Fridley v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Sav. Bank (In re Price's Estate)

• Citation: 136 Minn. 333,162 N.W. 454
• Decision Date: 27 April 1917
• Docket Number: No. 20156[284].,20156[284].
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Parties: In re PRICE'S ESTATE. FRIDLEY et al. v. FARMERS' & MECHANICS' SAV. BANK et al.

136 Minn. 333

162 N.W. 454

In re PRICE'S ESTATE.

FRIDLEY et al.

v.FARMERS' & MECHANICS' SAV. BANK et al.

No. 20156[284].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 27, 1917.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Charles S. Jelley, Judge.

Application by David H. Fridley for the vacation of all probate proceedings had by Frederick T. Price in the estate of Mary Fridley Price, deceased, was granted, and letters of administration issued to David H. Fridley, and he thereafter brought suit against the Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank and others, pending which, on application of such defendants, the probate court modified its order vacating the former probate proceedings, and from an order of the district court on Fridley's appeal, vacating the entire probate proceedings had by Price, the defendants appeal. Remanded, with direction to modify the judgment.

Syllabus by the Court

The administration of the estate of a deceased person is a proceeding in rem.

When the person alleged to be deceased is in fact dead and in fact left an estate within the territorial jurisdiction of the probate court, such court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of administering such estate.

When the power of a particular probate court to administer a particular estate is invoked by a petition proper in form, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, its jurisdiction attaches to such particular estate when it takes control of the estate by the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in such other manner as the law prescribes.

If in such case letters of administration be issued to a person not entitled thereto, they are voidable and may be revoked, but are not void ab initio. They are effective to the extent necessary to protect those who in good faith have acted in reliance upon them. Keith, Kingman, Cross & Wallace and James G. Swan, all of Minneapolis, for appellants.

C. J. Rockwood and Ware & Junell, all of Minneapolis, for respondents.

TAYLOR, C.

In 1896 Frederick T. Price was lawfully married at Wheaton in the state of Illinois to one Rose Smith, who is still living and from whom he has never been legally divorced. On October 2, 1907, a marriage ceremony was performed at the city of Minneapolis in this state between Frederick T. Price and Mary R. Fridley, and thenceforth they lived together in the city of Minneapolis as husband and wife and held themselves out as such until the death of Mary R. Fridley, then known as Mary Fridley Price, on November 28, 1914. She had no children and left no will; her mother had died before her death, and her next of kin and only heir was her father, David H. Fridley. Both she and her father believed that Price was her lawful husband, for neither knew that he had a former wife still living. Immediately after her death, Price presented a petition in proper form to the probate court of Hennepin county, in which he stated that he was the surviving husband of Mary Fridley Price, deceased, and asked to be appointed administrator of her estate. Letters of administration were issued to him on December 28, 1914; and he thereafter fully administered the estate, rendered his final account and caused a final decree to be entered assigning the property to himself as surviving spouse. The probate proceedings were in all respects regular, and complied in form with all the requirements of the law. In October, 1915, David H. Fridley learned that Price had a former wife still living, and that consequently he had never been the husband of Mary Fridley Price, as the marriage between them was absolutely void. G. S. 1913, § 7106. Promptly thereafter, David H. Fridley made an application to the probate court to vacate and set aside all the probate proceedings had by Price as unauthorized and void, for the reason that he was not the husband of the decedent and had no interest in her estate. The probate court granted this application, and made an order, dated December 6, 1915, vacating and annulling all proceedings had under the petition filed by Price, on the ground that the court had acquired no jurisdiction over the estate by the filing of such petition. On January 7, 1916, letters of administration were issued to David H. Fridley.

