Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood

Decision Date21 December 1971
Citation99 Cal.Rptr. 13,491 P.2d 805,6 Cal.3d 353
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 491 P.2d 805 Anne FREDRICHSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 29924. In Bank

Milton B. Miller, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Clausen, Gilliland & Fernandes, Victor M. Cox and Edward G. Koelsche, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

This is an appeal by plaintiff, Anne Fredrichsen, from a judgment in favor of the City of Lakewood, after the city's demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend on grounds that she had not alleged compliance with the claim requirements of section 900 et seq. of the Government Code. We have concluded that the facts alleged in the first amended complaint, if true, would estop the city from asserting the claim statute as a defense.

The allegations of the first amended complaint may be summarized as follows: On May 10, 1969, plaintiff fell while walking on a defectively maintained sidewalk in the City of Lakewood, California, and suffered personal injuries. Prior to May 15, 1969, plaintiff telephoned the city and requested that it supply her with the necessary claim form so that she could properly assert her claim for damages against it. The city never sent plaintiff a claim form, but instead sent her a copy of a May 15, 1969, letter, directed to Purex Corporation, Ltd., signed by the city clerk, which stated that the city had been informed by its public works director that the responsibility for maintenance of the defective sidewalk rested with the Lakewood Center Corporation. 1 Relying on this representation, plaintiff did not pursue her claim against the city but instead immediately began negotiations with Purex Corporation. 2

On April 15, 1970, plaintiff's claim was denied by Purex Corporation, and on April 22, 1970, she retained the services of her present attorney to pursue her cause of action. Again in reliance on the May 15, 1969, letter, a lawsuit was filed against Purex Corporation, Ltd., and Lakewood Center Corporation. Thereafter, on May 21, 1970, plaintiff's attorney while soliciting information from the public works department was informed that the defective sidewalk was in fact maintained by the city. Immediately after this discovery, the complaint was amended to include the City of Lakewood as a defendant.

Section 911.2 of the Government Code provides that a claim relating to a cause of action for personal injuries against a city must be presented to the clerk, secretary or auditor no later than the 100th day after the accrual of the cause of action. 3 It is not disputed that in the instant case no such claim was made.

It is settled that the failure to file the required claim, in the proper circumstances, may be excused and the governmental agency estopped from urging strict compliance with the statutory provisions. In Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624, 630--631, 145 P.2d 570, this court reversed a prior line of cases which had held that regardless of the governmental agency's actions, compliance with the appropriate claim statute was mandatory to a claimant's cause of action. Basing its decision on prior cases which had allowed claimants to estop governmental agencies from asserting the statute of limitations, the court reasoned that, since the time element with respect to the filing of the claim form is essentially procedural in nature and analogous to a statute of limitations, a claimant's failure to comply could, in the proper circumstances, be excused by estoppel.

The rule of the Farrell case has been subsequently applied to allow estoppel in factual situations where claimants have been misled by governmental agents with respect to the procedural and time requirements of the claim statute (Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d 558, 564, 225 P.2d 988; Mendibles v. City of San Diego, 100 Cal.App.2d 502, 503, 224 P.2d 42) as well as where claimants have been misled with respect to the advisability of retaining counsel (Rand v. Andreatta, 60 Cal.2d 846, 850, 389 P.2d 382).

The city argues that this line of cases can be distinguished in that they all involved representations by claims agents and not by mere clerks. However, in the instant case, plaintiff's reliance on the advice of the proper ministerial agent was even more justified than claimant's reliance in the prior cases on the advice of claims agents who, as negotiators for the city, were known to be acting in an adverse capacity. Since it is in the city's interest to have claims filed in order that it can evaluate their merit, and the city does not have any legitimate interest in discouraging the filing of the claim form, plaintiff was justified in relying on the city clerk's implicit procedural direction to file her claim with someone else.

In Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.2d 297, 61 Cal.Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245, this court established the relevant factors to be considered when estoppel is asserted against a public agency. Although Driscoll involved estoppel to assert the statute of limitations, the criteria to justify estoppel established in Driscoll apply equally to situations involving statutes of limitations and to situations involving claim statutes. As pointed out in Farrell v. County of Placer, Supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 630, 145 P.2d at p. 570, the policy considerations with respect to estoppel to assert the statute of limitations are the same as those relating to estoppel to assert the claim statute.

Driscoll held that whether an agency, which had been put on notice of a pending claim, should be estopped because of advice given to the claimant 'concerning His substantive rights against the agency, depends upon whether the public agency acted in an unconscionable manner or otherwise set out to, or did take unfair advantage of plaintiff.' (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, Supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 306, 161 Cal.Rptr. at p. 667, 431 P.2d at p. 251.) (Italics added.) Whether the agency acted in an unconscionable manner depends on an examination of the totality of the circumstances.

Among the factors which we indicated in Driscoll should be considered in determining whether or not the government's action was sufficiently culpable to warrant estoppel are whether or not the inaccurate advice or information is negligently ascertained, whether or to what extent the agency is certain of the information it dispenses, whether the agency purports to advise and direct or merely to inform and respond to inquiries, whether the agency acts in bad faith, whether the claimant is one who purports to have no knowledge or training which would aid him in determining his rights and the public agency purports to be informed and knowledgeable, whether the right of which claimant is being deprived is significant, and whether a confidential relationship exists between the claimant and the public entity.

In the instant case, it appears that the inaccurate information as to who bore responsibility for the sidewalk maintenance was negligently ascertained in that there is no indication that the question involved any difficult factual or legal considerations to which to attribute the error. Information as to who bore responsibility for the sidewalk maintenance was uniquely and readily available to the city through its public works department. The May 15, 1969, letter establishes the fact that the city claims to have ascertained such information. The information is of such a nature that it is extremely doubtful that it could be inaccurately obtained absent negligence. 4

Although plaintiff by her request for a claim form merely solicited information, the city, by its failure to furnish the form and its implicit advice as to the proper alternative defendant, purported to give plaintiff procedural directions and substantive advice. The fact that the May 15,...

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  • John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • March 30, 1989
    ...have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. (See, e.g., Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood (1971) 6 Cal.3d 353, 357-359, 99 Cal.Rptr. 13, 491 P.2d 805; Rand v. Andreatta (1964) 60 Cal.2d 846, 850, 36 Cal.Rptr. 846, 389 P.2d 382; Bruce v. Jefferson Union Hig......
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    ...threats prevented sexual abuse victim student from pursuing claim within statutory period]; Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood (1971) 6 Cal.3d 353, 355–356, 99 Cal.Rptr. 13, 491 P.2d 805 [defendant city misrepresented that private corporation, not city, was responsible for maintaining sidewalk......
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