The complaint is that the answer states an "unwarranted conclusion," and not the facts within the knowledge of the witness. The statement as to the understanding is immediately followed by a statement of what was said by both parties, from which the understanding was deduced. The conversation admits of no other understanding than that expressed. Had the latter part of the answer alone been given, the effect, with the jury, must have been the same. Under such circumstances, there could have been no prejudice. It is a statement of a conclusion from facts that are in evidence. The question is somewhat like that in Hoadley v. Hammond, 63 Iowa 599, 19 N.W. 794.
The following is part of an answer to an interrogatory by the witness: "Exhibit D" was given defendant by plaintiff, and has no relation to contract dated May 10, other than to secure to defendant the exclusive right to handle our beer at Des Moines. It was simply an undertaking on the part of plaintiff not to sell beer to any other person at Des Moines who would sell in competition to defendant." The court overruled an objection to the answer as stating a conclusion as to the intentions of the persons. The offer of the testimony by the plaintiff was on rebuttal. The defendant had before put the same in evidence, and the mere fact that it was placed there a second time would not constitute error.
III. The same witness testified that the plaintiff, in selling the beer, did not intend to furnish it to be sold in violation of the laws of Iowa. He said: The court refused to exclude this evidence, with other of like import, indicating the intent of the officers of the corporation, of which action complaint is made. It is conceded that the agents who acted in making the sales could testify as to their own intent, but the complaint is that they could not testify as to the intent of others. It is undoubtedly true that one person can not understand the mental process and conclusions of another, so as to know with what intent or purpose he acts, and likely, under many circumstances, as a witness, he would not be permitted to state as a fact, or as an opinion, such a conclusion. It is, however, true that persons who act for corporations may have such knowledge of its intentions and purposes as to be able to testify in regard to them in matters wherein such corporate intent becomes a subject of legal inquiry. Corporations can only act through agents, and it is not doubted but that intentions are as much an element in fixing their legal rights and liabilities as in cases of natural persons. If, then, in a matter wherein its intentions are important, it delegates to an agent power to act, defining to the agent its purpose, can it be said that such agent has not such knowledge of the intent of the corporation as to be competent to give evidence of it? It is difficult to imagine a case in which the intent of the agent, if responsive to his instructions and authority, would not be that of the corporation. In a very significant sense it may be said, where the agent observes his authority, that he is the embodiment of the purposes and intentions of the corporation. When the witness stated positively that the plaintiff had no intent that, in the sale of beer, the laws of Iowa were to be violated, he could properly have been understood as stating no more than the intent of the corporation as expressed or manifested by the proper authority in the course of the transaction. Of course, such a statement by the witness is not conclusive. The further examination may develop his means of knowledge, and the ultimate fact become one for the jury. We think there was no error in the action of the court.
IV. In the deposition of Miller there was evidence to show that the sales of beer were legal in the state of...
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