Friedman v. City of Beverly Hills

• Decision Date: 16 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. B090063,B090063
• Citation: 47 Cal.App.4th 436,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 882
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5312, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8599 Jeffrey FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 882

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 882

47 Cal.App.4th 436, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5312,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8599

Jeffrey FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B090063.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

July 16, 1996.

Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp; and Joshua L. Rosen, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gregory W. Stepanicich, City Attorney, Richards, Watson & Gershon, Sayre Weaver, and T. Peter Pierce, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

GILBERT, Associate Justice.

Vehicle Code section 22507 ¹ allows local agencies to create preferential parking on designated streets "... to residents and merchants...." May a city provide preferred parking to its residents, but not to its merchants? Yes, it may.

Jeffrey Friedman, a merchant, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of respondent, the City of Beverly Hills. The judgment denied Friedman a writ of mandate to compel the City to vacate its adoption of the resolution granting preferential parking to residents. Because section 22507 grants local entities broad power to prohibit or restrict parking, and substantial evidence supports the resolution, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

Friedman owns a commercial building at the corner of Burton Way and North Wetherly Drive in Beverly Hills. The building has five retail stores and ten offices. It is located within a small island of property zoned and used for commercial purposes, surrounded by property zoned and used for residential purposes.

Parking is scarce. Friedman's tenants told him that the shortage of parking threatened their businesses. Beginning in 1986, Friedman asked the City to alter existing parking restrictions to alleviate the problems of his tenants. Nearby residents opposed the changes Friedman sought because the proposed restrictions would hinder their ability to park at or near their homes.

What followed were a lengthy series of meetings and hearings involving Friedman, the residents, City officials, City's Traffic and Parking Commission, and other City entities. A variety of proposals were considered, but no compromise could be reached.

Ultimately, the City Council adopted a resolution approving a preferential permit parking zone "LL," pursuant to Beverly Hills Municipal Code section 7-3.202. The resolution allows "1-Hour Parking 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and No Parking 7:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., Monday through Saturday, Except by Permit, for the 300 block of North Wetherly Drive." The resolution allows certain residents to obtain permits so they may park in zone "LL" at any time.

Friedman then sought a writ of mandate to compel the City to vacate the resolution or to issue an injunction preventing its enforcement. His petition asserts that section 22507 preempts local legislators from creating a preferential parking district only for residents and their guests to the exclusion of adjacent merchants.

Section 21 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code, unless expressly authorized herein."

Section 22507 states, in pertinent part: "Local authorities may, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit or restrict the ... parking ... of vehicles ... on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the day. The ordinance or resolution may include a designation of certain streets upon which preferential parking privileges are given to residents and merchants adjacent to the streets for their use and the use of their guests, under which the residents and merchants may be issued a permit ... which exempt them from the prohibition or restriction of the ordinance or resolution.... A local ordinance or resolution adopted pursuant to this section may contain provisions which are reasonable and necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a preferential parking program."

The trial court determined that section 22507 constitutes a general grant of authority to local entities to adopt parking resolutions tailored to meet local needs. The trial court ruled that section 22507, as amended, is broad, permissive and does not require the City to adopt measures in favor of either or both merchants and residents. The trial court concluded that the challenged resolution is consistent with the provisions of section 22507, when the statute is read as a whole.

The trial court acknowledged that its decision is "extremely harsh to petitioners, [but the trial court] cannot determine that it was arbitrary and/or capricious." The trial court found that the record contained evidence to support the six evidentiary findings required by Beverly Hills Municipal Code former section 7-3.202 to support adoption of the resolution.

The trial court denied Friedman's request for a writ and sustained the City's demurrers to certain other causes of action without leave to amend and dismissed the remaining causes of action. The trial court entered its final judgment in favor of the City and this appeal ensued from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

May the City restrict parking only to residents pursuant to section 22507? Interpretation of a statute presents questions of law for this court to decide. (Gardiner Solder Co. v. SupAlloy Corp., Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1537, 1541, 284 Cal.Rptr. 206.) The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 54, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621.) In construing section 22507, we read it as a whole and give significance to every word in it. (Ibid.; Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 478, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592.) We construe its words in their context and harmonize them according to their ordinary, common meaning. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836.) Where a statute is theoretically capable of more than one construction, we choose the one which most comports with the intent of the Legislature. (Ibid.) We consider the consequences which would flow from each interpretation and avoid constructions which defy common sense or which might lead to mischief or absurdity. (Ibid.; Gardiner Solder Co., supra, at p. 1542, 284 Cal.Rptr. 206.) By doing so, we give effect to the legislative intent even though it may be inconsistent with a strict, literal reading of the statute.

"The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof, subject to legislative control." (Ex Parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 639, 192 P. 442; accord Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, 553, 183 Cal.Rptr. 73, 645 P.2d 124.) The right of control over street traffic is an exercise of part of the sovereign power of the state. Local ordinances regulating traffic which are inconsistent with general state laws are invalid. (Ex Parte Daniels, supra, at p. 639, 192 P. 442; Rumford, supra, at pp. 549-550, 553, 183 Cal.Rptr. 73, 645 P.2d 124; City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749, 753, 154 Cal.Rptr. 374.)

The regulation of parking on public streets, as an adjunct to traffic regulation, is similarly preempted by state law. (County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 192-193, 165 Cal.Rptr. 440, 612 P.2d 24; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 11 Cal.Rptr. 340; Bentley v. Chapman (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 1, 3, 247 P.2d 575.) Nonetheless, the regulation of traffic upon a public street is of special interest to the people of a municipality. (Ex Parte Daniels, supra, 183 Cal. at p. 639, 192 P. 442; City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 753-754, 154 Cal.Rptr. 374.) Because of the plenary, preemptive power of the state over such matters, "[s]tatutory amendments take on an added significance where the Vehicle Code is concerned." (Barajas v. City of Anaheim (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 764.) We consider the meaning of section 22507, as amended, with the foregoing rules in mind.

The first sentence of section 22507 states, in pertinent part, "Local authorities may, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit or restrict the ... parking ... of vehicles ... on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the day." The first sentence of section 22507 provides a broad, general grant of power to local entities to regulate the parking of vehicles, even though it does not expressly provide for preferential parking privileges and permits.

The Legislature amended section 22507 to expressly grant local government entities the power to issue preferential parking permits. The second sentence of section 22507 reads, "The ordinance or resolution may include a designation of certain streets upon which preferential parking privileges are given to residents and merchants adjacent to the streets for their use and the use of their guests, under which the residents and merchants may be issued a permit or permits which exempt them from the prohibition or restriction of the ordinance or resolution."

By referring to the ordinance or resolution permitted by the first sentence, the second sentence of section 22507 clarifies the initial grant of power to prohibit or restrict parking. It does so by stating that such an ordinance or resolution may provide for the issuance of preferential permits. The legislative intent of the amendment is to help assure that parking space is readily available to those most affected in a local area.

The last sentence of section 22507, added in 1980, reads, "A local ordinance or resolution adopted...