Fugate v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County

• Decision Date: 08 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 01-2069-KHV.,CIV. A. 01-2069-KHV.
• Citation: 161 F.Supp.2d 1261
• Parties: Roderick I. FUGATE, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY, KS. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

161 F.Supp.2d 1261

Roderick I. FUGATE, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY, KS. et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 01-2069-KHV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

August 8, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles H. McKenzie, Accurso Law Firm, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

F. Charles Dunlay, IV, Unified Government Legal Dept., Kansas City, KS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VRATIL, District Judge.

Roderick Fugate brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas, the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department, the District Attorney's Office For the 29th Judicial District Of The State of Kansas, Cline Boone, Matthew Bock, Dennis Davis, Wyandotte County Adult Court Services and Robert Podebarach, alleging that they violated his right to be free from unlawful seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also sues all defendants on state law claims of negligence, false arrest and false imprisonment. This matter comes before the Court on the Motion To Dismiss (Doc. # 18) which the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department filed March 15, 2001, and the Motion To Dismiss Of Defendants Boone, Bock, Podebarach, Wyandotte County Adult Court Services, and The District Attorney's Office for The 29th Judicial District (Doc. # 21), also filed March 15, 2001.¹ For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that both motions should be sustained.

Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

The Court may exercise jurisdiction only when specifically authorized to do so, see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir.1994), and must "dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Scheideman v. Shawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 F.Supp. 279, 281 (D.Kan.1995) (quoting Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.1974)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The party who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction is proper. See Basso, 495 F.2d at 909. When federal jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff bears the burden of showing why the case should not be dismissed. See Jensen v. Johnson Co. Youth Baseball League, 838 F.Supp. 1437, 1439-40 (D.Kan.1993).

Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must assume as true all well pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and view them in a light most favorable to plaintiff. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); see also Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984). The Court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 118, 110 S.Ct. 975; see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a); Lafoy v. HMO Colorado, 988 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir.1993). The Court, however, need not accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in nature, i.e., which state legal conclusions rather than factual assertions. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint is not whether he will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. See id. The Court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his theory of recovery that would entitle him to relief. See Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir.1991). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of his claims, he must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

Facts

Robert Podebarach is an employee or officer of Wyandotte County Adult Court Services ("Court Services"). Cline Boone and Matthew Bock are attorneys who are licensed to practice law in the State of Kansas. At all relevant times they worked in the District Attorney's Office ("D.A.'s Office"). Dennis Davis is a supervisor in the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department"). At all times alleged in the complaint, Podebarach, Davis, Boone and Bock were acting within the course and scope of their employment.

On May 24, 1999, Leroy K. Briggs committed felony crimes of burglary and criminal damage to property. Briggs possessed a fake Missouri driver's license in the name of "Rodrick Fugate," and the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas issued an arrest warrant for "Rodrick Fugate" which listed the information from that driver's license.² The Sheriff's Department then entered the arrest warrant into law enforcement computer systems. That same day, when law enforcement officers arrested him on the warrant, Briggs falsely identified himself as "Rodrick Fugate." The Sheriff's Department took photographs and fingerprints of Briggs. Unified Government and Sheriff's Department employees, including Davis, saw that Briggs had a tattoo of a bulldog on his forearm and that he wore glasses. Seven weeks later, on July 12, 1999, officials released Briggs (whom they still knew as "Rodrick Fugate") on bond. Briggs later failed to appear for a hearing and on August 10, 1999, the District Court of Wyandotte County issued a bench warrant for him-still in the name of "Rodrick Fugate." Employees of the Sheriff's Department and/or the Unified Government again entered the warrant into the law enforcement computer systems.

At some point before February 10, 2000, employees of Court Services (including Podebarach), the D.A.'s Office (including Bock and Boone) and the Sheriff's Department learned that Briggs was using the false name of "Rodrick Fugate."

On February 10, 2000, police officers in Kansas City, Missouri arrested Roderick L. Fugate (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff") on a traffic warrant issued by the Municipal Court Division of Kansas City, Missouri. Plaintiff paid a bond to be released, but officers then advised him of other warrants issued against him. These warrants were actually for traffic offenses that Briggs had committed while using the name "Rodrick Fugate." Plaintiff nonetheless posted bail for those warrants. Officers also advised plaintiff that the District Court of Wyandotte County had issued a felony warrant for his arrest, and they detained him in Jackson County, Missouri pending extradition to Kansas on that warrant. Plaintiff protested, claiming that he had not committed any felony offenses. On February 14, 2000, plaintiff appeared in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri and formally waived extradition to Kansas. That same day, law enforcement officers transported plaintiff to the Wyandotte County Detention Center on the felony warrant in the proceeding against Briggs. Plaintiff continued to protest that he had not committed any offenses and that they had detained the wrong person. The Sheriff's Department, however, did not investigate his claims of innocence.

Plaintiff asserts that defendants knew or with the exercise of reasonable care should have known that no warrant existed for his arrest. Plaintiff relies on the facts that (1) Briggs had been using the false name of "Rodrick Fugate," (2) the warrant named "Rodrick Fugate," not Roderick Fugate, (3) the warrant was for an individual with an operator's license, but plaintiff had a commercial driver's license, (4) the warrant listed a social security number and date of birth which were different from plaintiffs, (5) the warrant was for an individual with a bulldog tattoo, but plaintiff had no such tattoo and (6) Briggs' photograph and fingerprints did not match plaintiff's.

On February 15, 2000 — the day after plaintiff was committed to the Wyandotte County Detention Center — an employee of the Unified Government or Sheriff's Department told plaintiff that he knew that plaintiff was not the "Rodrick Fugate" whom authorities were seeking. Defendants nonetheless kept plaintiff in custody until the following day, February 16, 2000.

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action under Section 1983, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be secure in his person and to be protected from unreasonable seizure of his person. Plaintiff alleges that defendants acted pursuant to the custom and policy of the Sheriff's Department, the D.A.'s Office, Court Services and the Unified Government, and that all of these defendants knew or should have known that the alleged wrongs would be committed. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants had a practice and custom of failing to rectify discrepancies between information entered into the computer, and information regarding the person arrested, and that this practice or custom was likely to lead to an unauthorized arrest. Plaintiff complains that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his rights. He alleges that defendants did not properly train or supervise officers and employees to review arrest warrants and verify identifying information before initiating arrests. Plaintiff also advances state law claims of negligence, false arrest and false imprisonment.

Analysis

The Court first notes that plaintiff's complaint does not state whether he has sued the individual defendants in their official or personal capacities. Where the complaint does not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally or in their official capacities, or both, the Court must look to the course of proceeding to determine the nature of the liability sought to be imposed. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.1991). In his response to defendants' motion, plaintiff states that he sues the individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Further, the individual defendants have also argued that they are entitled to...