Fugate v. Ronin

• Decision Date: 03 July 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34443,34443
• Parties: Carll Ann FUGATE, a minor by and through John McArthur, her next friend, Appellant, v. Herbert A. RONIN, County Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 240

91 N.W.2d 240

167 Neb. 70

Carll Ann FUGATE, a minor by and through John McArthur, her next friend, Appellant, v. Herbert A. RONIN, County Judge, Appellee.

No. 34443.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

July 3, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. If a statute is unambiguous courts will not by interpretation or construction usurp the function of the law making body and give it a meaning not intended or expressed by the Legislature.

2. A statute is not available for construction as a matter of course. If it is unambiguous there is no room for construction and courts may not search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.

3. Juvenile courts do not have the sole or exclusive jurisdiction of children under 18 years of age who have violated our laws.

4. The county attorney is not limited by the Juvenile Court Act in any way in his duty to file proper complaints against wrongdoers and prosecute the same.

5. The words 'the case,' as used in the mandatory provision of section 43-211, R.R.S.1943, as they relate to justices of the peace and police magistrates in counties having a population of more than 50,000, refer to criminal matters of which those courts have jurisdiction and which the presiding magistrates thereof have authority to adjudicate and, whenever such provision applies, it is mandatory upon the presiding magistrate and not an optional privilege which may be exercised in behalf of the minor so charged.

6. A preliminary hearing on a felony charge is not a 'case' within the meaning of section 43-211, R.R.S.1943.

7. It is clearly the duty of this court to give a statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can be reasonably done.

8. The constitutionality of a statute will not be determined unless necessary to a proper disposition of the pending case.

John McArthur, Lincoln, Edmund O. Belsheim, Lincoln, of counsel, for appellant.

Clarence S. Beck, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. H. Meyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, WENKE, BOSLAUGH, JJ., and NEWKIRK, District Judge.

WENKE, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court for Lancaster County. It involves an action brought therein by Caril Ann Fugate, a minor, by and through John McArthur, her next friend, against Herbert A. Ronin, county judge of Lancaster County, seeking a writ of prohibition against him as such county judge. The district court denied plaintiff the writ. She thereupon filed a motion for new trial and this appeal was taken from the overruling thereof.

The writ of prohibition, and under what circumstances a litigant is entitled thereto, is fully set out and discussed in Conkling v. DeLany, Neb., 91 N.W.2d 250. See, also, State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676.

At all times herein material appellee was the duly elected, qualified, and acting county judge in and for Lancaster County. On February 3, 1958, the county attorney of Lancaster County filed a complaint in said county court charging the appellant with murder in the first degree on two counts. Appellant was arraigned thereon before appellee on February 3, 1958, and entered a plea of 'Not Guilty' to both counts. Thereupon appellee ordered a preliminary hearing to be held thereon at 9:30 a. m. on March 8, 1958. On March 8, 1958, on motion of the county attorney and by agreement of the parties, the preliminary hearing was continued to March 29, 1958, at 9:30 a. m. On February 19, 1958, appellant filed a motion requesting an order of the county court transferring the case to the juvenile court of Lancaster County on the ground that at the time the alleged offenses charged were committed (January 27, 1958) appellant was 14 years of age. The record shows appellant was born on July 30, 1943. Appellee overruled this motion on March 22, 1958. Thereupon this action was commenced to prohibit appellee, as county judge, from holding a preliminary hearing upon the complaint and from taking any other or further action thereon.

The fundamental question raised by this action is whether or not the appellee, as county judge of Lancaster County, was under a mandatory duty to transfer the complaint to the juvenile court. It is appellant's thought that section 43-211, R.R.S.1943, imposed a mandatory duty upon the appellee to transfer the complaint to the juvenile court for Lancaster County when she made a motion requesting the court to do so.

The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act (Laws 1905, c. 59, p. 305), which deals with the treatment and control of dependent, neglected, and delinquent children and is now a part of Chapter 43, article 2, R.R.S.1943, and the constitutional right of the Legislature to enact legislation in regard thereto in the manner that it did have been fully discussed by this court in State ex rel. Miller v. Bryant, 94 Neb. 754, 144 N.W. 804; Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 188 N.W. 110; Krell v. Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308, 43 A.L.R.2d 1122. Consequently no useful purpose would be served by again dealing therewith in this opinion.

Section 43-211, R.R.S.1943, provides: 'When in any county where a juvenile court is held, as provided in section 43-204, a child under the age of sixteen years is arrested with or without warrant, such child may, instead of being taken before a justice of the peace or public magistrate, be taken directly before such court, or if the child is taken before a justice of the peace or police magistrate, it shall be the duty of such justice of the peace or police magistrate to transfer the case to such court, and the officer having the child in charge, to take the child before that court. In any case the court may proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the same manner as if the child had been brought before the court upon complaint or affidavit as herein provided. In any case, the court shall require notice to be given and investigation to be made as in other cases under this act and may adjourn the hearing from time to time for that purpose.'

Section 43-204, R.R.S.1943, referred to in section 43-211, R.R.S.1943, and which relates to Lancaster County because its population is over 50,000, provides: 'In counties having a population of more than fifty thousand, the judges of the district court, on being inducted into office, shall select one of their number to preside over what shall be termed the 'juvenile court.' The judge so selected shall serve throughout his term, unless the judges choose, in the same manner as the original selection was made, another of their number to so act. The judge of the juvenile court shall hear all cases arising under the provisions of this act, and shall give precedence thereto. He shall also hear such other cases as may be assigned to him but may transfer such other cases to another judge for hearing or trial. A special courtroom, to be designated as the 'juvenile courtroom,' shall be provided for the hearing of cases arising under the provisions of this act. The finding of the court in such cases shall be entered in a book or books kept especially for the purpose, one of which shall be known as the 'juvenile record."

Section 43-202, R.R.S.1943, provides: 'The district courts of the several counties in this state, and the judges thereof in vacation, shall have original jurisdiction in all cases coming within the terms of this act; the county court in each county shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the district court, but in counties having a population of more than fifty thousand such jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the county court except in the absence of the judge or judges of the district court from the county. Where a preceeding has been instituted under this act before any county court, the jurisdiction of this court over such proceedings shall continue until the final disposition thereof; Provided, appeal may be had to the district court in the same manner as is provided by law in civil cases. In all trials under this act where a delinquent child is charged with a crime, any person interested therein may demand a jury or the judge of his own motion may order a jury to try the case; Provided, in cities having a population of forty thousand and upward, the police judge thereof shall have jurisdiction under this act concurrent with the county judge, within the limit of such city.'

In the construction of these statutes the following principles apply:

'If a statute is unambiguous courts will not by interpretation or construction usurp the function of the lawmaking body and give it a meaning not intended or expressed by the Legislature.

'A statute is not available for construction as a matter of course. If it is unambiguous there is no room for construction and courts may not search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.' Ledwith v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 156 Neb. 107, 54 N.W.2d 409, 412.

It will be noted that the mandatory provision of section 43-211, R.R.S.1943, does not specifically refer to county judges but only to justices of the...