Freeman v. Lane

• Decision Date: 09 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 3-84-0269,3-84-0269
• Parties: , 85 Ill.Dec. 216 Jerry Lee FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 584

473 N.E.2d 584

129 Ill.App.3d 1061, 85 Ill.Dec. 216

Jerry Lee FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-84-0269.

Appellate Court of Illinois Third District.

Jan. 9, 1985.

Verlin R.F. Meinz, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Michael T. Mullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

WOMBACHER, Justice:

Plaintiff Jerry Lee Freeman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel defendant Michael P. Lane, Director of the Department of Corrections, to grant Freeman meritorious good time earned prior to July 13, 1983. [Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3).] In pertinent part, Freeman's petition alleged that he had been incarcerated for 91 days in the county jail and 127 days in the Department of Corrections (hereinafter called "DOC") prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Lane v. Sklodowski (1983), 97 Ill.2d 311, 73 Ill.Dec. 462, 454 N.E.2d 322. In that case, the court limited the awarding of meritorious good time credit by the DOC to a total of 90 days. The court did not, however, alter any meritorious good time credits that had been awarded prior to the date of its decision, being July 13, 1983.

Freeman's petition further alleged that prior to the Lane v. Sklodowski decision, it was the established policy of the DOC to credit inmates who presented little or no disciplinary problem with meritorious good time, in amounts as specified by each institution, on a regular basis. The petition further alleged that by virtue of the policy of the DOC respecting meritorious good time awards, a duty had arisen upon Lane, as Director, to award defendant Freeman meritorious good time for the amount of time he had spent incarcerated prior to the Lane v. Sklodowski decision. The petition asserted that despite demands and requests, Freeman had not received the meritorious good time credit for the period of his incarceration prior to July 13, 1983. Freeman also alleged, with supporting affidavits, that he met all the conditions set forth as departmental policy for such an award and requested that a writ of mandamus issue, directing Lane, as Director, to grant him 96.8 days of meritorious good time, calculated at 40 days for each 90 days served prior to July 13, 1983.

The State responded with a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that it was insufficient as a matter of law. The State's motion was premised upon the assertion that Director Lane was under no duty to award Freeman meritorious good time, as the award of credit is an act within the director's discretion, and therefor not subject to mandamus action. The State argued that as a discretionary action, Freeman had no clear right to the award such as would permit mandamus. Reliance was placed upon pertinent statutory provisions [Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3) ], and applicable administrative regulations of the DOC. The circuit court agreed with the State concluding that the decision on the award of meritorious good time is within the sole discretion of the director, not subject to a mandamus action. The court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.

We reverse and remand.

There is little dispute as to the applicable law with respect to mandamus actions and discretionary duties. A writ of mandamus will not lie to direct the manner of performance of an action which requires the exercise of discretion. [People ex rel. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe v. Clark (1957), 12 Ill.2d 515, 519-520, 147 N.E.2d 89.] While it has been used to compel the exercise of discretion by a public official [People ex rel. Abner v. Kinney (1964), 30 Ill.2d 201, 207, 195 N.E.2d 651], it may be not used to direct or alter the manner in which discretion is to be exercised. To do so would be to substitute a court's judgment and discretion for that vested in the public official, and that is not permitted. [Ickes v. Board of Supervisors (1953), 415 Ill. 557, 563, 114 N.E.2d 669.] Mandamus relief is available where the duty is non-discretionary, or ministerial, and where the petitioner has shown a clear right to the relief requested. [12 Ill.2d 515, 520, 147 N.E.2d 89; People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons (1940), 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46.]

As noted, there is no dispute on this basic law, and neither is there dispute that, theoretically, the statutory provision respecting meritorious good time and the administrative regulations pertaining thereto leave the award of good time to the discretion of the director. The latter is not controlling, however, given the procedural posture of the instant case and the allegations of the petition for writ of mandamus. The state's motion to dismiss addressed only the legal sufficiency of the petition, and under accepted principles, well-pleaded facts in the petition must be taken as true by the court deciding the motion to dismiss. [People v. Johnson (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 843, 845, 10 Ill.Dec. 625, 368 N.E.2d 111.]

The factual allegations of Freeman's petition indicate a policy of the DOC where the discretion of the director had been surrendered by him, and supplanted by an established and regular policy of granting meritorious good time to a certain class of inmates of which Freeman alleges he is a member. These factual allegations, as noted, must be taken as true at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. We find the allegations sufficient to state a claim for mandamus relief because they indicate that the discretion vested with the director by law has been transformed, de facto, into a non-discretionary policy for awarding good time credit. If that is the case, and there was an across-the-board award of such credits to inmates in Freeman's class, then Freeman is entitled to an award.

The State, in its brief, suggests that Director Lane reviewed Freeman's case and made a conscious decision, after individual analysis, to deny him the award. It is contended that such actions indicate the discretionary nature of the decision with respect to Freeman. The difficulty with this is that there is nothing in the record indicating such action by Lane, nor anything contradicting the allegations of the petition. Statements from the brief of a party are not a substitute for matters of record. The State, upon remandment, will have full opportunity to present evidence disproving the allegations of the petition and establishing the discretionary nature of the decision. If they do so, then the petition for mandamus relief will be denied. At this point, the only factual matters are those pleaded in the...