Fulton County v. Woodside, s. 23343
| Decision Date | 07 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | 23344,Nos. 23343,s. 23343 |
| Citation | 222 Ga. 90,149 S.E.2d 140 |
| Parties | FULTON COUNTY et al. v. John J. WOODSIDE, III, et al. CITY OF ATLANTA v. John J. WOODSIDE, III, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
1. The petitioner had standing to attack the constitutionality of the Chief Judge Act and the rules promulgated by the Chief Judge as they deprived him of the alleged right to present his petition for temporary injunction to the superior court judge of his choosing.
2(a). Scetions 2 and 3 of the Chief Judge Act (Ga.L.1963, p. 646) and the rules promulgated by the Chief Judge pursuant thereto, were authorized by the provision of the Constitution of 1945 (Code Ann. § 2-3801) providing that 'The Legislature * * * shall have authority to regulate the manner in which the judges of such circuits (with more than one judge) dispose of the business thereof.'
(b). The Chief Judge Act does not violate the uniformity provision of the Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-4401), which relates to the jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and practice of all courts or officers invested with judicial powers, of this State for the reason that the language of that provision is preceded by these words 'Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution * * *' and by an amendment to the Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-3801) the legislature is given authority to regulate the manner in which the judges of multi-judge circuits shall dispose of the business thereof.
(c). The rules promulgated by the Chief Judge pursuant to authority invested in him by the Act creating his position are authorized by the Chief Judge Act and are fair and reasonable and not aribitrary or capricious.
3. Under the rulings in Division 2 of the opinion, the trial judge was without authority to act on the petition, and his judgment granting the injunction and other relief prayed for is nugatory and void.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Chambers, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. J. Summerour, Asst. Atty. Gen., T. Charles Allen, Atlanta, Harold Sheats, Lloyd T. Whitaker, Atlanta, for Fulton County et al.
Gould B. Hagler, David J. Heinsma, Augusta, James H. Baratton Jr., Ferdinand Buckley, G. Clyde Dekle, Jr., David H. Gambrell, William G. Grant, Thomas A. Rice, Robert B. Troutman, G. Seals Aiken, F. L. Breen, John A. Dunaway, W. Colquitt Carter, Atlanta, for party at interest not party to record.
Henry L. Bowden, Edwin L. Sterne, Robert F. Lyle, Atlanta, for City of Atlanta.
Houston White, Red Oak, E. J. Summerour, Harold Sheats, Atlanta, William W. Horton, Carl T. Hudgins, Decatur, for appellees.
These appeals arise from a suit brought by John J. Woodside, III against Fulton County, the State Highway Department of Georgia, the Wright Contracting Company, Inc., the Hudgins & Company Inc., and the City of Atlanta. The plaintiff, Woodside, seeks to recover damages under Code Ann. § 95-1710 () for the alleged negligent severance of his building from all the defendants, except the City of Atlanta, against which he seeks an injunction to prohibit the city from prosecuting him for violation of the Building Code of Atlanta imposing a criminal penalty upon anyone maintaining an unsafe building or structure. Counsel for plaintiff had attempted to have Judge George P. Whitman, Sr. of the Fulton Superior Court act on that portion of his petition seeking to temporarily enjoin the city. Judge Whitman refused to act on the petition, as the rules of the court required that all applications for temporary injunctive relief be presented to the Presiding Judge of the Civil Division, or to the Judge who may be temporarily serving for him. Counsel for plaintiff then approached the Presiding Judge and requested that the matter be assigned to Judge Durwood T. Pye of the same court. The Presiding Judge refused this request and referred counsel to the Chief Judge who suggested that he return to the Presiding Judge in accordance with the rules of the court. However, counsel for plaintiff presented the matter to Judge Pye, who declined to act but stated that in the absence of any successful attack on the rules of the court, and an adjudication of the question of his jurisdiction, if an attack was made upon the rules, he would refuse to take any action with reference to the case. Plaintiff filed amendments to his petition attacking the rules of the court and the Chief Judge Act (Ga.L.1963, p. 646) as unconstitutional, and praying that Judge Pye temporarily and permanently enjoin the City of Atlanta; pass an order accepting jurisdiction of the case, so that he and no other Judge of the Fulton Superior Court could hear and determine whether the city should be permanently enjoined; and, also that he should preside as judge over all other matters in the case, retaining complete jurisdiction in himself throughout the trial of the entire case.
