Freese v. Colvin

Decision Date05 August 2016
Docket NumberCase No.: 8:15-cv-1315-T-27AAS
PartiesSUSAN FREESE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("the Act"), as amended, Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her claim for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").

After reviewing the record, including a transcript of the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), the administrative record, and the pleadings and memoranda submitted by the parties in this case, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's final decision be REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.1

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Susan Freese, filed a Title II application for a period of disability and DIB and a Title XVI claim for SSI on March 5, 2009. (Tr. 28). Plaintiff's DIB claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 28). Plaintiff's SSI claim was initially approved, but Plaintiff did not receivepayments on this claim due to excessive income and her living arrangements. (Tr. 28). This determination was affirmed on reconsideration. (Tr. 243-45).

Plaintiff then protectively filed a new Title XVI claim for SSI on January 6, 2011 (Tr. 28, 247-55), and filed a new Title II application for a period of disability and DIB on May 25, 2011 (Tr. 28, 257-63). In both applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning March 27, 2004. (Tr. 28, 248, 257). Plaintiff's date last insured is September 30, 2006. (Tr. 28). Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 28, 94-128). Plaintiff received an administrative hearing before an ALJ, which was held on July 10, 2013. (Tr. 28, 51). Fifty-one (51) years old at the time of the hearing, Plaintiff has at least a high school education and no past relevant work. (Tr. 42).

On September 26, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims for disability benefits. (Tr. 28-44). On March 31, 2015, the Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-8), making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. FIVE-STEP DISABILITY ANALYSIS

Eligibility for disability benefits requires that the claimant be disabled and therefore unable to engage in "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."2 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a); 416.905(a). To qualify as a disability, the physical or mentalimpairment(s) must be so severe that the claimant is not able to do previous work or any other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

In making a disability determination, the Social Security Administration applies a five-step sequential evaluation process.3 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity."4 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, then, at the second step, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant has a severe, medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that meets the duration requirement.5 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987).6 Step two acts as a filter and "allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be rejected." McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986).7

At step three, the ALJ considers if the claimant's severe impairment(s) meets or medically equals the criteria of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. ("theListings" or "Appendix 1"). The Listings contain impairments so severe that if a claimant's impairment(s) meets or medically equals a listed impairment, the claimant is considered disabled without further consideration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

If the Listings do not apply, the ALJ will move to step four to assess whether the claimant can perform past relevant work based upon all the relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The determination at step four involves a two-pronged analysis. First, the ALJ must make a finding about a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the level of physical and mental work activities claimant can do on a sustained basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). In determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the medical and nonmedical evidence regarding claimant's impairments, regardless of severity, and any related symptoms, such as pain, that, in conjunction, may cause physical or mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. The second phase of step four requires the ALJ to determine whether a claimant can perform past relevant work in light of the RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).8

The ALJ moves to step five of the sequential analysis if the claimant is not able to perform his past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). At step five of the sequential analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the existence of other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that, given the claimant's impairments, the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). In making this determination, the ALJ considers a claimant's RFC,age, education, and work experience to determine if the claimant can perform any other work.9 The claimant is considered not under a disability if there are jobs that exist in significant numbers that the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the decision that a claimant is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (citation omitted). Under the substantial evidence test, findings of fact made by administrative agencies may be reversed only when the record compels a reversal. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1035 (2005). "[T]he mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings." Id.

Furthermore, it is the Commissioner's duty, not the Court's, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656, 656 (5th Cir. 1971).10 The Commissioner is also responsible for drawing inferences from the evidence, and those inferences are not to be overturned if they are supported by substantial evidence. Celebrezze v. O'Brient, 323 F.2d 989, 990 (5th Cir. 1963).

In determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court is not to reweigh the evidence. Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1178 (11th Cir. 1986). Rather, the Court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ's findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). The Court's review is limited to determining whether the record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable mind to conclude that the claimant is not disabled, taking into account evidence favorable and unfavorable to the decision. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983).

When the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result or if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court may remand the decision of the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) if the Commissioner's decision: 1) applies the incorrect law, 2) fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine whether the proper law was applied, or 3) is not supported by substantial evidence. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

With respect to the ALJ's findings of fact, judicial review is limited to determining whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's factual findings and whether the decision comports with correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). No presumption of validity attaches to the Commissioner's conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. The Commissioner is required to apply the correct law and provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has been conducted. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991); see Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 1993). If the reviewing court is unable to determine from the Commissioner's decisionthat the proper legal standards were applied, then remand to the Commissioner for clarification is required. See Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ'S DECISION

At step one of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 27, 2004, her alleged onset date, and determined Plaintiff's date...

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