Fumigation Dept. v. Pearson
Citation | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2092,559 So.2d 587 |
Decision Date | 06 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-3070,88-3070 |
Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2092, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D1160 FUMIGATION DEPARTMENT and Claims Center, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Wade PEARSON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
H. George Kagan, of Miller, Hodges, Kagan & Chait, Deerfield Beach, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Jerold Feuer, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Claimant seeks review of a November 15, 1988 workers' compensation order awarding him an attorney's fee of $330,000. Claimant seeks review of the amount of the fee award and also the deputy's refusal to rule on the issue of bad faith. We affirm.
An order on the merits of claimant's case was entered by the deputy on April 8, 1988. An appeal was taken to this court, and this court affirmed the deputy's order on the merits on August 15, 1989. Fumigation Department v. Pearson, 547 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Claimant was found to be permanently totally disabled due to exposure to toxic substances, and was awarded, among other things, lifetime attendant care. Claimant's recovery, reduced Claimant's attorney attempted to introduce evidence before the deputy on the issue of bad faith. The attorney for employer (self-insured) resisted this, noting that the employer acknowledged claimant's entitlement to an attorney's fee and contending that the issue of bad faith was therefore moot. In the order before us the deputy did not address the issue of bad faith. The deputy made several findings as to the scope of claimant's recovery. He found that claimant would require future psychiatric care at a rate set out in the merits order, and thus included this award of future psychiatric care in the benefits recovered by claimant. With respect to the issue of claimant's award of attendant care, the deputy found the market value of this care was to be measured by the cost to the employer of obtaining such attendant care in the market place. The deputy found that a reasonable average sum to be paid for this attendant care would be $11.25 an hour. With respect to the discount rate to be applied to the whole of claimant's award, he found that the 8% statutory discount rate applicable to an award of compensation was to be applied here also, and that the attendant care was to be classified as "services by other medical professionals," and therefore assigned an inflationary index to the cost over the next 47 years of 7.53% annually. The sum total of this recovery, after being reduced to present value, was $5,085,362.00. The order finds:
to present value, was ultimately determined to be over five million dollars.
11. Having determined the recovery (both past and anticipated future), the undersigned must now address the issue of the fee to be awarded claimant's attorneys for prosecuting the merits claim. The undersigned has considered the factors set forth in the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Lee Engineering as well as the schedule provided in Chapter 440.34, Florida Statutes.... I now review each of the individual factors and use them in determining what, in my opinion, constitutes a reasonable fee.
knowledge of the issues and the manner in which these cases need to be tried does not lead me to the view that only an attorney, with a degree in chemistry, could have prosecuted the claim. But it did require the skills of a competent workers' compensation practitioner.
The undersigned Deputy Commissioner has been aided in his determination of a reasonable fee by expert testimony from the attorneys of record and Workers' Compensation practitioners who are well known to the undersigned as experts in the field of workers' compensation. The 'bottom line' figure for a reasonable fee ... ranged from a low of $12,500.00 to a high of $1,000,000.00.... [E]ach expert has emphasized variables which, to this The undersigned, exercising my own independent judgment, and weighing the variables, feels a reasonable fee for successfully prosecuting this claim (for both claimant's attorneys) is the sum of $330,000.00. This sum represents substantially more than is customarily awarded in workers' compensation matters. It equals compensation in excess of $840.00 per hour and to this fact finder, a 'bottom line' fee of $330,000.00, is appropriate considering all the circumstances of the claim.... The undersigned recognizes the fee is less than the 25/20/15 schedule would call for. However, for the reasons set forth above, the amount of $330,000.00 is a reasonable fee.
fact finder, should not have been emphasized as much as they were....
The opinion in Sonesta Beach Hotel v. Hinckley, 483 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), indicates that alternative findings of entitlement to an attorney's fee based upon both...
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