Freedom Found. v. Bethel Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 53415-1-II,Consolidated No. 53430-4-II,53415-1-II
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: FREEDOM FOUNDATION, a Washington nonprofit organization, in the name of the State of Washington, Appellant, v. BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT; Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Respondents. Freedom Foundation, a Washington nonprofit organization, in the name of the State of Washington, Appellant, v. Bethel School District; Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Respondents.

14 Wash.App.2d 75

469 P.3d 364

FREEDOM FOUNDATION, a Washington nonprofit organization, in the name of the State of Washington, Appellant,

v.BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT; Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Respondents.

Freedom Foundation, a Washington nonprofit organization, in the name of the State of Washington, Appellant,

v.Bethel School District; Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Respondents.

No. 53415-1-II

Consolidated No. 53430-4-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Filed August 4, 2020

Robert Alan Bouvatte Jr., Attorney at Law, Po Box 552, Olympia, WA, Eric Rolf Stahlfeld, Attorney at Law, 145 Sw 155th St. Ste. 101, Burien, WA, for Appellant.

Chad Corwyn Standifer, John S. Meader, Office of the Attorney General, 1125 Washington St. Se, Po Box 40100, Olympia, WA, William A. Coats, Daniel C. Montopoli, Attorney at Law, 1201 Pacific Ave. Ste. 1900, Tacoma, WA, for Respondents.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Worswick, J. ¶1 This consolidated appeal arises from two superior court actions brought by Freedom Foundation regarding Bethel School District's processing of payroll deductions. First, Freedom Foundation filed a citizen's action against the District, alleging a violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), RCW 42.17A.775. The superior court granted the District's motion for summary judgment dismissal. Second, Freedom Foundation filed a petition for judicial review of the Public Disclosure Commission's (PDC's) decision to dismiss Freedom Foundation's complaint to the PDC regarding the District's conduct. Both the PDC and the District moved to dismiss, albeit under different rules. The superior court granted the PDC's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the District's motion for summary judgment dismissal.

¶2 On appeal, Freedom Foundation argues that the superior court erred in dismissing its actions because the District violated the FCPA, discovery remained outstanding in the citizen's action, and the District failed to meet its burden at summary judgment regarding the citizen's action. The District and the PDC argue that Freedom Foundation lacks the authority to bring a citizen's action and lacks standing to seek judicial review of the PDC's dismissal.

¶3 We agree with the District and the PDC. We hold that Freedom Foundation does not have authority to bring a citizen's action and that it lacked standing to seek judicial review of the PDC's dismissal. As a result, we do not consider Freedom Foundation's remaining arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶4 RCW 42.17A.495(3) allows employees to make written requests for payroll deductions to political committees. RCW 28A.405.400 requires school districts to make these payroll deductions if at least 10 percent of the school district's employees make a written request specifying the same payee. Approximately 24 percent of the District's employees designated the Washington Education Association's Political Action Committee (WEA-PAC) as a payroll deduction payee, and 17 percent designated the National Education Association Fund for Children and Public Educations (NEA-FCPE). As a result, the District processes these payroll deductions monthly and has done so for several years.

¶5 In June 2018, Freedom Foundation filed a complaint with the PDC regarding the District's payroll deductions. Freedom Foundation alleged that the District improperly used public facilities in violation of RCW 42.17A.555 to process employee payroll contributions to WEA-PAC and NEA-FCPE.

¶6 In September, the PDC found that evidence did not support a violation of RCW 42.17A.555 by the District. As a result, the PDC "closed the matter" and did not conduct a formal investigation into Freedom Foundation's complaint. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 24. Following the PDC's closing of the matter, Freedom Foundation filed two separate actions in Thurston County Superior Court.

¶7 First, Freedom Foundation filed a citizen's action complaint against the District. The District moved for summary judgment dismissal. The superior court granted the District's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the citizen's action complaint.

¶8 Second, Freedom Foundation filed an action seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act¹ (APA) of the PDC's dismissal of Freedom Foundation's initial complaint. The superior court granted the PDC's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the District's motion for summary judgment dismissal of the action seeking judicial review under the APA.

