Fullard v. City of Raleigh

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal,North Carolina
• Parties: CHANDRA FULLARD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RALEIGH, Defendant
• Decision Date: 22 January 2024
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Docket Number: 2:23-CV-49-D

1

CHANDRA FULLARD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RALEIGH, Defendant

No. 2:23-CV-49-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Northern Division

January 22, 2024

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On August 30,2023, Chandra Fullard (“Fullard” or “plaintiff”) filed a complaint against the City of Raleigh (“City of Raleigh” or “defendant”) alleging sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VH”), 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e et seq., [D.E. 1]. On October 30,2023, the City of Raleigh moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 9] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 10]. OnNovember2,2023, Fullard amended her complaint and alleges Title VH sexual harassment sex discrimination, and retaliation claims. See [D.E. 11] ¶¶ 42-68. Fullard seeks compensatory damages attorneys' fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and any other appropriate relief. See id. at 10. On November 13, 2023, Fullard responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss [D.E. 13]. On November 17,2023, the City of Raleigh moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 14] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 15]. On November 30,2023, Fullard responded in opposition [D.E. 16]. On December 13,2023, the City of Raleigh replied [D.E. 17]. As explained below, the court dismisses as moot the City of Raleigh's motion to dismiss the original complaint and grants the City of Raleigh's motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fullard failed to timely file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); therefore, her Title VH claims are not actionable.

I.

On June 1, 2021, Fullard began working for the City of Raleigh as a Training and Development Analyst. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 11] ¶¶ 9-10. Between August and October 2021, Fullard alleges that her supervisor, Dominick Nutter (“Nutter”): (1) asked her to move her chair closer to his desk in a closed-door meeting; (2) starred at her breasts, after asking her to move closer to him, during a seven-minute training video; (3) touched her breasts when grabbing items from her; (4) made inappropriate comments such as “You're buttering the wrong bread, I'm the one you need to talk to if you want to get what you need,” “I'll give you everything you need,” and “I don't want you anymore, I want [a female family member of Fullard's]”; (5) demanded that she visit his office for no reason; and (6) made sexual comments while licking his lips on a ten minute Microsoft Teams call. Id. at ¶¶ 14-23. In October 2021, Fullard complained to Human Resources. See Id. at ¶¶ 22-25. The City of Raleigh conducted an internal investigation. See Id. at ¶ 25. On January 4, 2022, the investigation concluded and substantiated Fullard's claims against Nutter. See id. at ¶ 30. The City informed Fullard she could either change supervisors and have minimal interaction with Nutter or change positions. See id. at ¶ 31. Fullard wanted Nutter removed from his position and to continue in her same position. See id. at ¶¶ 31-32. Fullard refused to return to work. See id.

On February 1,2022, the City of Raleigh terminated Fullard's employment. See Id. at ¶ 34. The City of Raleigh and Fullard attempted to negotiate a settlement agreement until July 22,2022, but they failed to reach an agreement. See [D.E. 16]3;[D.E. 17] 1. On September 27,2022, Fullard filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2. On June 4,2023, the EEOC issued Fullard right to sue notice. See id. at ¶ 39

II.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl, Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007); Coleman v, Md, Ct, of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,190 (4th Cir. 2010), affd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298,302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v, Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549,557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, a plaintiff's factual allegations must “nudge[] [her] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials “attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d435,448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159,165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263,268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court also may consider a document submitted by a moving party if it is “integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. “|T|n the event of conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . ., the exhibit prevails.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Fayetteville Invs. v. Com. Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a court may take j udicial notice of public records. See, e.g.. Fed.R.Evid. 201; Tellabs, Inc, v, Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176,180 (4th Cir. 2009).

Before a person may file a claim in court under Title VII, the person must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). An EEOC charge suffices “only if it is sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,508 (4th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted); see Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480,491-92 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the content of the EEOC charge determines the scope of plaintiff's right to maintain a Title VII claim in court See, e.g., Hentosh v. Old Dominion Univ., 767 F.3d 413,416-17 (4th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 (2019); Bryant v. BeU Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132-33 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954,963 (4th Cir. 1996); see Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012); Miles, 429 F.3d at 491-92; Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132-33. “Thus, a claim in formal litigation will generally be barred if the EEOC charge alleges discrimination on one basis, such as race, and the formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on a separate basis, such as sex.” Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297,300 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843; Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369,379 (4th Cir. 2011). The same principle applies with respect to a plaintiff who files an EEOC charge with respect to one adverse employment action (such as a failure to rehire), but then seeks to expand the formal litigation claim to a separate adverse employment action (such as an earlier termination). See Bonds, 629 F.3d at 379-80; Jones, 551 F.3d at 300; Miles, 429 F.3d at 491-92; Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509; Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132-33; Evans, 80 F.3d at 963. The rationale behind these principles concerning the scope of an EEOC charge relates to providing fair notice to an employer concerning a charge and to permitting the EEOC to investigate and (if appropriate) resolve the dispute without a lawsuit. See, e.g., Chacko, 429 F.3d at 508-09, 513; Miles, 429 F.3d at 491.

Under Title VII, Fullard had to file her EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged adverse employment action. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1); Davis, 139 S.Ct. at 1846; Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp, v, Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,109-15 (2002); E.E.O.C. v. Com. Off. Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107,110 (1988); Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423,428 (4th Cir. 2004); Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132; Donald v. Novant Health, Inc., __ F.Supp.3d__,2023 WL 5672832, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 1, 2023); Coleman v, Altec. Inc., No. 5:16-CV-954, 2018 WL 4289610, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 7,2018) (unpublished); Young v. Onslow Water & Sewer Auth., No. 7:16-CV-259, 2018 WL 405975, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2018) (unpublished); Barcliff v. N.C. League of Municipalities, No. 5:1 O-CV-244,2011 WL 3290578, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 1,2011) (unpublished); Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., 545 F.Supp.2d 533,539 (E.D. N.C. 2008); McDougal-Wilson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 F.Supp.2d 595,606 n.3 (E.D. N.C. 2006). If a party fails to timely file an EEOC charge, the party “lose[s] the ability to recover for” that claim because the claim is not “actionable.”...