Vann v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors

• Decision Date: 20 January 1988
• Docket Number: 75731,Nos. 75604,s. 75604
• Citation: 186 Ga.App. 208,367 S.E.2d 43
• Parties: VANN v. DeKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS et al. (Two Cases).
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 43

367 S.E.2d 43

186 Ga.App. 208

VANN v. DeKALB COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS et al. (Two Cases).

Nos. 75604, 75731.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 20, 1988.

Rehearings Denied Feb. 24, 1988 and

March 4, 1988.

Certiorari Denied April 7, 1988.

David R. Bundrick, John J. Goger, Atlanta, for appellant.

Albert S. Johnson, Baxter P. Jones, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Lucy T. Sheftall, Asst. Atty, Gen., Atlanta, for appellees.

BIRDSONG, Chief Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal. Appellant owns residential property in DeKalb County. Appellant contends that prior to 1986 his property was appraised as to fair market value for ad valorem taxation using a combination of methods of evaluation (including actual inspection by trained appraisers). However in 1986, the appellees (hereinafter referred to as the board) adopted a new appraisal method of dividing the county map into administrative areas (called "neighborhoods") which have no necessary resemblance of traditional neighborhoods. Each year, the board now determines the percentage of increase or decrease in fair market value of a given piece of residential real property by referring to the average sales price of property within that same neighborhood. Thus, sales are used as a guide to the changing fair market value of a house located in a given neighborhood, and such factors as the actual improvements or damages sustained by individual pieces of property or property location (proximity to favorable or unfavorable objects or conditions) are not directly considered in assessing property as to its fair market value. Rather the appraised value of each parcel within a given tax neighborhood is increased or decreased by the same percentage factor.

In April 1986, appellant appealed his property appraisal to the county board of equalization; and, after receiving an adverse ruling therefrom, he further appealed to the superior court pursuant to the appeal provisions of OCGA § 48-5-311(f) (hereinafter referred to as tax appeal). In April 1987, the superior court dismissed that portion of appellant's tax appeal challenging the constitutionality of the board's tax assessment method on the grounds that OCGA § 48-5-311(e)(1) did not vest the appellant taxpayer with the right to challenge the board's methodology of assessing property. This court denied appellant's interlocutory appeal to this ruling. On July 20, 1987, the superior court, noting that the appellant had contended that the fair market value of his property was $45,500 and that the board had stipulated to this fact, entered an order and judgment finding that the fair market value of appellant's property was $45,500. On August 19, 1987, the superior court issued a nunc pro tunc order and judgment amending its July 20th order and judgment to reflect that appellant's demand that his property "be equalized with other like and similar property in [the county] and that his property be uniformly appraised and assessed is dismissed as moot" in view of the stipulation as to fair market value thereof. Thus, appellant's constitutional objections to the board's method of assessment were not considered on the merits of the tax appeal.

While the tax appeal was in progress, appellant on November 26, 1986, initiated a class action suit in superior court challenging the board's method of property appraisal under the Constitutions and laws of the United States and of the State of Georgia (hereinafter referred to as class action). On July 2, 1987, the superior court entered an order granting the board's motion to dismiss the class action. The superior court, after noting that appellant in support of his class action "relies on State Law and Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983," concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to the 1986 appraisal of appellant's property because an adequate legal remedy existed under OCGA § 48-5-311 statutory tax appeal provisions, to contest "tax assessment and collection practices" and to protect his state and federal rights. The court then granted the board's motion to dismiss the class action on the grounds that appellant "has utilized the State statutory procedure for appeal, and ... this is an adequate remedy to protect [his] Federal rights." However, the tax appeal trial judge, in April 1987, had dismissed that portion of appellant's tax appeal complaint that challenged the legality and constitutionality of the board's method of appraisal. Vann also appeals from that judgment. Held:

1. Regarding the class action, appellant enumerates as error that the trial judge erred in dismissing his complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as " 'the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power.' " Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 849, 262 S.E.2d 135. But jurisdiction of the subject matter does not mean simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the court's attention, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which that particular case belongs. As applied to the subject matter of a suit, jurisdiction is always conferred by law. Zeagler v. Zeagler, 192 Ga. 453, 456, 15 S.E.2d 478.

