Sumrall v. State
| Decision Date | 25 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 12-20-00216-CR,12-20-00215-CR |
| Parties | JAMES ALTON SUMRALL, SR., APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
James Alton Sumrall, Sr. appeals his convictions for driving while his driver's license was invalid and without having established financial responsibility for the vehicle and possession of a handgun in a motor vehicle while driving with a suspended driver's license. Appellant raises four issues on appeal. We affirm.
Appellant was charged by separate informations with driving while his driver's license was invalid and without having established financial responsibility for that vehicle through a motor vehicle liability policy and possession of a handgun in a motor vehicle while driving with a suspended driver's license. Appellant pleaded "guilty" and elected to proceed pro se, although the trial court appointed counsel to attend proceedings on "standby." Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. Ultimately the trial court found Appellant "guilty" as charged on both counts and sentenced him to confinement for ninety days for each offense. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing sua sponte to hold a competency hearing.
We review a trial court's failure to conduct a competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Kostura v State, 292 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Lahood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 617-18 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet ref'd); see also Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A defendant is not competent to stand trial if he lacks (1) a sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2018). If evidence which raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial comes to the trial court's attention, the trial court sua sponte shall "suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial" and, then, "determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial." Id. art. 46B.004 (West 2018); see Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A bona fide doubt is "a real doubt in the judge's mind as to the defendant's competency." Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Evidence raising a bona fide doubt "need not be sufficient to support a finding of incompetence and is qualitatively different from such evidence." Id. Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Kostura, 292 S.W.3d at 747.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that Appellant suffered from mental illness or that he is an individual with any sort of moderate mental or intellectual disability. Appellant first contends that several communications he made to the trial court during trial sufficed to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competence to stand trial to the trial court's attention. The nature of these communications is summarized as follows:
However, Appellant's unusual behavior did not mandate a competency inquiry absent the existence of evidence raising a bona fide doubt as to his present ability to communicate or understand the proceedings. See Kostura, 292 S.W.3d at 747. As the State notes in its brief, despite these unusual statements, Appellant participated in trial, made arguments that are subject to a reasonable legal interpretation, and engaged to an effective degree with the witness during cross examination. The fact that Appellant does not have traditional legal training cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless, Appellant had a right to act as his own counsel. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-35, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540-41, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Based on our review of the record, Appellant's arguments reasonably can be interpreted to have raised issues related to (1) the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the constitutionality of Texas's firearms regulations and licensing scheme, and (3) the State's burden of proof on his identity inasmuch as he declined to concede that issue to the trial court. Lastly, it is undeniable that some of Appellant's statements at trial had a tenuous bearing, at best, on the issues in the case. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that such statements, when made by a defendant acting pro se, without more, trigger the trial court's duty to investigate that pro se defendant's competency.
In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court discussed the matter of pro se representation. See id. In so doing, the Court noted that it is "undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions, defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts" and that a pro se defendant may hope to realize, if at all, the "potential advantage of a lawyer's training and experience . . . only imperfectly." See id., 422 U.S. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
Here, Appellant made several statements that fairly can be described as "off-topic" legal arguments. And while such statements may appear, at first glance, to those with legal education and years of practical experience to be, as Appellant describes them in his brief, "bizarre," they are less than bizarre when considered in the context of a layperson's attempting to defend himself against criminal charges. The trial court reasonably could have construed these statements in this context as Appellant's lodging every potential "legal" argument he could devise, in the hope that one of the arguments would prove fruitful. Some of Appellant's arguments arguably were relevant but not successful. Others simply were neither artfully put nor relevant. Yet, we are mindful that, unlike this court, the trial court was in the best position to judge Appellant's demeanor and behavior. And we cannot rule out the possibility that the trial court reasonably could have interpreted Appellant's communications before it to be a matter of Appellant's behaving in an obdurate, difficult, or disruptive manner in an attempt to derail the ordinary course of the proceedings. In any event, based on our review of the record, we decline to categorize such statements as "truly bizarre" or indicative that Appellant did not understand the proceedings against him, so as to trigger the trial court's duty to conduct a competency hearing. See id.; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a); Kostura, 292 S.W.3d at 747.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the evidence supports that the trial court should have had any real doubt as to the Appellant's competency. See Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 599 n.10. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining sua sponte to investigate Appellant's competence. Appellant's first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that his decision to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se was not made knowingly and intelligently due to his incompetency and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting him to proceed pro se.
The standard by which an appellate court reviews whether the defendant "clearly and unequivocally" has invoked his right to represent himself is an abuse of discretion standard, viewing the evidence in "the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Rodriguez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). An appellate court may imply "any findings of fact supported by the evidence" when, as here, the trial judge "failed to make explicit findings." Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
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