¶9 Freedom Foundation appeals three orders from the two actions: (1) the order granting the District's motion for summary judgment dismissal regarding the citizen's action, (2) the order granting the PDC's motion to dismiss regarding judicial review under the APA, and (3) the order granting the District's motion for summary judgment dismissal regarding judicial review under the APA. We consolidated these appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. CITIZEN'S ACTION COMPLAINT

¶10 The District and the PDC argue that Freedom Foundation lacks the statutory authority to bring a citizen's action following the PDC's timely dismissal of its complaint. We agree.

A. Legal Principles

¶11 We review motions for summary judgment de novo. Voters Educ. Comm. v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n , 161 Wash.2d 470, 481, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). We view all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Utter v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n , 182 Wash.2d 398, 406, 341 P.3d 953 (2015).

¶12 We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Evergreen Freedom Found. , 192 Wash.2d 782, 789, 432 P.3d 805 (2019) (plurality opinion). When engaging in statutory interpretation, we endeavor to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Jametsky v. Olsen , 179 Wash.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). In determining the legislature's intent, we must first examine the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning. Jametsky , 179 Wash.2d at 762, 317 P.3d 1003. Legislative definitions included in the statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, we give the term its plain and ordinary meaning as defined in the dictionary.

State v. Econ. Development Bd. , 9 Wash. App. 2d 1, 10, 441 P.3d 1269 (2019). In addition, we consider the specific text of the relevant provision, the context of the entire statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole when analyzing a statute's plain language. Lowy v. PeaceHealth , 174 Wash.2d 769, 779, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012).

¶13 We liberally construe the FCPA

to promote complete disclosure of all information respecting the financing of political campaigns and lobbying, and the financial affairs of elected officials and candidates, and full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence of fairness of elections and governmental processes, and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.

RCW 42.17A.001(11).

B. RCW 42.17A.755 and RCW 42.17A.775

¶14 A person who believes the FCPA has been violated may bring an action in the name of the State against the alleged violator in certain circumstances. RCW 42.17A.775(1). This type of action, termed a citizen's action, has always been subject to prerequisites. RCW 42.17A.775 ; former RCW 42.17A.765 (2010); Utter , 182 Wash.2d at 407, 341 P.3d 953. And recently, the legislature amended the citizen's action process. See former RCW 42.17A.765 ; RCW 42.17A.775.

¶15 Before June 7, 2018, a person could file a citizen's action after giving notice to the attorney general if the attorney general failed to commence an action regarding the alleged FCPA violation within 45 days. Former RCW 42.17A.765(4) ; Utter , 182 Wash.2d at 407, 341 P.3d 953. Under the former statute, a citizen's action was precluded only if the attorney general or local prosecutor brought a suit. Utter , 182 Wash.2d at 412, 341 P.3d 953. The former statute did not preclude a citizen's action where the Attorney General declined to bring an action. Utter , 182 Wash.2d at 407, 341 P.3d 953 ; former RCW 42.17A.765(4).

¶16 In 2018, the legislature amended the citizen's action provisions. LAWS OF 2018, Reg. Sess., ch. 304, § 14.² The legislature removed the citizen's action provisions from former RCW 42.17A.765 and created RCW 42.17A.775, which set forth new requirements for a citizen's action. RCW 42.17A.775 states in relevant part:

(2) A citizen's action may be brought and prosecuted only if the person first has filed a complaint with the commission and:

(a) The commission has not taken action authorized under RCW 42.17A.755(1) within ninety days of the complaint being filed with the commission , and the person who initially filed the complaint with the commission provided written notice to the attorney general in accordance with RCW 42.17A.755(5) and the attorney general has not commenced an action, or published a decision whether to commence action pursuant to RCW 42.17A.765(1)(b), within forty-five days of receiving the notice;

(b) For matters referred to the attorney general within ninety days of the commission receiving the complaint, the attorney general has not commenced an action, or published a decision whether to commence an action pursuant to RCW 42.17A.765(1)(b), within forty-five days of receiving referral from the commission;

....

(3) To initiate the citizen's action, after meeting the requirements under subsection (2) (a) and (b) of this section, a person must notify the attorney general and the commission that the person will commence a citizen's action within ten days if the commission does not take action authorized under RCW 42.17A.755(1), or the attorney general does not commence an action or publish a decision whether to commence an action pursuant to RCW 42.17A.765(1)(b). The attorney general and the commission must notify the other of its decision whether to commence an action.

RCW...