Fridley v. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank
| Decision Date | 27 April 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,156 - (284) [2] |
| Citation | 162 N.W. 454,136 Minn. 333 |
| Parties | DAVID H. FRIDLEY v. FARMERS & MECHANICS SAVINGS BANK AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
In the matter of the estate of Mary Fridley Price, deceased, the Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank of Minneapolis, and two other banks, petitioned the probate court for Hennepin county to vacate its findings and decree of December 8, 1915, so far as they found that any order, proceeding or act of that court prior to November 1, 1915, in the matter of the estate, was without jurisdiction or void, except the order allowing the final account of Frederick T. Price as administrator thereof distributing the estate and discharging Price as such administrator, and that any decree with reference to annulling any order or act in respect to the administration of the estate should have inserted a provision in substance that the same in its operation should be without prejudice to the rights of all innocent third parties who in good faith and in reliance on the orders of the court have dealt with Price as the representative of the estate. The petition was heard upon stipulated facts and the findings and decree amended, Dahl, J. From the order modifying its findings and decree, David H. Fridley, as administrator, appealed to the district court for that county. The appeal was heard before Jelley, J., who set aside the findings and order of the probate court. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, the Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank of Minneapolis, Hennepin County Savings Bank and Union State Bank appealed. Modified.
Administration a proceeding in rem.
1. The administration of the estate of a deceased person is a proceeding in rem.
Administration a proceeding in rem -- jurisdiction of probate court.
2. When the person alleged to be deceased is in fact dead and in fact left an estate within the territorial jurisdiction of the probate court, such court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of administering such estate.
Administration a proceeding in rem.
3. When the power of a particular probate court to administer a particular estate is invoked by a petition proper in form and the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, its jurisdiction attaches to such particular estate when it takes control of the estate by the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in such other manner as the law prescribes.
Letters of administration voidable, not void.
4. If in such case letters of administration be issued to a person not entitled thereto, they are voidable and may be revoked, but are not void ab initio. They are effective to the extent necessary to protect those who in good faith have acted in reliance upon them.
James G. Swan and Keith, Kingman, Cross & Wallace, for appellants.
C. J. Rockwood and Ware & Junell, for respondents.
In 1896 Frederick T. Price was lawfully married at Wheaton in the state of Illinois to one Rose Smith, who is still living and from whom he has never been legally divorced. On October 2, 1907, a marriage ceremony was performed at the city of Minneapolis in this state between Frederick T. Price and Mary R. Fridley, and thenceforth they lived together in the city of Minneapolis as husband and wife and held themselves out as such until the death of Mary R. Fridley, then known as Mary Fridley Price, on November 28, 1914. She had no children and left no will; her mother had died before her death, and her next of kin and only heir was her father, David H. Fridley. Both she and her father believed that Price was her lawful husband, for neither knew that he had a former wife still living. Immediately after her death, Price presented a petition in proper form to the probate court of Hennepin county, in which he stated that he was the surviving husband of Mary Fridley Price, deceased, and asked to be appointed administrator of her estate. Letters of administration were issued to him on December 28, 1914, and he thereafter fully administered the estate, rendered his final account, and caused a final decree to be entered, assigning the property to himself as surviving spouse. The probate proceedings were in all respects regular, and complied in form with all the requirements of the law. In October, 1915, David H. Fridley learned that Price had a former wife still living, and that consequently he had never been the husband of Mary Fridley Price as the marriage between them was absolutely void. G.S. 1913, § 7106. Promptly thereafter, David H. Fridley made an application to the probate court to vacate and set aside all the probate proceedings had by Price as unauthorized and void, for the reason that he was not the husband of the decedent and had no interest in her estate. The probate court granted this application, and made an order, dated December 6, 1915, vacating and annulling all proceedings had under the petition filed by Price, on the ground that the court had acquired no jurisdiction over the estate by the filing of such petition. On January 7, 1916, letters of administration were issued to David H. Fridley.
At the time of her death Mary Fridley Price had money on deposit in three different banks in Minneapolis. After Price had been appointed administrator of her estate, these banks in good faith paid these deposits to him as such administrator. After Fridley was appointed administrator, he brought suit against the banks to recover these deposits. Thereafter and on April 25, 1915, the banks (which had not been parties to the prior probate proceedings) made an application to the probate court to amend and modify its order of December 6, 1915, by striking out the portion thereof which vacated and annulled the entire proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Upon this application the probate court modified its order of December 6, 1915, so that such order vacated and annulled the final decree, the order allowing the final account of Price, the order discharging him and his bond, and withdrew and revoked the letters of administration issued to him, without vacating the other orders or declaring the proceeding void for lack of jurisdiction. Fridley appealed to the district court. The district court rendered judgment to the effect that Price was not the surviving spouse of the deceased; that he never had any interest in her estate either as surviving spouse or otherwise; that he was not a person entitled to present a petition for the administration thereof; that everything done in the premises was without jurisdiction and void, and that the entire proceeding and each and every order and decree made therein was vacated, annulled and declared void. The banks appealed to this court. Price having been convicted in January, 1916, of the murder of Mary Fridley Price (see State v. Price, 135 Minn. 159, 160 N.W. 677), took no part in the proceedings conducted by the banks.
A single question is presented: Whether the probate proceedings initiated by Price were or were not void ab initio, for the reason that he was not the surviving spouse of the decedent, and did not in fact have any interest in her estate. All the material facts were stipulated to in both the probate court and the district court and are conceded in this court.
The Constitution provides that the probate courts "shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution." [Art. 6, § 7.] The administration of the estate of a deceased person is a proceeding in rem, the estate being the res. Morin v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. 33 Minn. 176, 22 N.W. 251; Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. 44 Minn. 5, 46 N.W. 79; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99, 69 L.R.A. 785; Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L.Ed. 283. That the person whose estate is sought to be administered is in fact dead, and in fact left an estate within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular probate court, are the fundamental facts which give that probate court jurisdiction of the subject matter of administering such estate. Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L.Ed. 283; Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mnfg. Co. 86 Minn. 140, 90 N.W. 378; Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 86 Am. Dec. 643. The probate court is given no jurisdiction over the estates of living persons (except those under guardianship with which we are not now concerned); and it is universally held that, although evidence be presented justifying the belief that a person is dead and the probate court assumes jurisdiction and administers his estate in the belief that he is dead, yet, if he in fact be living, the entire proceeding is coram non judice and utterly void ab initio, for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter. Many of the numerous cases so holding are cited in the note found in 4 Ann. Cas. at page 1119. The jurisdiction is limited to the estate of the deceased person and the proceeding is in rem. If there be no estate, or if the estate be beyond the reach of the court, there is no res upon which the power of the court can operate. This is recognized in Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. 44 Minn. 5, 46 N.W. 79; State v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 84 Minn. 289, 87 N.W. 783; Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mnfg. Co. 86 Minn. 140, 90 N.W. 378; Hanson v. Nygaard, 105 Minn. 30, 117 N.W. 235, 127 Am. St. 523.
When a person dies and leaves an estate upon which the power of a particular probate court can operate, that court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of administering such estate, and its jurisdiction over the particular estate attaches when it seizes the res, that is, when it takes control of the estate in the manner and by the means...
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