Fulton v. Capacity
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-1459 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER FULTON, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HAKINBERRY Sued In His Individual Capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Re: ECF No. 19
Plaintiff Alexander Fulton ("Plaintiff") is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") and is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Facility ("SCI") at Forest. Plaintiff has filed this civil rights action against John Hakinberry1 ("Defendant"), who is a Corrections Officer at SCI Fayette where Plaintiff was previously incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his rights provided by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution from October 30, 2013 through May 6, 2014, by depriving Plaintiff of his medically prescribed wheelchair and his walking cane, and that Defendant violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., by denying Plaintiff access to programs and services available to non-disabled inmates, by subjecting him to discrimination by virtue of his disability, and by failing to provide Plaintiff with his wheelchair and walking cane for a sustained period of time.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss submitted on behalf of Defendant. ECF No. 19. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Public Employees' Retirement System v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) ().
Plaintiff has brought his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979) (footnote omitted). Thus, in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it could be inferred that "the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Id. at 423. As previously discussed, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his rights provided by the ADA, RA and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
Defendant initially argues, correctly so, that because parties cannot be held liable in their individual capacities under the ADA or the RA, Plaintiff's ADA and RA claims against Defendant should be dismissed. Plaintiff has apparently conceded the issue and has requested in his Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, ¶ 4, to withdraw his claims brought pursuant to these statutes. See O'Donnell v. Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 790 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (M.D. Pa. 2011), aff'd, 507 F. App'x 123 (3d Cir. 2012), citing A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir. 2007), and Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161,178 (3d Cir.2002) (). As such, Plaintiff's ADA and RA claims will be dismissed.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), requires a prisoner filing a Section 1983 action to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a).2 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). See also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (). In order to properly exhaust his or her administrative remedies, a plaintiff must be in "compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . ." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). The DOC's Grievance System Policy, DC-ADM 804, sets out a three-step grievance and appeals process. First, an inmate is required to legibly set forth all facts and identify all persons relevant to his claim in a grievance which will then be subject to "initial review." Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d at 232, 233. Second, after the initial review by a grievance officer, the inmate has the opportunity to appeal to the Facility Administrator for a second level of review. Id. at p. 232. Finally, an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals is available. Id.
In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement includes a procedural default component which requires morethan "simple" exhaustion; it requires "proper" exhaustion. Id. at 228, 230. Thus, where the inmate fails to specifically name the individual in the grievance or where the grievance is untimely or otherwise defective, claims against an accused individual are procedurally defaulted. Id. at 234. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 90-91 () (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, Defendant has provided the Court with a copy of Grievance No. 500717, upon which Plaintiff relies upon in his Complaint as demonstrating compliance with the exhaustion requirements.3 Review of Grievance No. 500717, which Plaintiff filed on March 10, 2014, shows that Plaintiff complained only of the "oppression of staff and the cooperation of medical" in refusing to give Plaintiff his wheelchair and walking cane in his cell. ECF No. 20-1, p. 8. Although it is clear that Plaintiff followed the grievance procedure through the second level of appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals, it is also clear that he did not specifically name Defendant in the grievance or in either of the subsequent appeals but simply makes general reference to "staff" and "medical" as having denied him access to his wheelchair and cane. ECF No. 20-1, pp. 2-8. As such, Grievance No. 500717 does not providethe basis for finding that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies relative to his Eighth Amendment claims brought against Defendant.4
Plaintiff, however, has provided a copy of a grievance he allegedly filed on May 7, 2014 -- the day after his wheelchair was returned to him -- in which he specifically complains that it was Defendant who took Plaintiff's wheelchair. Plaintiff argues that, because that grievance was never responded to, he exhausted all of the administrative remedies that were available to him and that he should therefore be allowed to proceed with his claim against Defendant. See Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013) (); Price v. Corr. Med. Servs., 493 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (D. Del. 2007) ().
Defendant does not dispute that the DOC's failure to respond to a grievance serves to excuse the exhaustion requirement but counters that, notwithstanding the DOC's failure to respond to the grievance, it does not excuse the fact that the grievance was untimely filed in the first...
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