There were other amendments to the petition and defensive pleadings filed, none of which need to be stated here as, in our view of this case, the controlling issue is whether the order of the court of October 18, 1965 holding the Chief Judge Act (Ga.L.1963, p. 646) and the rules implementing that Act promulgated by the Chief Judge unconstitutional is correct. In reaching that decision, the trial judge held that the judges of the superior courts of the State have concurrent authority under the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which authority cannot be curtailed or expanded by the legislature or by rules of the court, that plaintiff has the constitutional right as a litigant to have his entire case handled by one judge; that he, Judge Pye, assumed jurisdiction of the case, and that each of the nine Judges of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit was a separate superior court. By another order of the same date, Judge Pye continued the temporary restraining orders against the city prohibiting it from prosecuting plaintiff under the Building Code of Atlanta and as against all the defendants prohibiting them from filing any petition for declaratory judgement or other pleading connected with the issues of the instant case, pending the interlocutory hearing on the issue of the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff.
To these rulings the City of Atlanta filed its enumeration of errors as did the other defendants. All defendants assign error on the orders of October 18th and to previous orders by Judge Pye adverse to their particular pleadings and motions.
1. The contention that the appellee has failed to show any lawful standing upon which to attack the constitutionality of the Chief Judge Act and the Chief Judge Rules is wihtout merit. The test for proper standing is that '(B)efore a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack.' South Georgia Natural Gas Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 214 Ga. 174, 175(1), 104 S.E.2d 97 and cases cited. Clearly the petition presents the issue that the enforcement of the Chief Judge Act and the Chief Judge Rules deprives petitioner of his right to present his petition to any Judge of the Fulton Superior Court, and that the infringement upon his right to do so results from the unconstitutional features of the statute and rules upon which he bases his attack, which rules require that a petition for injunctive relief must be presented to the Presiding Judge. If the Chief Judge Act and Rules are constitutional, Judge Pye had no authority to take jurisdiction of the case and issue the temporary injunction; if unconstitutional, he was authorized to do so.
2. The primary question for determination in this case is whether the trial judge erred in his order of October 18, 1965 declaring unconstitutional Sections 2 and 3 of the Chief Judge Act (Ga.L.1963, p. 646) and the Chief Judge Rules promulgated by the Chief Judge. All other rulings excepted to were made either in contemplation of the result reached in said order or in pursuance of said order.
Section 1 of the Chief Judge Act merely establishes the office of Chief Judge of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit and provides for his election by a majority of the judges, tenure, and removal by majority vote of the judges. This section is not affected by any ruling of the trial judge. Section 2 of the Act setting out the duties of the Chief Judge states as follows: 'Such chief judge shall be responsible for the administration and the expeditious disposition of the business of the superior court of said circuit, and shall have power to make such rules as he shall deem necessary or proper for such purpose, but not in conflict with the general laws of this State, which rules, when entered on the minutes of said court, shall be binding upon the other judges of said circuit, until the same shall be overruled by an order signed by a majority of the judges of such circuit.' Section 3 of the Act states as follows: 'Such chief judge may by published rule, or from time to time by order, allocate the jurisdiction and powers of the superior court of said circuit, and the duties of the judges thereof, among the judges of said circuit; may assign to the judges of said circuit such of the business of said circuit as he shall deem appropriate, provided that any assignment of cases to or among the other judges of said circuit shall be in accordance with a published rule of court; may make and publish calendars; may require reports from the clerk of court of said circuit relative to business pending before the court of said circuit; and generally shall supervise and direct the disposition of all the business of said court.' (Ga.L.1963, pp. 646, 647). The Chief Judge Rules implement the Chief Judge Act and purport to regulate the business of the...
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