Freeze v. Sec'y, Dep't of Children & Families
| Decision Date | 26 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:08-CV-2045-T-27TGW |
| Parties | TERRY FREEZE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, a detainee in the Florida Civil Commitment Center proceeding pro se, brings this amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Dkt. 8). The Court has considered the amended petition, Respondent's response (Dkt. 18), and Petitioner's reply (Dkt. 24). Upon review, the Court determines that the amended petition must be denied because Petitioner's grounds do not provide a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), enacted and effective on April 24, 1996, "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Where a state court initially considers the issues raised in the petition and enters a decision on the merits, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) governs the review of those claims. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782,792 (2001); see also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2003).
Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634,638-39 (2003); Clarkv. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). A state court's factual finding is presumed to be correct, and a petitioner must rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(l).
A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;..." 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732,735 (11th Cir. 1998). In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also, Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003)("A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.")(quoting Judd v. Haley, 250F.3d 1308,1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995)(,[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner 'fairly present' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights[.]"') (citation omitted).
Under the procedural default doctrine, "if the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). "The doctrine of procedural default was developed as a means of ensuring that federal habeas petitioners first seek relief in accordance with established state procedures." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 891 (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d at 1313).
Pre-AEDPA decisions from the Supreme Court establish the framework governing procedural default in federal habeas cases. A procedural default will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the default. "Cause" ordinarily requires petitioner to demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state court. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995).
To show "prejudice," the petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his factual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,170 (1982)). The petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Second, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, if such review is necessary to correct a fundamentalmiscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception is only available "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception concerns a petitioner's "actual" innocence rather than his "legal" innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)); Murray v. Carrier, All U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) (). To meet this standard, a petitioner must "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" of the underlying offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). In addition, '"to be credible,' a claim of actual innocence must be based on [new] reliable evidence not presented at trial." Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324) ( "given the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected") (internal quotation marks omitted). The, Schlup Court stated the petitioner must show constitutional error coupled with "new reliable evidence -- whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence -- that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. This fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is not available unless "the petitioner shows, as a factual matter, that he did not commit the crime of conviction." Ward v. Cain, 53 F. 3d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1995)(denying certificate of probable cause)(footnote omitted).
Petitioner, Terry Freeze (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner"), pleaded guilty to three countsof sexual battery and one count of attempted first degree murder (Dkt. 1A at Initial Brief p. 5). He was sentenced to twenty years incarceration (Id.).
On January 1, 1999, the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators Treatment and Care Act (hereinafter "Ryce Act") went into effect, which created a system for the involuntary evaluation and confinement of sexually violent offenders, and for treatment of these individuals. Fla. Stat. Ch. 394.910 et seq.1 On January 26, 2001, prior to Petitioner's April 7, 2001 anticipated release from prison, a multi-disciplinary team of mental health professionals rendered a report pursuant to the Ryce Act in which it concluded that Petitioner was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of Fla. Stat. §394.910, and met the criteria for involuntary civil commitment (Respondent's Ex. IE, Vol. I at pp. 20-63). On March 15, 2001, the Office of the State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit filed a petition for civil commitment and requested a probable cause determination from the Pinellas County Circuit Court (Id. at pp. 18-63). On March 16, 2001, the Circuit Court found probable cause that Petitioner was a sexually violent predator and ordered Petitioner's appearance for further proceedings (Id. at pp. 64-65).
On April 7, 2001, Petitioner completed the incarceration term of his sentence.2 On April 18, 2001, a jury trial commenced on the petition for civil commitment (Respondent's Ex. IE, Vol. IIIat pp. 89-202, Vol. IV at pp. 203-381). On April 19, 2001, the jury unanimously found Petitioner a sexually violent predator (Respondent's Ex. IE, Vol. II at p. 267). The Circuit Court adjudged Petitioner a sexually violent predator, and committed him to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services "for control, care and treatment until such time as the Respondent's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it is safe for the Respondent to be at large." (Id. at pp. 268-69). On December 12, 2003, the appellate court affirmed the commitment order, but certified to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance whether a jury instruction was required that the State must prove that the individual has serious difficulty in controlling his or her dangerous behavior (Respondent's Ex. 1G); Freeze v. State, 861 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), rev. denied, 906 So. 2d 1058 (Fla.), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1036 (2005). The Florida Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction on June 10, 2005 (Respondent's Ex. 1H); Freeze v. State, 906 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2005). On November 28, 2005, the United States Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari (Respondent's Ex. II); Freeze v. Florida, 546 U.S. 1036 (2005).
On January 12, 2007, the state...
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