White v. Oklahoma ex rel. Tulsa County Office
| Decision Date | 22 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-CV-158-EA(J).,02-CV-158-EA(J). |
| Citation | 250 F.Supp.2d 1319 |
| Parties | Eddie Dean WHITE, Plaintiff, v. State of OKLAHOMA, Ex Rel., TULSA COUNTY OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
James M Caputo, Tulsa, OK, for Eddie Dean White, plaintiff.
Linda Kay Greaves, District Attorney's Office, Tulsa, OK, for Tulsa County Dist. Attorney's Office, Tim Harris, defendants.
Andrew T Rees, Tulsa City Attorney, Tulsa, OK, for City of Tulsa, defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (Dkt.# 36) of the United States Magistrate Judge with respect to defendant City of Tulsa's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#3) and defendant Tim Harris' ("Harris") Motions to Dismiss (Dkt.##4, 11). Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner recommended that the Court grant the City of Tulsa's request for dismissal, and grant in part and deny in part Harris' request for dismissal. Harris filed a timely Objection (Dkt.# 37) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b), and Eddie White ("White") filed an Objection (Dkt.# 38) and a Response to Harris' Objection (Dkt.# 39). Accordingly, the Court has conducted a de novo review.
White alleges civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his arrest on or about October 25, 2000, in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. White contends that he was falsely arrested after his name and physical description were transposed onto an arrest warrant to apprehend a suspect wanted for indecent exposure.
On August 22, 2000, Eddie M. Barnet ("Barnet") reported an indecent exposure incident to Tulsa Police Officer Odell ("Officer Odell") naming Edward Dean White as the perpetrator. Barnet knew the suspect's identity because she recognized the perpetrator as the son of her landlord Erma White. In her statement to police, Barnet described the suspect as a Negro male with a dark complexion, black hair and brown eyes, approximately six foot one inch in height, and 175 pounds in weight. Barnet also provided police with the suspect's address: 2247 N. Quincy Ave., Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Police Detective Greg Douglass ("Detective Douglass") interviewed Barnet on September 8, 2000, at which time Barnet relayed the information previously given to Officer Odell. On September 15, 2000, officers from the Tulsa Police Department prepared a Prosecution Report naming Edward Dean White as the suspect. The Prosecution Report did not contain any of the suspect's descriptive information.
White alleges that on September 15, 2000, Detective Douglass and an unnamed clerk for the police department prepared an affidavit for an arrest warrant for Edward Dean White. The affidavit described the suspect as a Black male, date of birth 6/22/60, social security number 448666637, residing at 2247 N. Quincy Ave., Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74110. However, the affidavit contained the birth date and social security number of Eddie Dean White, the plaintiff.
On October 12, 2000, the Honorable Peter Messier, District Court of Tulsa County, executed a Warrant of Arrest for "Eddie Dean White." The warrant described the suspect as an Indian male, five foot ten inches in height, 175 pounds, black hair, green eyes, date of birth 6/22/60, social security number 448666637, and home address of 2247 N. Quincy Ave., Tulsa, Oklahoma.
White alleges that employees of the District Attorney's office supplemented the arrest warrant information as follows: changing the suspect's first name from Edward to Eddie; adding an a.k.a. of Edward; changing suspect's height from 6'00"-6'01" to 5'10"; changing eye color from brown to green; changing suspect's race from Negro to Indian; changing the zip code from 74110 to 74106; adding a driver's license number 06019096; adding a District Attorney's History Number 040279; and adding a Tulsa Police Identification Number P1686.
White was arrested for the crime of indecent exposure and peeping torn on October 25, 2000. White contends that Assistant District Attorney Ron Fraley announced at the preliminary hearing on April 27, 2001 that he had spoken with the victim, Barnet, who stated the perpetrator was a Black male. Barnet claimed she had never before seen the individual that the police arrested.
A motion to dismiss is properly granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Ramirez v. Department of Corrections, 222 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000). For purposes of making this determination, a court must accept all the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ramirez, 222 F.3d at 1240. However, the Court need not accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Conclusory allegations state legal conclusions rather than factual assertions. Fugate v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 161 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1263 (D.Kan.2001) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Section 1983 provides for civil liability for those who have deprived an individual of his constitutional rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). To establish a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating two elements:
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of' any State or Territory."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Assoc., 787 F.Supp. 189, 191 (W.D.Okla.1992).
A. City of Tulsa's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff alleges that the City of Tulsa is liable under section 1983 based on a custom or policy of deliberate indifference in training its employees to distinguish between races when preparing affidavits and warrants for arrest. A municipality, such as the City of Tulsa, is subject to liability only for official policies of customs that inflict an injury that the government as an entity is responsible for under section 1983. See Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Merely employing a tortfeasor does not subject a municipality to liability under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Id.
Failure to train actions under section 1983 require a direct causal connection between the failure to train and the alleged constitutional violation. In Brown, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[i]n order for liability to attach in a failure to train case, `the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury,' so that it `actually caused' the constitutional violation." Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (citations omitted)). White must do more than merely identify the conduct properly attributable to the City of Tulsa. See Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Rather, for the City of Tulsa to be liable under section 1983, the City of Tulsa itself must be a "moving force" behind the constitutional violation. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
White must further demonstrate the inadequate training evidenced a deliberate indifference on the part of the City of Tulsa. See Brown, 227 F.3d at 1291-92. In order to find deliberate indifference on the part of the City of Tulsa, White must show that "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the City can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
White alleges that the City of Tulsa was negligent in the preparation of affidavits and warrants for arrest and that such negligence indicates a lack of proper training. White fails, however, to demonstrate a causal connection between the City of Tulsa's failure to train and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. In order to be successful on his section 1983 claim, White must demonstrate that the City of Tulsa was a "moving force" behind the deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, in merely alleging that one of the City of Tulsa's employees negligently transposed descriptive information about the suspect, White fails to allege that the City of Tulsa was a "moving force" behind the constitutional violation.
White also fails to allege that the inadequate training evidenced a deliberate indifference on the part of the City of Tulsa. White merely alleges that the City of Tulsa was negligent. Allowing White to establish municipal liability based upon a conclusory statement of negligence would violate the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Canton,...
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