Frederick v. Sprint/United

• Decision Date: 04 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-13958,99-13958
• Citation: 246 F.3d 1305
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) Bridgette FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY & Sprint Communications Company, L.P., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1305

246 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001)

Bridgette FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY & Sprint Communications Company, L.P., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-13958.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 4, 2001.

April 18, 2001.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (No. 96-02170-CV-JEC-1), Julie E. Carnes, Judge.

Before CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK^*, District Judge.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Bridgette Frederick appeals from a summary judgment order entered in favor of her employer, Sprint/United Management Company and the Sprint Communications Company (collectively "Sprint"), on her Title VII sexual harassment claim.

I. BACKGROUND

On review of a summary judgment order, the court must consider all of the parties' evidence, and view it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party's claims. Therefore, the following account is drawn from the parties' deposition testimony and supporting materials, viewed in the light most favorable to Frederick's allegations. Frederick began work at Sprint as a permanent employee in August 1988. In 1992, she was transferred to the Call Before You Dig Department ("CBYD") and was assigned to supervisor Ralph Moore. Frederick testified that while working at CBYD, Moore subjected her to a range of discomforting behaviors. Specifically, Moore would stare at her for prolonged periods, look her up and down, and blow kisses at her. He also visited Frederick's work station several times a day, conversing with her up to 15 to 20 minutes at a time. While at her work station, he would lean over her at her computer and rub his face and hair against her jaw; on one occasion he kissed her on the cheek. Additionally, Moore touched Frederick's breasts while standing over her, ostensibly assisting her in typing on her computer. Frederick testified that Moore's sexual harassment continued throughout her pregnancy. Specifically, Moore made comments about how her pregnancy had likely decreased her sexual desirability in her husband's eyes, and he stated that "they should do this" but her "organs were going to take a long time to get back in place."

Soon after Frederick began working at CBYD, she filled out several transfer request forms. Moore was required to sign these forms and forward them to Sprint's Human Resources Department ("Human Resources") for processing. Human Resources, however, never acted on Frederick's transfer requests. Frederick also testified that she never followed up with Moore about what action was being taken regarding her requests for a transfer. Also, after six months at CBYD, Frederick petitioned Moore for a promotion, seeking to move from her current "Coordinator I" position to a "Coordinator II" position. Frederick attested that she was qualified for the promotion and that it should have been granted automatically; however, Moore denied her request, telling her that she "needed to do more things." When Frederick asked Moore what additional tasks she needed to perform, Moore told her that she already knew and he asked her to leave his office. Taken in combination with what she perceived to be Moore's overtly sexual behavior, Frederick perceived Moore's comment to be a demand for sex in return for the promotion.

Sprint offered evidence to show that it had an established sexual harassment policy with reasonable complaint procedures. First, Sprint offered a publication called "The Employee Resource: A Guide to Human Resource Policy," which it contends was distributed after December 1990 to all employees, and was posted throughout Sprint's offices ("1990 Policy"). The 1990 Policy defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical contact that is sexually offensive." The 1990 Policy also indicates that employees are to "report sexual harassment ... to their supervisors and/or Human Resources immediately."

Next, Sprint presented "Sprint's Code of Ethics," (the "Code"), a twenty-page booklet which describes a broad range of employee misconduct. Two lines in the Code refer to sexual harassment complaints. Specifically, the Code states, "[i]t is our policy, in accordance with the law, to maintain an environment free from discrimination on the basis of sex, race ... or disability. Sexual harassment is both illegal and unethical and it should be reported immediately." The Code further provides that "any questions" about incidents arising under the Code should be reported to one's "supervisor, who in turn will work with Human Resources, the Law Department, or the Chief Ethics Office, to get an answer." The Code last indicates that an employee can anonymously call the Sprint Ethics Code Hotline with her questions.

Sprint also presented a booklet that was copyrighted in 1994, entitled "Sexual Harassment," which provides a more detailed account of the company's sexual harassment policies ("1994 Policy"). The 1994 Policy describes a range of behaviors that can be categorized as sexual harassment, and advises an employee who has been sexually harassed to "report the incident to [her] supervisor, the next level of management, [her] local Employee Relations or Human Resources representative, or to another member of management with whom [she is] comfortable." Vince Goodwine, the Sprint employee responsible for handling employees' complaints in Frederick's division, testified that it was his impression that the 1994 Policy simply was "a recommunication" of the existing 1990 sexual harassment policy, and that Sprint had long required that a low level manager who received a sexual harassment complaint should report that complaint to persons in higher levels of management.

Frederick testified that she retained all of the Human Resources materials she received when she began working at Sprint, and she did not recall having received the 1990 Policy. She also testified that the 1990 Policy was not posted on her floor during the period she allegedly was subject to harassment. Frederick further stated that she had received the Code and recognized that it applied to her sexual harassment claim, but that she did not understand how to file a complaint under the Code. Frederick last indicated that she did not receive the 1994 Policy until she went to Human Resources in 1994 to request a copy.

Frederick also testified about her attempts to report Moore's behavior. Specifically, Frederick indicated that she never complained to Moore, the various departments listed in the Code, or called Sprint's Ethics Code Hotline. However in 1993, Frederick and a temporary employee met with Denise Pough, a supervisor in Sprint's customer service department, to discuss Moore's sexually harassing behavior. Pough took no action on Frederick's complaint; however, Frederick recalls that Pough may have told her to report her complaint to Human Resources. Subsequently, Frederick and the temporary worker met for lunch with Andre Weathersby, a supervisor in Sprint's Service Management Center, and complained about Moore's sexually harassing behavior. Frederick testified that Weathersby advised her, and the complaining temporary worker, not to lodge complaints about Moore with Human Resources or with other managers, and that they should not retain counsel to pursue their complaints. Weathersby contends that this conversation never occurred.

Some time later, in 1994, Goodwine learned from Sprint employee Brava Henson that Moore was allegedly harassing a female subordinate. In August 1994, Goodwine conducted an investigation of Moore, and he approached Frederick and many other Sprint employees for interviews. During Frederick's interview, on August 15, 1994, she informed Goodwine about Moore's harassing behavior. When Goodwine concluded his investigation two weeks later, on August 29, 1994, Sprint terminated Moore for inappropriate conduct. Nine months later, Frederick received her promotion to Coordinator II.

Frederick filed suit in July 1996, raising both "hostile environment" and "quid pro quo"claims; she alleged that Sprint was liable for Moore's harassment because Pough and Weathersby failed to timely act once she told them about the harassment. The district court granted Sprint summary judgment on Frederick's claim in 1997, but a panel of this Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). On reconsideration, the district court again granted summary judgment to Sprint, on both of Frederick's claims. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo, and view all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all inferences in her favor. See Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The Court, however, will not make credibility determinations, nor weigh the parties' evidence. See Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court indicated that courts should no longer use the labels "quid pro quo " and "hostile environment" to analyze whether an employer should be held liable on an employee's Title VII claim concerning a supervisor's sex-based harassment. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (applying new standard).¹ Instead, when analyzing whether an employer should be held liable for...