Freeman v. Finney, s. 8223SC1029

• Decision Date: 20 December 1983
• Docket Number: 8321SC336,Nos. 8223SC1029,s. 8223SC1029
• Citation: 65 N.C.App. 526,309 S.E.2d 531
• Parties: Joseph W. FREEMAN, Jr., Guardian Ad Litem, for Dawn France, minor, Angela Moxley, William France, Linda France, and Nadine M. Bare v. Aaron Paul FINNEY, Betty Smith Finney, Laune Stephan Eary, Jodi Lynn Landreth, John Doe, and (Talmadge L. Woodel) William R. ZWIGARD, Administrator of the Estate of Todd Douglas Zwigard, Deceased v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, d/b/a Reelo, James Hyde Wilson, Jr. and James Hyde Wilson, Sr.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 531

309 S.E.2d 531

65 N.C.App. 526

Joseph W. FREEMAN, Jr., Guardian Ad Litem, for Dawn France,

minor, Angela Moxley, William France, Linda

France, and Nadine M. Bare v. Aaron Paul FINNEY, Betty Smith Finney, Laune Stephan Eary, Jodi Lynn Landreth, John Doe, and (Talmadge L. Woodel)

William R. ZWIGARD, Administrator of the Estate of Todd

Douglas Zwigard, Deceased v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, d/b/a Reelo, James Hyde Wilson, Jr. and James Hyde Wilson, Sr.

Nos. 8223SC1029, 8321SC336.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 20, 1983.

E. Vernon, F. Glenn and David P. Shouvlin, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellant, Joseph W. Freeman, Jr., et al.

Morrow & Reavis by John F. Morrow; and Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by Jimmy H. Barnhill and Juanita H. Blackmon, Winston-Salem, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vannoy & Reeves by Wade E. Vannoy, Jr., West Jefferson, for defendant-appellee, Talmadge L. Woodel.

Petree, Stockton, Robinson, Vaughn, Glaze & Moready by R.M. Stockton, Jr. and John F. Mitchell, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee, Mobil Oil Corp.

VAUGHN, Chief Judge.

G.S. 18A-8, in effect at the time of both actions, makes it a crime for any person, firm or corporation knowingly to sell or give malt beverages or unfortified wine to any person under eighteen years of age. Violation of such statute is a misdemeanor. G.S. 18A-56. There is no question that defendants in both actions violated the statute; the question before this Court is whether defendants can be subjected to civil liability for automobile accidents caused by the negligence of intoxicated minors who purchased malt beverages from defendants. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that plaintiffs' claims were improperly dismissed; whether plaintiffs can prove a cause of action against defendants is a matter for the jury to determine from the attendant circumstances, not for the court to determine as a matter of law.

To make out a prima facie case of common law negligence plaintiffs must establish:

(1) that defendants had a duty or obligation recognized by the law, requiring them to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;

(2) a failure on defendants' part to conform to the standard required (3) a reasonably close causal connection between defendants' conduct and plaintiffs' injuries; and

(4) actual loss or damage.

Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C.App. 1, 13, 303 S.E.2d 584, 592, review denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983), quoting W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 30, p. 143 (4th ed. 1971).

G.S. 18A-8 imposes upon defendants a duty or obligation not to sell beer to minors. The purpose of this statute is to protect both the minor and the community at large from the possible adverse consequences of the minor's intoxication. See Hutchens, supra. When a statute, such as the one in this case, imposes upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others, a violation of such statute constitutes negligence per se. Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955); Hutchens, supra. Defendants, in other words, were negligent as a matter of law when they failed to conform to the standard imposed by G.S. 18A-8. It is up to plaintiffs, however, to prove that defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries.

The test of proximate cause is whether a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen the actual results or similar injurious results from their negligent conduct. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970). Although plaintiffs' injuries were a direct result of the minors' negligent driving, there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Hutchens, supra; Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C.App. 509, 255 S.E.2d 318, review denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 913 (1979). A person may be held liable if his negligent conduct was a substantial, foreseeable cause of another's injuries. See Watters v. Parrish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960). Defendants should not be insulated from liability as a matter of law merely because their conduct was, if anything, an indirect cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Nor should defendant in the second case be insulated from liability merely because he did not sell beer to the driver, but sold it to another minor who, in turn, gave the beer to the driver. Defendants' negligent conduct, in both cases, started the chain of events leading to plaintiffs' injuries. The question of whether defendants should have foreseen the injurious consequences from their negligent conduct and whether their conduct was a substantial cause of plaintiffs' injuries cannot be discarded as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.

Defendants cite a case decided in 1913 for the proposition that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants. In Spencer v. Fisher, 161 N.C. 116, 76 S.E. 731 (1913), our Supreme Court interpreted a civil damage statute, in effect at the time, making it a misdemeanor for a dealer to sell intoxicating liquors to an unmarried minor and giving the father, or if he be dead, the mother, guardian, or employer of such minor a right of action against the dealer if injurious consequences followed from the sale. In Spencer, liquor had been shipped, with a minor receiving the bill of lading for the shipment from a bank cashier. The Court strictly construed the word "dealer" in the statute, so as not to impose liability on the bank cashier. In dicta, the Court explained that a cause of action under such statute was governed wholly by its provisions, there being no cause of action at common law. Id. at 117, 76 S.E. at 732. (Emphasis added). The civil damage statute in the Spencer case, later codified as G.S. 14-332 remained in effect until 1971 when the General Assembly repealed this statute. When plaintiffs' claims arose in the instant cases, we had no civil damage statute.

We do not find the Spencer decision to be on point or its dicta to be controlling. As we have explained in the past:

The doctrine of stare decisis contemplates only such points as are actually involved and determined in a case, and not what is said by the Court ... on points not necessarily involved therein. Such expressions, being, obiter dicta, do not become precedents .... It cannot be reasonably expected that every word, phrase, or sentence contained in a judicial opinion will be so perfect and complete in comprehension and limitation that it may not be improperly employed by wresting it from its surroundings, disregarding its context and the change of facts to which it is sought to be applied ....

Moose v. Commissioners, 172 N.C. 419, 433-34, 90 S.E. 441, 448-49 (1916) quoting 7 R.C.L., 1000, 3, 4, cited with approval in Hayes v. Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 536, 91 S.E.2d 673, 682 (1956). We adhere to the rationale adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court to the effect that in 1913, when the Spencer decision was rendered, it could be said as a matter of law that the commingling of alcohol and horses did not produce a foreseeable injury. In 1980 and 1981, however, when plaintiffs' claims arose, the commingling of alcohol and horsepower presented a different situation in which the reasonably...