Fukuzaki v. Superior Court

Decision Date21 May 1981
Citation174 Cal.Rptr. 536,120 Cal.App.3d 454
PartiesJimmie FUKUZAKI, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of California, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Respondent, Masae FUKUZAKI, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 20223.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Stephen James Wagner and Desmond, Miller, Desmond & Bartholomew, Sacramento, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Clarence D. Walters, Sacramento, for real party in interest.

EVANS, Associate Justice.

By this petition for writ of mandate, petitioner (Jimmie) seeks to nullify an order of respondent court holding a marital settlement agreement provision for spousal support was modifiable.

Jimmie and Masae separated in 1967, after 16 years of marriage. The parties signed a marital settlement agreement on the 26th day of November 1971. The agreement contained a spousal support provision and a further statement that the agreement was to be merged in the judgment of marital dissolution. On July 25, 1980, Masae secured an order to show cause concerning modification of spousal support. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the court limited its initial hearing to the question of the right of the court to modify the spousal support award under the terms of the agreement. Following a hearing conducted virtually on briefs and an examination of the agreement, the court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider modification. This writ petition followed, and we issued our alternative writ.

Our resolution of the sole question presented is controlled by the provisions of Civil Code section 4811, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), and paragraphs 4, 8, 10, and 17 of the marital settlement agreement.

The provisions of Civil Code section 4811, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), provide as follows:

"(a) The provisions of any agreement between the parties for child support shall be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provisions of such agreement relating to property and support of the wife or husband. All orders for child support shall be law-imposed and shall be made under the power of the court to make such orders. All such orders for child support, even when there has been an agreement between the parties on the subject of child support, may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion of the court, except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke.

"(b) The provisions of any agreement for the support of either party shall be deemed to be separate and severable from the provisions of the agreement relating to property. All orders for the support of either party based on such agreement shall be deemed law-imposed and shall be deemed made under the power of the court to make such orders. The provisions of any agreement or order for the support of either party shall be subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court order, except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke, and except to the extent that any written agreement, or, if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement entered into in open court between the parties, specifically provides to the contrary. (Emphasis ours.)

"(c) This section shall be effective only with respect to property settlement agreements entered into on or after January 1, 1970, and shall not be deemed to affect agreements entered into prior thereto, as to which the provisions of Chapter 1308 of the Statutes of 1967 shall apply."

The pertinent provisions of the settlement agreement provide:

"4. PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT. The purpose of this agreement is to make a final and complete settlement of all rights and obligations concerning the support of wife and minor child and the custody of our minor child."

"8. AGREEMENT IS ENTIRE. This agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties on the matters it covers, and supersedes any previous agreement between us. No other agreement, statement or promise made by or to either of us or the agent or representative of either of us shall be binding on us unless it is in writing and signed by both of us or unless contained in an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on each of us and the heirs, personal representatives, assigns and other successors in interest of each of us."

"10. INCORPORATION AND MERGER INTO JUDGMENT. This agreement shall be submitted to the court for incorporation and merger into...

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11 cases
  • Marriage of Hufford, In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • March 6, 1984
    ...exception requirement of section 4811, subdivision (b) (id., at p. 874, 165 Cal.Rptr. 389). More recently, Fukuzaki v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 454, 174 Cal.Rptr. 536, discussed what language in an agreement was sufficiently specific to preclude judicial modification of spousal ......
  • Marriage of Forcum, In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • July 29, 1983
    ...case discussing what language is sufficiently specific to preclude modification of spousal support was Fukuzaki v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 454, 174 Cal.Rptr. 536. There the marital settlement agreement contained common boilerplate provisions that the purpose of the agreement wa......
  • In re the Marriage of Quock, A117767 (Cal. App. 9/30/2008), A117767
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 30, 2008
    ...enforceable only if they contain "some specific unequivocal language directly on the question of modification." (Fukuzaki v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 454, 458; see also In re Marriage of Jones (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 505, 510.) Here, the October 2002 order, which is based upon the......
  • Kelkar v. Kelkar (In re Kelkar)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 10, 2014
    ...be modified if they contain a “specific” provision precluding modification. The line of cases exemplified by Fukuzaki v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 454, 174 Cal.Rptr. 536 construes the requirement of specificity narrowly, holding language such as the language in the agreement in t......
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