Fulgham v. State
Decision Date | 27 August 1999 |
Parties | Larry Lamar FULGHAM v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
John Fleming Brasfield, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Jack W. Willis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1990228.
AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM. NO OPINION.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision in its unpublished memorandum that the State's fingerprint evidence alone presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain Larry Lamar Fulgham's convictions for three counts of possession of a forged instrument in the second degree.
West v. State, 57 Ala.App. 596, 599, 329 So.2d 653, cert. denied, 295 Ala. 427, 329 So.2d 658 (1976).
"A person commits the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree if he possesses or utters any forged instrument of a kind specified in Section 13A-9-3, [e.g., a check,] with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud." § 13A-9-6(a), Ala.Code, 1975.(Emphasis added.)
As the majority notes with regard to the convictions, evidence was presented by the State that Jack D. Darby and Robert Montgomery ordered blank checks for their checking accounts, but that they never received their checks. The evidence indicated that two forged checks were written on Darby's account and one forged check was written on Montgomery's account. The only evidence presented connecting Fulgham to the offenses was his unauthorized fingerprints on each of the forged checks and the fact that he lived close to Darby and Montgomery's residences. No evidence was presented placing Fulgham in the businesses where the forged checks were presented as payment or offering any handwriting analysis of the signatures on the checks.
Based on the evidence presented by the State, I do not believe that the circumstantial evidence supports Fulgham's convictions for criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. While I agree with the majority that the fingerprint evidence does indicate that Fulgham at some point in time had unauthorized possession of the checks, this fact alone does not prove Fulgham's knowledge and his intent to possess a forged instrument. Section 13A-9-6(a), Ala.Code, 1975, clearly states that a defendant must have knowledge that the instrument is forged and have intent to defraud.
I further disagree with the majority's conclusion that this evidence "authorized the jury to find that the fingerprints were made at the time the crimes were committed." No evidence was presented to establish whether Fulgham had possession of the checks before or after they were forged. Consequently, I do not believe that the jury could find that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. See Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979).
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