Fried v. Fried

• Decision Date: 11 October 1954
• Docket Number: No. 18685,18685
• Citation: 211 Ga. 149,84 S.E.2d 576
• Parties: Wilma Harris FRIED v. Emile Jacob FRIED.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 576

84 S.E.2d 576

211 Ga. 149

Wilma Harris FRIED v. Emile Jacob FRIED.

No. 18685.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 11, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

Evidence pertaining to the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce granted (in a retrial of the alimony issue) was not germane to the needs of the wife or the ability of the husband to pay alimony. The court erred in admitted this evidence over objection and in charging the jury that it might be considered in determining the amount of alimony to be allowed.

The wife filed a petition for divorce on the ground of cruel treatment, and prayed for custody of the minor child and for temporary and permanent alimony. The husband filed a cross-bill, in which he denied the material allegations of the wife's petition as to cruel treatment, and alleged that the wife had voluntarily abandoned him and had been guilty of cruel treatment, and he prayed that he be granted a divorce. Upon the trial of the cause the jury returned a verdict for a total divorce without stating whether the verdict was for the plaintiff or the defendant, and denied alimony to the wife. On review in this court, the verdict was construed to be one for the plaintiff (wife). The verdict and decree awarding the wife a divorce, with the right to both parties to remarry, was affirmed by this court, but the judgment denying the motion to vacate the verdict and decree as to alimony was reversed, with direction that the next trial be restricted to the question of alimony for the plaintiff and her minor child. See Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862.

On the retrial of the cause the jury returned a verdict allowing an amount as alimony for the support of the child, but denied any alimony for the wife. The wife's motion for new trial and her motion to modify the judgment and decree were both overruled, and she excepted. On review in this court, it was said that, in the absence of any evidence that the wife was guilty of misconduct other than as contended on the first trial (cruel treatment), the court erred in charging the jury that it was the duty of the husband to support the wife when living separately, according to his ability and his condition in life, "unless the wife has forfeited the claim she has on the husband for support by her misconduct." See Fried v. Fried, 209 Ga. 854, 76 S.E.2d 395, 396.

Subsequently, and before the call of the case for retrial on the issue as to alimony, the wife filed a motion to determine the issues to be tried and the evidence, or class of evidence, admissible on the trial. It was the contention of the wife that on retrial of the cause the evidence should be limited as to the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay, and that evidence as to the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce action would not be admissible.

The trial court passed an order in which it was said in part: 'It is the contention of the plaintiff that the issue of misconduct and fault having been determined by the adjudication of the jury on the question of divorce, it would be improper to admit or consider any evidence as to the conduct of the partes prior to the grant of the divorce. While the Supreme Court held in this case 'in the absence of any evidence that the wife was guilty of misconduct other than as contended on the first trial, the court erred in charging the jury (that the wife may forfeit the claim that she has on the husband for support by her misconduct)', this holding is not presently construed by this court as meaning that the conduct of the parties prior to the separation may not be relevant to the question of the amount of alimony.'

The court declined to enter a ruling excluding evidence pertaining to the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce action, citing Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 98, 145 S.E 63. On the trial of the case evidence was admitted as to the conduct of the parties with reference to cruel treatment prior to the divorce decree. To the order denying her motion the wife excepted pendente lite. In her bill of exceptions she assigns error on the order denying her motion for new trial and on her exceptions pendente lite.

Edward F. Taylor, David L. Mincey, Macon, for plaintiff in error.

T. Arnold Jacobs, Popper & Morgan, Joseph W. Popper, Macon, for defendant in error.

HEAD, Justice.

The controlling question in the present case is whether or not the court erred in admitting evidence as to the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce granted. The previous rulings of this court in Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862, and Fried v. Fried, 209 Ga. 854, 76 S.E.2d 395, have become the law of the case and are not subject to review or modification as to the right of the wife to recover alimony from the husband for the support of herself and minor child.

In Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862, this court construed the divorce to have been granted to the wife, and held that the verdict denying her alimony was contrary to law. The guilt or fault of the parties was fixed by the judgment of this court construing the verdict for divorce, and under the ruling that the wife was entitled to alimony, no discretion was vested in the jury to deny, or limit the amount of, alimony on the ground of cruel treatment.

This court having held that the wife was entitled to alimony, and that the evidence was sufficient to show that the husband was amply able to support the wife, this case would fall within the rule stated in Robertson v....