Fryman v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 11 May 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 94-SC-305-D,94-SC-313-DG,s. 94-SC-305-D
• Citation: 896 S.W.2d 908
• Parties: Mike FRYMAN, individually, and in his Official Capacity as Bourbon County Jailer; Bourbon County Government; and Dorcas Davis, individually, and in her Capacity as Bourbon Circuit Clerk, Appellants, v. Prentice HARRISON, Appellee. and Prentice HARRISON, Appellant, v. Mike FRYMAN, individually, and in his Official Capacity as Bourbon County Jailer; Bourbon County Government; and Dorcas Davis, individually, and in her Capacity as Bourbon Circuit Clerk, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 908

896 S.W.2d 908

Mike FRYMAN, individually, and in his Official Capacity as

Bourbon County Jailer; Bourbon County Government;

and Dorcas Davis, individually, and in

her Capacity as Bourbon

Circuit Clerk, Appellants, v. Prentice HARRISON, Appellee. and Prentice HARRISON, Appellant, v. Mike FRYMAN, individually, and in his Official Capacity as

Bourbon County Jailer; Bourbon County Government;

and Dorcas Davis, individually, and in

her Capacity as Bourbon

Circuit Clerk, Appellees.

Nos. 94-SC-305-DG, 94-SC-313-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

May 11, 1995.

Leslie Patterson Vose, Landrum, Shouse & Patterson, Lexington, Chris Gorman, Atty. Gen., William B. Pettus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civ. Div., Frankfort, Jane Durkin Samuel, Sheila P. Hiestand, Landrum & Shouse, Lexington, for appellants/appellees, Mike Fryman, Bourbon County Government and Dorcas Davis.

Douglas R. Wright, Judy M. Wright, Wright & Wright, Falmouth, for appellee/appellant, Prentice Harrison.

G. Phillip Williams, R. Thaddeus Keal, Williams and Wagoner, Louisville, for amicus curiae Ky. Ass'n of Counties.

REVERSING IN PART AND AFFIRMING IN PART

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.

This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal against the defendants in their official capacities on the basis of sovereign immunity. However, a majority of the Court of Appeals held that the jailer and the circuit clerk could be sued individually for negligent acts.

Harrison alleges that injuries suffered by him as a result of an assault by Robert Custard would not have occurred except for the negligence of the government officials who released Custard from jail without requiring that a bail bond be properly posted. The Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the circuit court which had dismissed the complaint against the government officials.

The questions presented are whether the jailer and the circuit clerk are liable in an individual capacity; whether they have a duty to protect Harrison from harm; whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be abolished and whether the dismissal by the circuit court was proper.

In January of 1991, Custard was arrested in Bourbon County and charged with first-degree assault and wanton endangerment for an incident involving the shooting of a woman and himself. He was released on $15,000 unsecured bail bond signed by his parents. At arraignment, his parents were released from the bond at their request, and Custard was placed in the custody of the jailer. Custard was released on April 22, 1991, without another bond being posted. He assaulted Harrison on June 12, 1991, in Harrison County. He pled guilty to the offense of second-degree assault and was sentenced to five years for the crime of assault. Harrison filed suit alleging that the circuit clerk was negligent in completing documentation on a bond revocation and that the jailer was negligent in releasing Custard following the bond revocation and that such negligence caused the injury suffered by Harrison when he was assaulted by Custard in June. Harrison also filed a civil complaint against Custard but he is not a party to this appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Bourbon County and the jailer and clerk in their official capacities but remanded all claims against the jailer and clerk in their individual capacities. This Court granted discretionary review to Fryman and Davis with regard to their individual liability and to Harrison in respect to the question of sovereign immunity.

In this analysis of legal duty, we have determined that the major issue is the question of foreseeability. In order to apply any "universal duty of care" to a particular circumstance, "it must appear that the harm was foreseeable and the facts must be viewed as they reasonably appeared to the parties charged with negligence...." North Hardin Developers v. Corkran, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 258 (1992); Mitchell v. Hadl, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 183 (1991). If the ultimate injuries were not foreseeable to the governmental officials in their individual capacity, and if the victim of the injury was not identifiable, there was no duty to prevent such an injury. Cf. Grayson v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328 (1987).

The Court of Appeals goes far beyond the decision of this Court in Grayson, supra. The concepts of foreseeable injury and readily identifiable victim are broadly extended regardless of foreseeability. The requirement of a "duty to all" is a beginning point for any duty analysis. The examination must be focused so as to determine whether a duty is owed, and consideration must be given to public policy, statutory and common law theories in order to determine whether a duty existed in a particular situation.

In this case, the jailer and the clerk cannot be held individually responsible for the criminal acts of an inmate after that inmate has been released from the custody of the jailer for over two months. Public officials in an individual capacity or otherwise, cannot be expected to protect every individual whether known to them or not from any possible harm by third parties. Fryman and Davis did not have a duty to protect anyone from harm who was not readily identifiable.

In order to establish an affirmative legal duty on public officials in the performance of their official duties, there must exist a special relationship between the victim and the public officials. Ashby v. Louisville, Ky.App., 841 S.W.2d 184 (1992). Such a requirement relates not only to actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but to an ordinary tort case such as this one. Although the Ashby case involved municipal immunity as well as a § 1983 claim, we find that the decision of the Court of Appeals in Ashby v. Louisville, supra, provides a soundly reasoned position and properly announced a two-part test for determining when a "special relationship" existed. It must be demonstrated that "the victim was in state custody or was otherwise restrained by the state at the time in question, and that the violence or other offensive conduct was perpetrated by a state actor." Here, it was not alleged that Harrison was in state custody or otherwise restrained by the state, or that Custard was a state actor. Therefore, there was no special relationship between Harrison and the clerk and jailer. The relationship between Custard, the clerk and the jailer was only a general duty owed to the public at large and not specifically to Harrison. In the absence of facts...