Freitas v. Auger
| Decision Date | 07 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1597,87-1597 |
| Citation | 837 F.2d 806 |
| Parties | Richard John FREITAS, Sr., Appellant, v. Warden Calvin AUGER; Deputy Director for Institutions Paul Grossheim; Director of Dept. of Corrections Hal Farrier; Correctional Security Manager G.A. Winders; and Adjustment Committee Members Barrens, Bermeyer and Thomas, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Philip Mears, Iowa City, Iowa, (appointed), for appellant.
Layne M. Lindebak, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before HEANEY, BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
A prison disciplinary committee at the Iowa State Men's Reformatory punished Richard J. Freitas for allegedly conspiring with other inmates in planning an escape. Freitas brought an action before a magistrate 1 under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against various prison and state officials, contending that they had violated his constitutional rights. After a hearing, the magistrate held against Freitas. We affirm.
Freitas is a prisoner at the Iowa State Men's Reformatory in Anamosa, Iowa. Gary A. Winders, the Correctional Security Officer placed Freitas in administrative segregation on October 28, 1985. On October 29, Winders told Freitas he was under investigation for conspiring to escape from the Reformatory. Freitas admitted that two other inmates had discussed with him a plan to escape through the "hobbycraft" area of the Reformatory. Freitas, however, denied that he either initiated or furthered these conversations. The State concedes that Freitas did nothing more than participate in these conversations.
On October 31, 1985, Freitas and Winders talked again. Freitas revealed more about the conversations but again denied any involvement in the escape plan. Freitas consented to a polygraph examination on certain issues.
On November 5, 1985, a polygraph examination was administered. The examiner asked Freitas whether he intended to escape through the hobbycraft area, whether he would kill a guard to further an escape, whether he knew of another prisoner who would kill a guard to further an escape, and whether he knew of any hacksaw blades which might have been smuggled into the reformatory to further an escape. The examiner told Freitas and Winders that Freitas had truthfully answered "no" to each question. He also said that Freitas had no "deliberate conscious plan" to escape through the hobbycraft area.
On November 8, Freitas was charged with a major disciplinary violation of conspiring to escape. Under the Reformatory rules, an inmate can act in complicity to escape "if, with the intent that an offense be committed, [he] commands, induces, procures, or aids another to commit it." At a hearing on November 12 before the Adjustment Committee (consisting of appellees Brimeyer, Behrends, 2 and Thomas), Freitas denied the charges. Winders offered a memorandum concerning the polygraph results and two confidential statements of informants. 3
Based on this evidence, the Committee found Freitas guilty of conspiring to escape. The Committee punished Freitas with ten days in solitary confinement and a minimum of thirty days in administrative segregation. He also was removed from the honor roll and lost forty-five days of good time.
On appeal, the warden, Calvin Auger, determined that a new hearing was necessary for submission of the typed results of the polygraph examination. Because of a lengthy delay in the preparation of the typed results--Freitas was in administrative segregation during this time--Freitas decided to proceed with the hearing without the typed results. 4 At the hearing on December 24, 1985, Freitas told the Committee in some detail about the conversations with the other inmates. He reiterated that he had in no way furthered these conversations or conspired to escape.
Winders explained, not under oath, the polygraph results. The Committee concluded that, while Freitas had answered the questions truthfully, the questions did not address whether Freitas acted in complicity with others in planning an escape.
The Committee again found Freitas guilty of the charge and imposed the same punishment as before. The Committee stated that it relied on the confidential information, the fact that Freitas admitted to having the discussions about the escape, and that he admitted to Winders that he would "leave in a minute" if he had the opportunity to escape.
On internal appeal, Warden Auger upheld the decision but reduced the penalty. Paul W. Grossheim, Deputy Director for Institutions of the Department of Corrections, denied the appeal of that decision.
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution forbids the State of Iowa from depriving Freitas of his right to liberty, except by due process of law. The deprivation in this case is the punishment imposed by the Committee: the loss of good time, the solitary confinement, administrative segregation, and the removal from the honor roll. Because Freitas is a prisoner, however, less procedural due process may be required because of security concerns in penal institutions. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-75, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Before analyzing Freitas' constitutional claims, we state that the only tenable ground for the disciplinary action against Freitas is that Freitas assisted, induced, or encouraged others to escape. There is no evidence that Freitas himself intended to escape. Nor can Freitas be disciplined for simply participating in discussions about escape. Clearly, Freitas must have had the intent to further an escape in some manner.
Due process requires prison officials to inform a resident of charges to be brought against him or her and the evidence relied on in bringing those charges. See id. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-79. The adequacy of the notice hinges on whether it allows the inmate to "marshal the facts" and prepare a defense. Id. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978.
The notice in this case stated that Freitas had violated reformatory rules 5, 27 and 41. 5 It also specifically stated:
Conspiring with others to escape: During the last 60 days, Freitas has talked with other inmates in the institution about planning an escape through the hobbycraft/school building. Freitas has informed myself [sic] that even though he was talking with these people, that he was not actually planning on escaping through the hobbycraft area.
In an effort to maintain the peace and tranquility of the institution, confidential names have been left out of this disciplinary report.
Freitas contends that this notice was constitutionally inadequate because it did not specify the dates of the alleged conversations, where they took place, their content or who participated in them. We do not find these omissions to violate the Constitution. The district court did not err in deciding that prison officials were justified in withholding information about confidential informants because of the risk of revealing their identities. Further information, either about the identity of the informants or the substance of what the informants said, may have endangered the informants. See Dawson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 896 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1714, 8 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984). Cf. Muhammad v. Butler, 655 F.Supp. 1470, 1472 (D.N.J.1987) ().
In addition, Freitas admitted to having the three conversations in question. It does not matter that he may have mistakenly assumed that the prison officials were withholding additional evidence to be used against him. The only information withheld concerned the confidential informants. The decision of the Committee ultimately relied solely on the content of those conversations revealed by Freitas, either to the Committee or to Winders, and the confidential reports. The notice informed Freitas that this was the evidence on which the Committee would rely. It therefore was constitutionally adequate.
The Constitution requires that a written statement be drafted contemporaneously with the disciplinary action which informs an inmate of the evidence and reasons relied upon by the factfinders in reaching their decision. See Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1411-12 (8th Cir.1986). Freitas contends that the factual findings of and the reasons given by the Committee were inadequate. 6
In reaching its decision, the Committee relied on Freitas' admission to having had conversations about escaping on three separate occasions, on Freitas' indication he would "leave in a minute," if given the opportunity, and on confidential statements of informants. The Committee explicitly noted that it did not rely on the polygraph results in reaching its decision.
While these findings and reasons may not be extensive, the record does not indicate that the Committee relied on any other findings or reasons in reaching its decision. In addition, the Committee explicitly noted both its reliance on confidential information and that this information had been deleted for security reasons. See Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F.Supp. 165, 170 (S.D.Ia.1980) (). We therefore find the statement of the Committee's findings and reasons is constitutionally adequate.
Freitas argues that additional due process protections should be afforded in cases involving confidential informants. He suggests that the district court should confirm the reliability of the informants in some manner. 7 The appellees on the other hand argue that due process does not require the district court to review the...
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