Fulbright v. State
| Decision Date | 01 March 2001 |
| Citation | 41 S.W.3d 228 |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) BENNETT FULBRIGHT, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE NO. 2-99-018-CR |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 10 OF TARRANT COUNTY
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON, J.; and DAVID L. RICHARDS, J. (Sitting by Assignment).
Appellant Bennett Fulbright appeals his conviction for driving with a suspended license. After a jury trial, his sentence was assessed at 150 days' confinement and a $100 fine. On appeal, appellant complains the trial court improperly permitted him to represent himself. Appellant asserts the court failed to adequately admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so his waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily. Appellant also contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint standby counsel. We will affirm.
Appellant was charged by complaint and information with the offense of driving while license suspended. On July 31, 1998 he appeared at a pretrial hearing and announced he was not ready for trial. Appellant stated he was representing himself because he could not afford an attorney. The judge continued the trial until September 14, at which time he apparently appointed a Fort Worth attorney, Ed Jones, to represent appellant. No record was made of that hearing. At an October 26 hearing, appellant informed the trial court that he did not want Jones to represent him, so the court removed Jones from the case. At appellant's request, the court allowed appellant to represent himself and reset the trial for November 5.
On November 4, appellant filed a motion requesting public funds to hire an attorney of his choice to act in an advisory role.1 The following day, appellant appeared without counsel and reiterated his desire to represent himself. In response to the trial court's inquiries about his background, appellant stated that he was a 40-year-old unemployed computer programmer with a degree in computer science and engineering from the University of Texas at Arlington and work towards a master's degree from the University of Houston. Appellant indicated that he had represented himself once before in municipal court for driving without insurance,2 did not have mental or emotional problems, and was not representing himself out of duress or coercion. Appellant stated that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or the range of punishment, so the trial court explained that appellant was being charged with driving while his license was suspended on or before August 17, 1997 and that the punishment range was three to 180 days in jail and up to a $500 fine. The trial court also told appellant a lawyer might aid him in understanding these things. In response to the court's further questioning, appellant stated that he was "not completely" familiar with the rules of evidence governing trial procedure, but did understand his right to a trial by jury and knew the possible dangers associated with representing himself.
Regarding his right to an attorney, appellant explained to the court that he did not want a lawyer to represent him, but wanted to represent himself with assistance from court-appointed standby counsel. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and appellant:
What I don't want the lawyer to do is take over my powers of representation. I need advice and assistance of counsel, but I don't need him to take away my powers of representation, my control over decisions like what kind of defense to present to the jury or whether to make a request for continuation. I want to retain that control.
. . . .
The trial court then agreed to reappoint Jones as standby counsel and reset the trial for November 19.
Before voir dire on November 19, the following exchange occurred:
. . . .
On the day of trial, appellant prepared and signed a declaration, which states in relevant part:
1).I, Bennett Stephen Fulbright, am representing myself and speaking by and for myself in this case and knowingly elected to do so, but have also requested expert assistance.
2).I am financially unable to hire the services I feel I need to fully prepare and conduct my defense, or to do this by myself. I have no job or signiificant [sic] available fundes[.]
During voir dire, the judge informed the jury that appellant was entitled to an attorney, but had chosen to represent himself, and all rules of evidence, procedure, and court would apply to him.
Appellant participated in both phases of his trial, conducted voir dire, gave opening and closing statements, cross-examined and presented witnesses, and made and responded to objections. In addition, he filed numerous pre- and post-trial motions.
In his first two points, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel because he never waived his right to counsel and because he was never adequately admonished about...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. State
...S.W.2d 144, 145-47 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). 28. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824; TEX.R.APP. P. 44.2(a). 29. 41 S.W.3d 228, 235-36 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). 30. Id. at 234. 31. Id. at 235. 32. Id. 33. Id. 34. Id. at 236. 35. Id. 36. Id. 37. Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 578-79......
-
Verhoef v. State
... ... counsel. This right may be waived, and a defendant may choose ... to represent himself at trial. Faretta v ... California , 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, ... 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Fulbright v. State , 41 S.W.3d ... 228, 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) ... However, a waiver of the right to counsel will not be ... inferred lightly, and courts will indulge every reasonable ... presumption against the validity of such a waiver ... Geeslin v ... ...
-
Buster v. State
...In cases of constitutional error, a reviewing court applies Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). Fulbright v. State, 41 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). A constitutional error within the meaning of Rule 44.2(a) is an error that directly offends the United States......
-
Sumrall v. State
... ... defendant in a criminal trial has the right to assistance of ... counsel. This right may be waived, and a defendant may choose ... to represent himself at trial. Faretta , 422 U.S. at ... 819-20, 95 S.Ct. at 2533; Fulbright v. State , 41 ... S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) ... However, a waiver of the right to counsel will not be ... inferred lightly, and courts will indulge every reasonable ... presumption against the validity of such a waiver ... Geeslin v ... ...