Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co.
Decision Date | 13 October 1934 |
Docket Number | 33129 |
Citation | 75 S.W.2d 844,335 Mo. 1058 |
Parties | H. C. Fulkerson and Ida L. Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Company, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Rehearing Granted, Reported at 335 Mo. 1058 at 1067.
Appeal from Andrew Circuit Court; Hon. Guy B. Park, Judge Opinion filed at May Term, 1934, May 17, 1934; motion to modify opinion filed; motion overruled at September Term October 13, 1934.
Reversed and remanded.
Charles M. Blackmar, Samuel D. Newkirk and Kenneth E. Midgley for appellant; Merservey, Michaels, Blackmar, Newkirk & Eager and Booher & Wolverton of counsel.
(1) The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' witnesses, Charles Holland, and others, to testify as to the market value of the land before the pipe line was laid and as to its market value immediately after the pipe line was laid, leaving out of consideration damages done to fences, crops and the surface of the land. Under the right of way agreement sued upon and the evidence in the case, plaintiffs were entitled to recover only for damages done to crops, fences and the surface of the land. O'Connor v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 63 F.2d 523; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 87; Bolt & Nut Co. v. Caldwell, 240 Mo. 365; Blanke Bro. v. American Surety Co., 297 Mo. 41; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; Southern Surety Co. v. Town of Greenville, 261 F. 929; Hickman v. Cabot, 183 F. 747; Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 259 F. 658; Pulom v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 182 F. 356; Swift & Co. v. Columbia Ry. Co., 17 F.2d 46; McSherry v. Heimer, 132 Minn. 260, 156 N.W. 130; Merchants & Mfgs. Lloyds Ins. Exc. v. So. Trading Co., 205 S.W. 352; Allen v. Murray, 182 N.Y.S. 369, 112 Misc. 156; Sands v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 115 Wis. 232, 91 N.W. 679; Liggett v. Levy, 233 Mo. 590; Stanton Co. v. Underwriters Agency, 206 F. 983; Corbett v. Winston, etc., Co., 296 F. 577. (2) The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' witnesses, H. C. Fulkerson and Hosea Jackson to testify as to the reasonable market value of the land before the pipe line was laid and as to its reasonable market value immediately after the pipe line was laid. See authorities under Point 1, supra.
Daniel H. Frost and Culver & Phillip for respondents.
(1) Plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the damages done by the construction, operation and maintenance of the pipe line to that portion of the tract of land not actually taken. Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 Mo. 663, 267 S.W. 647; Lemon v. Garden of Eden, 310 Mo. 179, 275 S.W. 46; Doyle v. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 287, 20 S.W. 971; 49 C. J. 1328. (2) Where a contract is ambiguous, it will be construed more strongly against the party preparing it or employing the words concerning which doubt arises. And this is especially true where the contract is in the printed form. 13 C. J. 544-5; Grossenbacher v. Daly, 287 S.W. 782; Commercial Electrical Supply Co. v. Mo. Comm. Co., 166 Mo.App. 332, 148 S.W. 995; Belch v. Schott, 171 Mo.App. 357, 157 S.W. 658; Lechner v. Strauss, 98 N.E. 448; Ford v. Clement, 135 S.W. 343; Minge v. Green, 58 N.E. 294; Staten Island v. Sperin, 134 N.Y.S. 98. (3) It has always been an aid in the construction of contracts that we place ourselves in the situation of the contracting parties. This has ever been true in the construction of wills, and evidence aliunde is permitted to place the court in the position of the maker of the instrument. Then he is able to see with the same eye and judge with the same attitude of mind and arrive at the true meaning of the instrument. These are fundamental principles and I will not bother the court with lengthy citations. Coal & Iron Co. v. Coal Co., 176 Mo.App. 407. (4) Another familiar rule is, that a contract should be construed as a whole. 13 C. J. 526; Sconce v. Surmeyer Co., 258 Mo. 616; Thompson v. Lindsay, 242 Mo. 53; Coal & Iron Co. v. Coal Co., 176 Mo.App. 408; Meyer v. Christopher, 176 Mo. 580. The court ascertains their meaning from all their provisions and not from single words or phrases or sentences, and when the intention of the contracting parties is thus ascertained that intention will be effectuated, unless it violates some inexorable rule of law. Meyer v. Christopher, 176 Mo. 580.
Action for damages claimed by plaintiffs because of the laying of a pipe line across their farm by defendant. Plaintiffs obtained a judgment for $ 600 from which defendant appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals which, by a divided opinion, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause. [Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 60 S.W.2d 71.] Upon the request of the dissenting judge, who deemed the majority opinion in conflict with certain decisions of this court, the Court of Appeals, following the constitutional mandate, certified the cause to this court.
Plaintiffs are owners of 160 acres of improved farm lands in Clinton County, Missouri, occupied by them for farming purposes and the handling of stock. Defendant is a corporation engaged in transporting oil and oil products through Missouri. In October, 1930, defendant procured from plaintiffs a right of way agreement giving defendant the right to lay pipe lines across plaintiffs' said land. As this case turns upon the construction of that contract we set it out in full:
About May, 1931, defendant laid a pipe line across plaintiffs' land, whereby certain damage was done to plaintiffs' fences, crops and the surface of the land along the pipe line. The pipe is two and a half or three feet beneath the surface and does not now interfere with cultivation of the land. For a time a ridge of earth was left and in some places the filled-in earth over the pipe sank, leaving depressions. The ridges and depressions have been leveled and now present no obstacle to the use of the surface. Plaintiffs' petition seeks recovery specifically for the damage to the fences, the corn crop and grass destroyed, damage to the surface of the land occasioned by the ridges and depressions above referred to and the trampling and packing of the soil, all of which are itemized, and in addition damages for depreciation in the "market value and the actual value" of plaintiffs' said tract as a whole "as a result of the grant of said easement and the rights therein given defendant and its assigns and the construction and maintenance of said pipe line."
The case was tried and submitted to the jury on the theory that plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the alleged depreciation in value of the entire tract on account of the grant and the existence of the easement, and plaintiffs were permitted to recover such depreciation, which their evidence introduced over defendant's objections, tended to show, in...
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