At the time of her death Mary Fridley Price had money on deposit in three different banks in Minneapolis. After Price had been appointed administrator of her estate, these banks in good faith paid these deposits to him as such administrator. After Fridley was appointed administrator, he brought suit against the banks to recover these deposits. Thereafter and on April 25, 1915, the banks (who had not been parties to the prior probate proceedings) made an application to the probate court to amend and modify its order of December 6, 1915, by striking out the portion thereof which vacated and annulled the entire proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Upon this application the probate court modified its order of December 6, 1915, so that such order vacated and annulled the final decree, the order allowing the final account of Price, the order discharging him and his bond, and withdrew and revoked the letters of administration issued to him, without vacating the other orders or declaring the proceeding void for lack of jurisdiction. Fridley appealed to the district court. The district court rendered judgment to the effect that Price was not the surviving spouse of the deceased; that he never had any interest in her estate either as surviving spouse or otherwise; that he was not a person entitled to present a petition for the administration thereof; that everything done in the premises was without jurisdiction and void; and that the entire proceeding and each and every order and decree made therein was vacated, annulled and declared void. The banks appealed to this court. Price having been convicted in January, 1916, of the murder of Mary Fridley Price (see State v. Price, 160 N. W. 677), took no part in the proceedings conducted by the banks.

A single question is presented: Whether the probate proceedings initiated by Price were or were not void ab initio, for the reason that he was not the surviving spouse of the decedent and did not in fact have any interest in her estate. All the material facts were stipulated to in both the probate court and the district court and are conceded in this court.

[2] The Constitution (article 6, § 7) provides that the probate courts, ‘shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution.’ The administration of the estate of a deceased person is a proceeding in rem, the estate being the res. Morin v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 176, 22 N. W. 251;Hutchins v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 46 N. W. 79;Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N. W. 99,69 L. R. A. 785;Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L. Ed. 283. That the person whose estate is sought to be administered is in fact dead, and in fact left an estate within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular probate court, are the fundamental facts which give that probate court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of administering such estate. Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L. Ed. 283; Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co., 86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378;Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 86 Am. Dec. 643. The probate court is given no jurisdiction over the estates of living persons (except those under guardianship with which we are not now concerned); and it is universally held that, although evidence be presented justifying the belief that a person is dead and the probate court assumes jurisdiction and administers his estate in the belief that he is dead, yet, if he in fact be living, the entire proceeding is coram non judice and utterly void ab initio for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Many of the numerous cases so holding are cited in the note found in 4 Ann. Cas. at page 1119. The jurisdiction is limited to the estate of the deceased person and the proceeding is in rem. If there be no estate, or if the estate be beyond the reach of the court, there is no res upon which the power of the court can operate. This is recognized in Hutchins v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 46 N. W. 79;State ex rel. v. Probate Court, 84 Minn. 289, 87 N. W. 783;Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co., 86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378;Hanson v. Nygaard, 105 Minn. 30, 117 N. W. 235,127 Am. St. Rep. 523.

[3] When a person dies and leaves an estate upon which the power of a particular probate court can operate, that court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of administering such estate, and its jurisdiction over the particular estate attaches when it seizes the res; that is, when it takes control of the estate in the manner and by the means prescribed by law.

It has already been determined that under our statutes a particular probate court acquires control over a particular estate upon the filing of a proper petition for administration, and that the court acquires no control or jurisdiction over the estate until such petition has been filed. Hanson v. Nygaard, 105 Minn. 30, 117 N. W. 235,127 Am. St. Rep. 523;Bombolis v. M. & St. L. Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 112, 150 N. W. 385;Culver v. Hardenbergh, 37 Minn. 225, 33 N. W. 792;Chadbourne v. Alden, 98 Minn. 118, 107 N. W. 148. The statute provides that:

‘No defect of form or in the statement of facts contained in the petition shall invalidate the proceedings.’ G. S. 1913, § 7288.

The precise effect of this provision may not be entirely clear, but it shows that the Legislature intended that a defective petition should not render the proceedings void as distinguished from voidable, and that jurisdiction should attach notwithstanding a defective petition. The rule thus indicated is in accord with the rule adopted by the courts generally.

[4] There are many grounds upon which a probate order or...