The jurisdiction of our superior courts is that vested by the Constitution of the State of Georgia and by statute. See e.g., Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I, Georgia Constitution; OCGA § 15-6-8; Department Industrial Relations v. Travelers Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883; see generally Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 100, 149 S.E.2d 140 holding that neither the legislature nor a judge can limit the jurisdiction of a superior court. As a general rule, "a right of action arises by necessary implication against a county when it violates a constitutional right of a citizen." Baranan v. Fulton County, 232 Ga. 852, 856, 209 S.E.2d 188; Waters v. DeKalb County, 208 Ga. 741(1), 69 S.E.2d 274; Watkins v. Cobb County Comm., 135 Ga.App. 324(2), 217 S.E.2d 298; see Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 424, 11 S.E. 850. The class action suit, in part, involves a constitutional challenge of a county property appraisal and tax assessment policy and a challenge of the intentional conduct of certain county officials in their implementation of this policy. However, we need not determine whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction in the classic sense over the matters asserted in appellant's class action complaint, because if the trial court's ruling granting the motion to dismiss was proper and legal for any reason it will be affirmed, regardless of the reason assigned by the court in support thereof. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 539, 307 S.E.2d 914; Hairston Enterprises v. Lee, 162 Ga.App. 475, 291 S.E.2d 404; Vada Corp. v. Harrell, 156 Ga.App. 137, 141, 273 S.E.2d 877; Turner v. Baggett Transp. Co., 128 Ga.App. 801(4), 198 S.E.2d 412.

Regarding that portion of appellant's class action which is alleged to rest upon a cause of action created by state law, we find that appellant has failed to assert a claim cognizable by the superior court. OCGA § 48-5-311 provides a statutory appeal system which authorizes any taxpayer to appeal from an assessment by the county board of tax assessors "as to matters of taxability, uniformity of assessment, and value, and as to denials of homestead exemptions." Id. at OCGA § 48-5-311(e)(1). If a remedy at law is plain and adequate, that is, as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity, it will exclude appropriate equity relief. Sherrer v. Hale, 248 Ga. 793(2), 285 S.E.2d 714; Middlebrooks v. Lonas, 246 Ga. 720(2), 272 S.E.2d 687, citing Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Gunn, 185 Ga. 108, 194 S.E. 365. OCGA § 48-5-311 provides a plain and adequate remedy at law to appellant's challenge that the county's tax assessment and appraisal system deprived him of due process of law, equal protection of the law, and lacked uniformity as required under the provisions of the Constitution of Georgia. See generally Wilkes v. Redding, 242 Ga. 78, 247 S.E.2d 872 (holding that the board of equalization is the appropriate forum for deciding taxpayers' constitutional and procedural issues as well as questions of uniformity, valuation and taxability); see generally Butts County v. Briscoe, 236 Ga. 233, 223 S.E.2d 199 (holding that all legal and constitutional questions can be settled in a statutory tax appeal action); see also Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 786, 243 S.E.2d 489; Chilivis v. Backus, 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371; Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759; see also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. 1, Par. 1 (General Assembly may authorize administrative agencies to exercise quasi-judicial power). Cf. Cobb County Bd. of Commrs. v. Poss, 257 Ga. 393, 395-397, 359 S.E.2d 900 (requiring the exhaustion of legislative remedies before the board, but holding that where appeals to the superior court are de novo proceedings the property owner is not restricted to the evidence presented to the local zoning officials in support of his constitutional challenge of the zoning ordinance). Further, in addition to barring injunctive relief, this rule bars the issuance of a declaratory judgment or mandamus. Wilkes v. Redding, supra 242 Ga. at 79, 247 S.E.2d 872; Barr v. Jackson County, 238 Ga. 332, 232 S.E.2d 923; Butts County, supra 236 Ga. at 236, 223 S.E.2d 199.

Appellant also asserted that he was deprived of due process of law and equal protection of the law in violation of the United States Constitution, and contends he has a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. We disagree. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, the Supreme Court of the United States held that if a state provides adequate post-deprivation remedies then...