Freeborn County by Tuveson v. Bryson
| Decision Date | 31 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 43569,43574 and 43582,s. 43569 |
| Citation | 210 N.W.2d 290,297 Minn. 218 |
| Parties | , 4 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,215 COUNTY OF FREEBORN, by Robert C. TUVESON, its County Attorney, Respondent, v. William H. BRYSON, et al., Appellants, and State of Minnesota, by William H. Bryson, et al., Appellants, State of Minnesota, by Warren Spannaus, its Attorney General, intervenor, Appellant. STATE of Minnesota, by the Sierra Club, intervenor, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF FREEBORN, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under the Environmental Rights Act, Minn.St. c. 116B, any person, including the owner of a family-owned farm, may maintain an action for declaratory or equitable relief for the protection of the air, water, land, or other natural resource.
2. The Environmental Rights Act, Minn.St. c. 116B, which was enacted to ensure that effects on the environment be considered by persons conducting any type of activities within the state, limits the power of a county to condemn land for a public highway.
3. Where the evidence presented by plaintiffs shows that the proposed county highway would divide a natural marsh; that the marsh is an ecological unit; that the construction of the highway would eliminate some of the area's natural physical assets; and that the highway would increase animal fatilities and disturb the quietness and solitude of the marsh, plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that the highway would materially adversely affect the environment.
4. Under the Environmental Rights Act, the county may rebut the prima facie case made by plaintiffs by showing that there is no prudent or feasible alternative to the highway as planned or that the conduct of the county is in the best interest of the public.
Christian, Slen, Savelkoul, Johnson & Broberg and Rolf O. Slen, Albert Lea, for Bryson.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Curtis D. Forslund, Sol. Gen., Jonathan H. Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Geoffrey P. Jarpe, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., Minneapolis, for State by Spannaus.
Lawrence D. Downing, Rochester, Michael J. Mollerus, Minneapolis, Will Hartfeldt, St. Paul, for State by Sierra Club.
Robert C. Tuveson, County Atty., Bob A. Goldman, Asst. County Atty., Albert Lea, for respondent.
Ralph T. Keyes and Mentor C. Addicks, Jr., St. Paul, for Assoc. of Minnesota Counties, amicus curiae.
Heard and considered en banc.
This action was brought in response to condemnation proceedings initiated by the County of Freeborn for the purpose of acquiring certain lands for the construction of a county highway. William H. Bryson and Arlene Bryson, owners of lands sought to be condemned, filed an answer in the condemnation proceedings and brought this action pursuant to Minn.St. c. 116B (Minnesota Environmental Rights Act) alleging that the proposed condemnation would materially and adversely affect portions of a natural wildlife marsh. Permission was granted to the attorney general and the Sierra Club to intervene on behalf of the landowners. The condemnation action and the action pursuant to the Environmental Rights Act were consolidated for trial. The landowners and both intervenors appeal from an order dismissing the action for injunction for failure to establish a prima facie case under the statute. We reverse and remand.
The main issue on this appeal is whether the county's power to condemn land for a public use is limited by the Environmental Rights Act enacted by the 1971 Legislature.
The Brysons are the owners and operators of a 120-acre farm located in Freeborn County. The farm consists of three contiguous 40-acre squares forming the configuration of an inverted 'L.' Winding through the property is an area of marshland which is part of a larger slough area beginning south of the farm and continuing several miles north to Freeborn Lake.
Of the 120 acres, all but 19 acres have been improved for agricultural purposes. Of these remaining 19 acres, which are designated by the landowners as a 'wildlife area,' approximately 7 1/2 acres consist of natural marsh or wetlands including three open water ponds. This marsh area contains abundant and varied plant and animal life. The area has been developed as a wildlife habitat through fir tree plantings, excavation of the open water ponds and maintenance of a 1-acre unharvested food plot for the wildlife.
Expert witnesses testified that marshes or wetlands provide a unique natural ecosystem or environment because they are capable of supporting a greater diversity of life than other habitats such as woodlands, tundra, desert, or grasslands. This particular marshland was regarded by the experts as an integrated unit with the larger slough complex. Because of its natural attributes, it was considered a desirable waterfowl habitat and production area.
The county proposed to condemn a strip of the Bryson farm for the purpose of relocating a county highway. The reconstruction was to primarily utilize existing county and township roads. To avoid curves in the highway, it was necessary to acquire the strip across the landowners' farm. The proposed highway would cross approximately 600 feet of the marsh area eliminating approximately .7 acre of marsh on the Bryson property, including one of the open water ponds and surrounding vegetation.
Various alternative routes were considered by the county and were rejected principally because they were less safe in design, more costly in construction, and of less utility in accomplishing the objective of the highway relocation. Several additional alternative routes were proposed by the landowners and intervenors at trial, all of which incorporated curves.
The expert witnesses all stated their opinion that the construction of the proposed highway would have a significant detrimental effect on the marsh area's value as a wildlife area because it would eliminate some of the area's natural assets, destroy the quietness and solitude of the marsh, increase animal and bird fatalities, and have other adverse effects.
In the court below, the county first presented evidence in support of its petition for condemnation of the subject land for highway purposes. Following this, the trial court denied the Brysons' motion for a dismissal. The Brysons and intervenors State of Minnesota and Sierra Club then presented their evidence for injunctive relief to restrain the county from acquiring the Bryson land and from constructing a highway on it, claiming such conduct was prohibited by the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act. The county then moved for dismissal of the action for injunctive relief, contending that the Brysons and intervenors had failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain their burden of proof under the act by establishing a prima facie case. This motion was granted. While the trial court certified to this court two issues as important and doubtful, the order dismissing the complaint for injunctive relief was in and of itself appealable under Rule 103.03(b), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Thus, the scope of our review is broader than these narrow questions certified by the trial court:
'A. Is the general power of a county under Minnesota Statutes 163.02 and 117.01 to exercise the power of eminent domain for a public use; to wit, a highway, limited by the provisions of Chapter 952, Laws of 1971, (The Environmental Rights Act) where such highway would affect a family-owned farm, a portion of which includes wetlands used as a private game refuge and no part of such lands are dedicated to the public?
While the scope of our review is not limited to these questions, nonetheless, our review is circumscribed to a great extent by the fact that the appeals here are from the order dismissing the complaint for injunctive relief and that order was granted prior to the county's asserting any affirmative defenses it may have under the statute (§ 116B.04), such as that there is no feasible and prudent alternative that the county's conduct would be consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction, and economic considerations. However, economic considerations alone would not constitute a defense. Minn.St. 116B.04.
While the trial court found that the landowners and intervenors had not sustained their burden of proof and had not made a prima facie case under the act, it did not directly pass upon the affirmative defenses that the county might have as the trial had not reached the point when the county would normally adduce evidence in this regard. While the county did introduce evidence in support of its condemnation petition which was relevant to a defense under the Environmental Rights Act, it did not offer it as such. The trial court commented on this in the memorandum made a part of its order as follows:
'It might have been a simple matter for the County of Freeborn to have suggested when the Landowner and Intervenors rested that the evidence submitted with respect to the Petition for Condemnation and the various routes considered for the laying out of the road that such evidence might apply with like force to that portion of the case where Landowners and Intervenors presented their evidence under the Act, but notwithstanding the absence of such a statement by the County of Freeborn, there is evidence in the case which deals with various routes and all facts which legitimately bear on the case ought to be considered.'
Thus, the court below considered this evidence in connection with the issue of the prima facie case for injunctive relief but made no finding on an affirmative defense.
This appeal raises questions of first impression to this court. The issues are: (1) Whether...
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