Freeman v. Town of Lusk

• Decision Date: 10 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-151,85-151
• Citation: 717 P.2d 331
• Parties: Howard L. FREEMAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. TOWN OF LUSK, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 331

717 P.2d 331

Howard L. FREEMAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. TOWN OF LUSK, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 85-151.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 10, 1986.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1986.

Howard L. Freeman, pro se.

A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, JJ. and ROONEY, ^* J., Retired.

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

The essence of the claim of error in this case as we perceive it, is that an unsworn traffic citation which was issued and which charged a violation of a town ordinance is insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The consequence of the failure to verify the complaint according to the appellant is that he was deprived of constitutional due process. There are collateral claims of error set forth in the appellant's brief, and we will quote those hereafter. We conclude that there was no error in connection with the appellant's conviction. That is the conclusion which the district court reached upon review of the finding of guilty in the municipal court. We affirm the conviction.

Appellant recites the following issues in his brief:

"I. DID THE 10TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZE SECTION 7-16-101 WYOMING STATUTES 1977 TO BE APPLIED IN A

MANNER THAT MUNICIPAL COURTS MAY IGNORE ALL TIMELY CLAIMED RIGHTS OF NATURAL CITIZENS, ALL SEPARATION OF POWER DOCTRINES OF STATE AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND ALSO EVEN THE WYOMING RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SO LONG AS THE PUNISHMENT FOR SAID CRIMINAL ACT DOES NOT EXCEED $750.00?

"II. DOES SECTION 7-16-101, W.S.1977 AUTHORIZE UNSWORN COMPLAINTS IN CRIMINAL CASES?

"III. DOES A COURT, WHICH DECLARES ON THE RECORD THAT IT IS HEARING AN ACTION BROUGHT IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE, HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO THEN IGNORE LEGAL DEFENSES, AND SUMMARILY TRY THE CRIME UPON THE LETTER OF AN ORDINANCE?

"IV. DID APPELLANT HAVE HIS FIRST TRIAL BY AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER EMPOWERED TO PERFORM EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL OFFICES, WHERE THE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME WAS $40.00, AND THEN A TRIAL DE-NOVO IN MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE SAME OFFENSE, WHERE THE ONLY CHANGE WAS THAT THE PUNISHMENT WAS INCREASED TO $200.00 PLUS $10.00 COURT COSTS?

"V. DID THE 10TH AMENDMENT AUTHORIZE GUILT TO BE WRITTEN INTO STATE STATUTES AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES?"

As appellee, the State of Wyoming, suggests the following questions are involved in the claims of error and arguments of the appellant:

"I. WHETHER TOWN OF LUSK ORDINANCE 12-207 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

"II. WHETHER THE INITIATION OF THE ACTION AGAINST APPELLANT BY THE ISSUANCE OF A CITATION WAS PROPER.

"III. WHETHER THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE."

It is the responsibility of an appellant to present relevant authority and cogent argument, and it is not enough to identify potential issues and expect this court to flesh them out. Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980). There are many precedents for the proposition that this court will not consider issues which are not supported with cogent argument or pertinent authority. E.g., Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 349 (1986). In the past this court has not hesitated to invoke this rule against pro se litigants. Skurdal v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1241 (1985). The appellant in this case does appear pro se, but no special consideration is to be given a litigant who presents his own case. Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1984); Annis v. Beebe and Runyan Furniture Company, Wyo., 685 P.2d 678, 680 (1984); Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976 (1984).

In an expansion of the first issue that he has articulated, appellant has the following in his brief:

"Appellant argues 'No.' Appellee argues 'Yes.' To declare that the authorized police power under the 10th Amendment does away with the rest of the Constitution, and the rest of the substantive organic Law of the Land, or that it allows Amendment, or alteration to the U.S. Constitution by State Statutes not pursuant thereto, provided the statute does not affect a property interest above $750.00, is to Appellant prima facie evidence of unlawful usurpation by public servants, who are sworn 'juristic persons' to obey the Organic Law of the Land, and not to bend it by far fetched legalese."

The entire argument of this issue by the appellant in his brief is as follows:

"There is no authorization in the legal contract, which binds every public servant to obey and to support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Wyoming, to set an arbitrary figure of $750.00 at which figure Constitutional protection of natural rights is said to begin. Lusk Town Ordinance # 12-207 is unenforceable upon natural citizens as it is written and administered."

In light of the precedents cited we do not address the appellant's first issue. ¹

Turning to the second and third issues presented which we will address together, the appellant's essential argument is that the citation which was issued to him on June 6, 1984, never was signed under oath by the arresting officer. He contends it could not serve as a valid complaint to invoke the jurisdiction of the municipal court. That citation charged him with driving the wrong way on a one-way street. We find no dispute in the record about the fact that Mr. Freeman on that day did drive south for one block along Maple Street in the Town of Lusk, and that Maple Street is a one-way street for those traveling north.

The appellant mistakenly relies upon § 7-16-101, W.S.1977, which addresses jurisdiction of justices of the peace. It does provide for misdemeanor jurisdiction "on information or complaint, under oath, saving to the defendant the right of appeal to the district court." The relevant provisions in rules and statutes pertaining to this case are as follows:

"The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath * * *." Rule 3(a), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.

"As provided by law * * * citations may issue for offenses violating * * * any traffic ordinance of any city or town." Rule 24(b), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.

"These rules shall also apply to police justice proceedings relating to trial of offenses against the ordinances of cities and towns." Rule 1(a)(2), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.

"In the event the form of citation * * * includes information and is sworn to as required under the general laws of this state * * * when filed * * * shall be deemed to be a lawful complaint for purposes of prosecution under this act [Regulation of Traffic on Highways]." Section 31-5-1213, W.S.1977.

These provisions establish that a citation should be subscribed and sworn to by the officer who issues it. This is the regular way to constitute it a lawful complaint for purposes of prosecution. The officer in this case did sign the citation in the proper place, but that portion of the citation indicating that the officer had sworn to the contents never was executed. It is a better practice in all instances to assure that the complaint is made upon oath, and the statutes do furnish guidance with respect to the proper manner of converting a citation into a formal complaint. The municipal judge could have easily set the matter straight when it was first brought to his attention.

Be that as it may, in Cisneros v. City of Casper, Wyo., 479 P.2d 198, 200-201 (1971) this court said:

"The verification is not a substantial part of the complaint and is merely to ensure good faith in instituting the proceedings. Absence of the required verification is only a simple defect in the complaint and does not render the complaint void or deprive the court of jurisdiction."

In Cisneros, the defendant did enter a plea without objecting to the lack of verification, but the court also emphasized that the defendant knew who the complaining witnesses were; that he never had any misapprehension as to the charge; and that he was not...