Withers v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 01 January 1864
• Citation: 27 Tex. 491
• Parties: MARY D. WITHERS AND OTHERS v. WILLIAM PATTERSON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

27 Tex. 491

MARY D. WITHERS AND OTHERS

v.WILLIAM PATTERSON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1864.

The jurisdiction of a court means the power or authority conferred upon it by the constitution and laws to hear and determine causes between parties, and to carry its judgments into effect.

The powers of the county courts, with regard to estates of decedents, are all conferred by statute. Whatever the statute authorizes these courts to do, they may rightfully do.

Though authorized, under certain circumstances, to order a sale of land of a decedent, yet, if the court orders the sale when the circumstances required do not exist, its order is without jurisdiction and without authority.

In the absence of proof as to whether the circumstances required did or did not exist, there always arises a presumption that the county court, in making an order which, under certain circumstances, it has the power to make, acted within the limit of its authority. Therefore, in the absence of such proof, the circumstances which would have authorized the court to make the order are presumed to have existed. But such a presumption can be indulged only in the absence of proof, and not against proof.

NOTE.--Lawler v. White, ante, 250.

Though often said that an order of the county court for the sale of an estate, and a sale under such order, are effectual to pass the title to the purchaser, yet such expressions are predicated on the assumption that, in making the order, the jurisdiction of the court was rightfully called into exercise, and that the order itself was a valid one.

It is not universally true that if a court determines incidentally a question of fact necessary to support its jurisdiction, its determination or judgment can never be collaterally impeached. See the opinion in this case for examples.

Orders or judgments of a county court, made or rendered in the progress of a rightful administration, concerning matters upon which the court had the right to deliberate and decide, cannot be collaterally impeached, because, however erroneous they may be, they are not void.

Orders and judgments which the court has not the power, under any circumstances, to make or render, are, of course, null; and being null, their nullity may be asserted in any collateral proceeding where they are relied on in support of a claim of right.

NOTE.--Trammel v. Philleo, 33 Tex., 395;Marks v. Hill, 46 Tex., 345.

The county court has no general power to order the sale of lands of an estate. It can order such sale for no other purpose than the payment of debts and expenses of administration, or to raise the amount of the allowance for the surviving wife and children, or, in certain cases, for the purpose of partition and distribution among the heirs.

If the grant of letters of administration was void, and not merely irregular or erroneous, that fact may be shown collaterally; and an order of sale of the estate, made in the course of such void administration, would, however regular in form, be also a nullity; and a purchaser at a sale under such order, though in good faith and without notice, would acquire no title.

So, if the grant of letters was valid, but it was apparent by the record that the special circumstances, authorizing the court to order the sale, did not in fact exist, the order of sale was void; and, in a collateral action, it might be shown to be void by the record of the court, even as against a purchaser without notice other than the record imported.

But a bona fide purchaser at an administration sale, made in pursuance of an order which the court had the power to make, takes a good title, unaffected by any irregularities in the proceedings of the court; and his title cannot be impeached collaterally.

See the opinion in this case for a consideration of the cases in which an order, made by a county court for the sale of land of an estate, may be impeached collaterally in an action of trespass to try title, based upon a chain of title dependent for its validity upon the order of sale.

The power of the county court to grant letters of administration in any particular case, depends upon the facts as they exist at the time the letters are granted; and if the court had not the power to grant the letters, all of the proceedings in the course of the administration are nullities, and they can have no validity in favor of any person because such person was ignorant of the want of power in the court to grant the letters of administration.

Upon the estate of an intestate, who died early in 1837, an administrator was appointed in March of that year, who acted as such until July, 1840, when he settled his account and was discharged, there being due him from the estate, and allowed by the court, an unpaid balance of $289. In September, 1840, an administrator de bonis non was appointed, who acted as such until the April term, 1842, when he made his final settlement, showing a balance in his favor of $3.83, and he was then discharged. At the February term, 1843, a third administrator was appointed, but his petition for appointment being lost, the reasons for it do not appear. At the May term, 1843, he petitioned for the sale of the entire estate, alleging that “some small debts have been made against the estate for fees of office, etc., and that a sale of a portion of said estate is necessary to meet said debts,” and further representing that the interest of the estate would be promoted by a sale of the entire estate “under the law which provides for the disposition of estates, where no heirs shall claim within a period of nine years.” The order of sale was granted as prayed for, and the lands of the estate were sold. The records of the county court showing the foregoing facts, it is held that the estate for all purposes, except partition and distribution, had been fully administered by the second administrator; that the small balance due him was to be presumed to have been remitted, and, besides, was subject to the rule de minimis non curat lex; that in view of the facts disclosed by the record, the county court had no power to grant the third administration under which the sale was made; that if the record of the county court were entirely silent, or did not forbid the presumption, it would, perhaps, be presumed in a collateral proceeding like the present, that a necessity for the third administration was shown to the county court; but that this presumption was repelled by the record of the county court, and, therefore, could not be indulged; and, consequently, that it was not error for the district court, in an action of trespass to try title, founded on the sale under the order of the county court, to instruct the jury in substance that the county court had no power to grant the third administration, and that the sale under it conferred no title.

ERROR from Colorado. Tried below before the Hon. Fielding Jones.

Trespass to try title and for damages, brought by the plaintiffs in error against the defendant in error, on the 7th of August, 1858.

The material facts are stated fully in the opinion of the court. There was verdict and judgment below for the defendant, and the plaintiffs prosecute their writ of error.

Harcourt & Robson, for the plaintiffs in error.

Ballinger & Jack, R. L. Foard and H. T. Garnett, for the defendant in error.

BELL, J.

The plaintiffs in this suit are the surviving wife and the children of R. W. Withers, deceased. They claim the land in controversy by a chain of title from the original grantee of the government, Henry Harrison. Henry Harrison died in Colorado county in the early part of the year A. D. 1837. In the month of March, A. D. 1837, Abram Alley was appointed administrator of the estate of Harrison. He continued to act in the capacity of administrator of the estate until the July term, 1840, of the probate court, at which time he presented his final account showing a balance due him by the estate of two hundred and eighty-nine dollars and eighty-four cents ($289.84). The court made a decree discharging Alley from the further administration of the estate, but there was no formal decree entered that the estate was found to have been fully administered. At the September term, 1840, of the probate court, one Wadham was appointed administrator of the estate, and proceeded with the administration, paying the debt due by the estate to Alley, paying taxes, surveying fees and fees of court, collecting money due to the estate from the previous sale of land, etc., until the April term, 1842, of the court, when he presented his final account, showing a balance due him by the estate of three dollars and eighty-three cents. This account was received by the court, and acted on as an account for final settlement, and Wadham was discharged from the administration, and released from further liability.

At the February term, A. D. 1843, William J. Jones was appointed administrator of the estate of Harrison. His petition for letters of administration has been lost from the records of the probate court, and we are, therefore, not informed of the grounds upon which the application was made. At the May term, 1843, Jones petitioned for a sale of all the estate of Harrison. His petition represented that “some small debts have been made against the estate for fees of office, etc., and that a sale of a portion of said estate is necessary to meet said debts.” He further represented that the interest of the estate would be promoted by a sale of the entire estate, “under the law which provides for the disposition of estates, where no heirs shall claim within a period of nine years.” Upon this petition the probate court ordered a sale of all the estate, both real and personal, upon a credit of twelve months; and further ordered that when the purchase money was collected, the administrator should pay all the debts of the estate, and then pay the balance into the treasury of the republic, “according to the provisions of the law made and...