Frye v. King County

• Decision Date: 11 March 1929
• Docket Number: 21421.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: FRYE et al. v. KING COUNTY et al.

275 P. 547

151 Wash. 179

FRYE et al. v. KING COUNTY et al.

No. 21421.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 11, 1929

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge.

Action by Hermon S. Frye and others against King County and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed with instructions.

Frank E. Hammond, Tucker, Hyland & Elvidge, Shorett, McLaren &amp Shorett, and E. R. Taylor, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Ewing D. Colvin, Harry A. Rhodes, and Wingate & Benz, all of Seattle, and Emil N. Stenberg, of Tacoma, for respondents.

FRENCH J.

For many years prior to 1900, one Edgar Battle and one Clause C Ramsey were the owners of lots 1 and 2 of section 34 township 26 north, range 4 east W. M., King county, Wash. This land bordered on Lake Washington, and on the 17th day of October, 1903, Mr. Battle and Mr. Ramsey, and upland owners, made application to purchase the second-class shore lands lying in front of lots 1 and 2, and a contract was issued to them whereby the state of Washington agreed to sell such shore lands; the payments to be made in installments. The contract provided for forfeiture in case of default.

Thereafter in April, 1906, the Seaboard Security Company caused to be surveyed and staked the Lake Shore View addition to the city of Seattle; the description and dedication of such plat reading as follows:

'This plat of 'Lake Shore View Addition to the City of Seattle' embraces all of the following described tract of land to-wit: Beginning at the 1/4 corner between sections 27 and 34 Tp. 26 N., R. 4 E., W. M., thence N. 89~54' E. 1571.36 Ft., thence N. 22~51' E. 456.20 Ft., thence N. 11~ 18' E. 210.30 Ft., thence N. 13~09' W. 883.60 Ft., thence N. 18~44' W. 739.00 Ft., thence N. 17~14' W. 434.00 Ft., thence N. 89~18' W. 1231.78 Ft., to the place of beginning.'

'Dedication

'Know all men by these presents, That we, the undersigned, Seaboard Security Company, a corporation organized and doing business at the City of Seattle, in said State, being the owners in fee simple of the land above described and embraced in the plat of 'Lake Shore View Addition to City of Seattle' do hereby declare said plat and do hereby dedicate to the use of the public forever the streets and avenues thereon shown.

'In Witness Whereof said Company has caused these presents to be executed by its President and Secretary thereunto duly authorized and its corporate seal thereunto affixed.

Seaboard Security Company, By F. F. Mead, Its President, and Paul C. Murphy, Its Secretary.'

On the 7th day of May, said Battle and Ramsey deeded to the Seaboard Security Company lots 1 and 2, and this deed was duly recorded on the 8th day of May. On the 9th day of May, 1906, the plat was duly filed and recorded. On the 8th day of May, 1906, Battle and Ramsey assigned to the Seaboard Security Company the contract they held for the purchase of the shore lands from the state of Washington, and on July 7, 1906, a deed from the state of Washington to the Seaboard Security Company was issued conveying such lands to the Seaboard Security Company. The shore lands lie wholly without the metes and bounds description of the plat as above set out. The Seattle & International Railway Company's right of way approximately follows the shore of the lake along the entire eastern portion of the plat, and immediately west of the railway right of way is Lake Shore Boulevard, and all of the east and west streets in the plat come into this Lake Shore Boulevard, which runs generally north and south and follows the right of way of the railroad through the entire plat.

Shortly after the land had been platted by the Seaboard Security Company, it was placed on the market and has been sold to a large number of individuals. The lines of the plat extend to the east of the railway right of way, and the lots there are numbered and also the blocks set out. All shore lands, however, that were sold were conveyed by separate description, and there was never any attempt to sell or convey any shore land by lot and block. After disposing of the various tracts as set forth in this plat and the shore lands fronting on the various lots, the Seaboard Security Company apparently went out of business many years ago, but in the fall of 1926 the appellants Frye, Hammond, and Robison purchased certain shore lands from the Seaboard Security Company; these shore lands generally being what would on the plat correspond to the ends of the streets if the streets were extended across the shore lands. The metes and bounds description of the land included in the plat does not include all of Government Lot 2, and the appellants Parker and Godfrey claim to own by right of purchase that portion of Government Lot 2 lying east of the easterly metes and bounds description on the plat. A controversy arising between the respective parties as to their rights to the land involved, and King county claiming that the streets extended to and across the shore lands by reason of the dedication above set out, and certain upland owners intervening, the matter came on for trial in the superior court of King county, and the lower court held that the appellants had no right, title, or interest in or to any part of the land in question. This appeal follows.

It is the well-settled law that in construing a plat the intention of the dedicator controls. The rule has been stated to be: 'The intention of the owner is the very essence of every dedication.' City of Palmetto v. Katsch, 86 Fla. 506, 98 So. 352. See, also, McCoy v. Thompson, 84 Or. 141, 164 P. 589; Van Wieren v. Macatawa Resort Co., 235 Mich. 606, 209 N.W. 825; East Birmingham Realty Co. v. Birmingham Machine etc. Co., 160 Ala. 461, 49 So. 448; Ft. Smith & Van Buren Bridge Dist. v. Scott, 111 Ark. 449, 163 S.W. 1137; Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160; Humphrey v. Krutz, 77 Wash. 152, 137 P. 806.

But this intention must be adduced from the plat itself, where possible, as that furnishes the best evidence thereof.

In Hanson v. Proffer, 23 Idaho, 705, 132 P. 573, the court held in the syllabus: 'The first essential of a dedication is the intention of the owner of the land to dedicate it, and such intention is usually shown by the plat filed. The contrary intention cannot be shown by something hidden in the mind of the land owner.'

In Minton v. Smith, 102 Okl. 79, 227 P. 75, the court, quoting 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, said: 'The intention of the owner in making the plat is to be ascertained from all the marks and lines appearing thereon, and, if possible, such an interpretation should be followed as will give effect to all the lines and statement.'

In Melin v. School Dist., 312 Ill. 376, 144 N.E. 13, the court said: 'The words on the plat indicate the intention of the dedicators.'

And in McCoy v. Thompson, supra, it was said: 'The intent of the dedicator is the foundation and life of all dedications, and the intent must be clearly manifested. Where the dedication is statutory in character, the plat and writing generally furnish the means by which to ascertain the intent, and these like all other writings, must be construed by the terms contained in them.'

It is true, is course, that where the plat is ambiguous parol testimony as to contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties will sometimes be received in arriving at the dedicator's intent; but in this case there is no claim that the plat is in any way ambiguous, so that it must be determined from a consideration of the plat itself and of the descriptions and dedicatory language contained therein, as to whether there was any intention to dedicate the streets lying east of the easterly metes and bounds of the property platted, or east of the upland contained in lots 1 and 2.

One who does not own either the legal or equitable title to land cannot dedicate.

In Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392,

107 P. 178, this court held: 'It is fundamental that title is essential to the dedicator of land. * * *'

One who owns an equitable estate may make a...