Fuller v. Okaloosa Correctional Inst.

• Citation: 22 So.3d 803
• Decision Date: 24 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1D09-1166.,1D09-1166.
• Parties: William FULLER, Appellant, v. OKALOOSA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION and Division of Risk Management, Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

22 So.3d 803

William FULLER, Appellant, v. OKALOOSA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION and Division of Risk Management, Appellees.

No. 1D09-1166.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

November 24, 2009.

Steven P. Pyle, Winter Park, and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant.

Frank C. Bozeman, III and Colleen Cleary Ortiz of Bozeman, Jenkins & Matthews, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Claimant, a corrections officer, challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying compensation for a cardiac condition. Claimant argues competent substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC's finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational cause of the condition. We agree and reverse.

Background

In 1995, prior to entering into service as a corrections officer with the Employer, Claimant suffered a fainting episode which required medical attention. Claimant was hospitalized and underwent a battery of tests, all of which were negative for any cardiac condition or heart disease. In 1997, Claimant became employed with the Employer as a corrections officer after successfully passing a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of a cardiac condition.

In 2003, while Claimant was employed with the Employer, Claimant had another fainting episode that was attributed to either sick sinus syndrome or vasovagal syncope, conditions which cause a decreased heart rate which, in turn, causes an individual to become dizzy and pass out. As a result, a pacemaker was implanted to prevent the recurrence of such syncopal events.

Claimant filed a claim for compensation for this condition, and the JCC found that whether Claimant was suffering from sick sinus syndrome or vasovagal syncope, both were cardiac conditions and thus, Claimant was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, the JCC found the E/C rebutted the presumption because logic dictated that the same condition that caused the decreased heart rate that resulted in the 1995 syncopal episode (which predated Claimant's employment) was also responsible for the 2003 event. Significantly, this finding was supported by the opinion testimony of the Employer's independent medical examiner (IME), Dr. Videau, who testified that the most likely diagnosis was vasovagal syncope, which was pre-existing and, thus, not job-related. On appeal, this court affirmed the JCC's finding and the resulting denial of compensation. Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 13 So.3d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (PCA).

In 2007, Claimant had another fainting episode. At the time of this event, however, a rapid heart rate was recorded by Claimant's pacemaker. Because the pacemaker was implanted to prevent a decreased heart rate and episodes relating therefrom and further, because an elevated heart rate was recorded, Dr. Mathias, Claimant's cardiology IME, ruled out vasovagal syncope as the cause of the 2007 event — the cause ascribed by the Employer's IME, Dr. Videau. Dr. Mathias further opined that the most likely diagnosis of the condition causing the 2007 event was right ventricle outflow tract (RVOT) tachycardia, which is a rapid heartbeat from the right ventricle. Dr. Mathias could not state whether Claimant had this same condition prior to his employment. Contrarily, Dr. Videau, testified he did not believe Claimant had RVOT tachycardia.

Claimant filed a claim for compensability of the RVOT tachycardia. The JCC found RVOT tachycardia was the only suggested diagnosis which would explain why Claimant suffered the 2007 syncope. The JCC found Claimant established entitlement to the presumption of compensability afforded by section 112.18(1). Nevertheless, the JCC again found the E/C rebutted the presumption because he found it reasonable and logical to conclude RVOT tachycardia caused not only the 2007 episode, but the 1995 and 2003 episodes as well. In explaining the means by which the E/C overcame the presumption of compensability, the JCC stated:

Unlike 2007 when the pacemaker was in place to act as a heart monitor, claimant was not subject to any form of heart monitoring in 1995 or 2003. As a result, there is no evidence Claimant's syncope episodes in 1995 and 2003 were caused by a decrease in heart rate as opposed to an increase in heart rate. If, as Claimant contends and as Dr. Mathias opines, his proper diagnosis is RVOT tachycardia, I find it both reasonable and logical to conclude RVOT tachycardia caused not only the 2007 episode, but the 1995 and 2003 episodes as well.

On appeal, Claimant argues CSE does not support the JCC's finding the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability afforded by section 112.18(1), because no medical evidence established Claimant had a cardiac condition or disease, most notably RVOT tachycardia, prior to entering service as a corrections officer.

Analysis

We begin by noting that the unique procedural posture of this case constrains our analysis. Here, the JCC found Claimant, a corrections officer, had disabling RVOT tachycardia, a cardiac condition, which was undetected on Claimant's pre-employment physical. Accordingly, the JCC concluded Claimant was entitled to the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18(1). These findings and conclusions are not challenged on...