French v. Special Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 November 1958 |
| Citation | 107 Ohio App. 435,159 N.E.2d 785 |
| Parties | , 8 O.O.2d 421 FRENCH, Appellant, v. SPECIAL SERVICES, INC., Appellee. * BODNAR, Appellant, v. SPECIAL SERVICES, INC., Appellee.* |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A participant in a stock car race and the proprietor thereof are free to contract in such a manner as to relieve the latter from the responsibility for damages or injuries to the former caused by the latter's negligence, excepting when caused by willful or wanton misconduct.
2. An agreement between a participant in and the proprietor of a stock car race, whereby the former assumes the risk of injuries resulting from his participation in such event and releases the proprietor from any claims for damages, is not invalid as against public policy.
3. The consideration expressed in such release agreement--the 'being allowed to compete in auto racing events' for which prizes are awarded--is a valuable consideration; and such release is not, therefore, invalid for want of consideration.
Hyman & Hyman and Young & Young, Cincinnati, for appellant in cause No. 453.
Chorpening & Chorpening, Ashland, for appellant in cause No. 454.
Kenneth J. Nordstrom, Ashland, for appellee.
These cases are companion cases and, while in cause No. 454 it is maintained that it has one unique feature, nevertheless, we think that, in the light of our conclusions, a single opinion will suffice.
These cases arise out of an action for damages, in negligence, against the proprietor of a race track by parties who engaged in stock car races for prizes. In both cases the plaintiffs alleged negligence of the defendant in certain respects. In neither case were facts alleged in the petition bringing the actions within the purview of wanton or willful misconduct. In both cases it was admitted by the plaintiffs that, prior to their entry into the races, they signed a release as follows, which was set up in the defendant's answer:
'Whereas the undersigned wishes to compete in auto racing under the rules of the Special Services, Inc., and
'Whereas the undersigned knows of the perilous nature of his undertaking as it relates to loss of life and/or limb, therefore it is agreed as follows:
'That in consideration of being allowed to compete in auto racing events the undersigned hereby voluntarily assumes all risks of accident or damage to his person or property and hereby releases the Special Services, Inc., and its stockholders from every claim, liability, or demand of any kind for or on account of any personal injury or damage of any kind sustained, whether caused by negligence of the said Special Services, Inc., and its stockholders or otherwise.'
A demurrer was filed to these answering defenses in both cases, and each was overruled. Thereupon, replies were filed, which admitted the execution of the above releases but claimed, in cause No. 453, that the same was without consideration and void as against public policy and, in cause No. 454 where those same contentions were made, in addition it is claimed that the intent of the release did not cover the situation exhibited in the allegations of the petition. The trial court thereupon, in both cases, upon a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, rendered judgment for the defendant. This appeal on questions of law results, and the errors assigned are in substance that those judgments are contrary to law.
Counsel on both sides agree that there is no specific announcement by the Supreme Court of Ohio under the facts of the instant cases, but they are not agreed as to the impact of certain other decisions in other states on the previous announcements of the Supreme Court of Ohio in cases which may or may not be analogous.
In both of these cases the trial court rendered a 15-page opinion, much of it the same in both cases, in which the propositions involved were given extended and well-documented consideration. Since we agree with the conclusions of the trial court and its reasoning, we might well affirm these decisions for the reasons and the authority therein expressed, except for the fact that in our court arguments were presented and Ohio authorities cited which seemingly were not before the trial court. Therefore, it is necessary first for this court to summarize the decision and opinion of the trial court and then add thereto our analysis of the cases cited and certain remarks of our own.
The plaintiffs' contentions were that this release is invalid for want of consideration and because it is against public policy. The trial court first pointed out that the release was plain and unambiguous and that the consideration therein expressed, viz., the privilege of competing in races for prizes, was a valuable one. In considering the question of whether the release was void as against public policy, it was first pointed out that under the Constitutions of the United States and the state of Ohio it is forbidden to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, yet it was recognized that in some cases public policy interdicted certain types of contracts.
The court then took the law from 2 Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 1079, Sections 574 and 575, and demonstrated that the cases under consideration did not fall within any of the illegal situations therein set forth.
The court then pointed out that a standard has been adopted in Ohio for the protection of persons against unreasonable risk of harm in automobiles and aircraft, and this is the so-called 'guest statutes,' Sections 4515.02 and 4561.151, Revised Code, which provide against liability of the operator except in cases of wanton or willful misconduct. The court was of the opinion that public policy did not demand a different rule in stock car races, and the court concludes this phase of its opinion with the following observation:
'The defendant, Special Services, Inc., not being a public utility or common carrier, and not owing any obligation of public trust to the plaintiff, a contestant, and not being the plaintiff's employer; the court finds that plaintiff and defendant were free to contract in such a manner as to relieve the defendant from the responsibility for damage or injuries to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc.
...Speedway, Inc. (1971), 31 Ohio App.2d 141, 146, 60 O.O.2d 236, 239, 287 N.E.2d 111, 115-116, and French v. Special Services, Inc. (1958), 107 Ohio App. 435, 8 O.O.2d 421, 159 N.E.2d 785. See, also, Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Ctr. (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 27, 9 OBR 28, 457 N.E.2d 1185......
-
Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc.
...36 A.D.2d 552, 317 N.Y.S.2d 228; Corpus Christi Speedway v. Morton (Tex.Civ.App.1955) 279 S.W.2d 903; French v. Special Services, Inc. (1958), 107 Ohio App. 435, 159 N.E.2d 785, 4 Ciofalo v. Tanney Gyms, Inc. (1961), 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N.Y.S. 962, 177 N.E.2d In both Bernstein v. Seacliff Be......
-
AMERICAN DRUGGISTS'INS. CO. v. Equifax, Inc.
...(Auglaize Co. 1971); Hine v. Dayton Speedway Corp., 20 Ohio App.2d 185, 252 N.E.2d 648 (Montgomery Co. 1968); French v. Special Services, Inc., 107 Ohio App. 435, 159 N.E.2d 785 (Ashland Co. 1958). ADIC argues that this Court should find the release in the instant case void as a limitation ......
-
Bryan Zivich, A. Minor
...participation in the soccer activities for which he was present on the field at Garfield Park, and for which his mother signed the release. Id. This release purports to insulate Soccer Club and the City, which owns Garfield Park, from "any claim" arising "as a result of" Bryan's participati......