Freeman v. Unisys Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 September 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-73112.
• Parties: Ali R. FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNISYS CORPORATION, Douglas Holloway, and Allen Ebert, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

898 F. Supp. 485

Ali R. FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNISYS CORPORATION, Douglas Holloway, and Allen Ebert, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 94-73112.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 6, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William A. Roy, Roy Shecter & Vocht, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for plaintiff.

Judith E. Caliman, Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz, Detroit, MI, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ali Freeman is seeking damages and other relief under Michigan law from defendant Unisys Corporation for race discrimination in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, breach of implied contract, and false-light invasion of privacy. This action was originally filed in Wayne County Circuit Court, but was subsequently removed by defendant to this court based upon the court's diversity jurisdiction. Presently before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e)(2) (E.D.Mich. Jan. 1, 1992), the court will dispense with oral argument and decide defendant's motion based on the briefs submitted by the parties.

I. Background

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant Unisys Corporation, was forced to resign from that company due to his alleged misappropriation of company property. Defendant's investigation of the alleged misconduct revealed that plaintiff utilized the Unisys Logistics System to obtain parts for his personal home computer and that he falsified company records to reflect usage of these parts in a customer's equipment. Plaintiff contends that his attempt to pay for the parts he received resulted in his termination.

In Count I of his three-count complaint, plaintiff contends that all three defendants discriminated against him based upon his race in violation of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.A. § 37.2202. In Count II, plaintiff also claims that Unisys breached an implied just cause employment contract. Finally, in Count III, plaintiff alleges that defendants Holloway and Ebert committed the tort of false-light invasion of privacy when, in the scope of their duties as supervisors of defendant Unisys, they told other Unisys employees and a state employment agency that plaintiff was involved in the misappropriation of company property.

In its December 9, 1994 Order, this court found that no reasonable basis existed for a claim of false-light invasion of privacy or racial discrimination against either Holloway or Ebert. Accordingly, defendants Holloway and Ebert were dismissed as parties to the instant case.¹

II. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A fact is material and precludes the granting of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties, and "would necessarily affect the application of appropriate principles of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (6th ed. 1979)). The court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (6th Cir.1984).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. See Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). The initial burden on the movant is not as formidable as some decisions have indicated. The moving party need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by showing that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party discharges that burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine triable issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Gregg, 801 F.2d at 861.

To create a genuine issue of material fact, however, the nonmovant must do more than present some evidence on a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986):

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the nonmovant's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. (Citations omitted).

See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (holding that a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law whenever the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case on which it has the burden of proof); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In this respect, the standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Consequently, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a nonmovant must do more than raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmovant must produce evidence that would be sufficient to require submission to the jury of the dispute over the fact. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi Transp. Serv., Inc., 738 F.Supp. 214, 217 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1991). The evidence itself need not be the sort admissible at trial but it must be more than the nonmovant's own pleadings. Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1990). For the reasons stated below, the court will grant defendant's motion.

III. Discussion

In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant raises three arguments. In its first argument, defendant contends that plaintiff has no evidence to support his claim of race discrimination. Plaintiff responds that a trier of fact could reasonably find that he intended to pay for the merchandise allegedly misappropriated. In its second argument, defendant asserts that plaintiff's employment was terminable at-will. To rebut this, plaintiff argues that he had an implied contract not to be terminated except for just cause. Finally, in its third argument, defendant claims that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of false-light invasion of privacy. Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges that statements made by employees of defendant regarding plaintiff's misappropriation placed plaintiff in a false light, characterizing him as dishonest. The court will address each of the disputed issues seriatim.

A. Race Discrimination

Plaintiff asserts a claim of employment discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.A. § 37.2202. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of his race when he was forced to resign from Unisys after an investigation revealed that he misappropriated company property for personal use and falsified documents to conceal the misappropriation. In a race discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his employment was adversely effected by his racial status. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). To do so, plaintiff must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Sisson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 174 Mich.App. 742, 746, 436 N.W.2d 747 (1989).

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:

(1) that he was a member of the class entitled to protection under the act, and (2) that, for the same or similar conduct, he was treated differently than one who was a member of a different race.

Id. at 746-47, 436 N.W.2d 747.

In the present case, there is no dispute as to whether Freeman, a black male, is a member of a protected class. Accordingly, he has satisfied the first element of the test.

With respect to the second prong of the test, plaintiff contends that he was more severely disciplined than similarly situated white employees as Unisys management has allowed white employees to similarly "juggle" inventory without retribution. In support of his argument, plaintiff relies on statistical evidence in an attempt to demonstrate that a disproportionate number of blacks, formerly employed by defendant as customer service representatives, have been terminated. In addition, plaintiff attempts to strengthen his position by clearly misrepresenting the answers of Mr. Ebert's deposition as racially discriminatory.

These conclusory allegations are not indicative of racially disparate treatment and provide no dispositive evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of defendant. Plaintiff openly admits to receiving the parts without paying for them. Furthermore, plaintiff admits that he knows of no white employee who misappropriated company property who was not subsequently terminated.² Therefore, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was treated differently, on account of his race, than any another employee similarly situated. As a result, plaintiff has not satisfied the second prong of the test and has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

Plaintiff has attempted to create factual support for his claim by relying on postdeposition affidavits which...