Futrell v. George

• Decision Date: 13 October 1910
• Citation: 69 S.E. 182,135 Ga. 265
• Parties: FUTRELL et al. v. GEORGE et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

69 S.E. 182

135 Ga. 265

FUTRELL et al. v. GEORGE et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 13, 1910

Syllabus by the Court.

The act of August 12, 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 26), is in conflict with article 1, § 4, par. 1, of the Constitution of this state and is therefore invalid.

Section 2 of the above act (Acts 1903, p. 26) is so connected with the general legislative scheme embodied in the act, that it cannot be stricken and the remainder of the statute be upheld as valid.

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

A law to be "general," under article 1, § 4, par. 1, of the Constitution, must operate uniformly, throughout the whole state, upon the subject or class of subjects with which it purposes to deal.

Error from Superior Court, Crawford County; W. H. Felton, Judge.

Suit by J. W. George and others against L. C. Futrell and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

L. D Moore and A. J. Danielly, for plaintiffs in error.

H. A Mathews and R. C. Le Sueur, for defendants in error.

BECK, J. (after stating the facts as above).

1. It appears that the alternative road law, embraced in sections 573-583 of volume 1 of the Code of 1895, was in effect in the county of Crawford by virtue of the recommendation of the grand jury of that county at the March term, 1909, of the superior court, unless the election referred to in the petition, under the provisions of the act approved August 12, 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 26), had the effect of annulling the recommendation of the grand jury to put in operation the alternative road law. The court below was of the opinion that this law was not of force in said county, but was suspended by a vote in the election held December 13, 1909, as ordered by the ordinary. The plaintiffs in error, however, contend that the act of August 12, 1903, is unconstitutional, being in conflict with the provisions of article 1, § 4, par. 1, of the Constitution, which provides that "laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law." In the case of Haney v. Commissioners, 91 Ga. 770, 18 S.E. 28, this court held that the act approved October 21, 1891, now embraced in sections 573-583, vol. 1, of the Code of 1895, in relation to public roads, is a general law and has uniform operation throughout the state, and it may be put in operation in any county in the state upon the recommendation of the grand jury at any term of the superior court of the county, and the operation of this alternative road law may be suspended in any county in the state where it has once been put in operation upon a like recommendation of the grand jury, after the lapse of three years from the time that it is put into operation. Thus a complete system of road laws for the state, which may be put into effect in any county upon recommendation of the grand jury, and after a fixed period be suspended upon a like recommendation, is provided for by a general law. If the act of 1903, relative to the same subject, should be held valid, it would have the effect of providing another method by which the suspension of the alternative road law could be accomplished, different from that provided in the law embraced in the sections of the Code referred to; and to that extent, in those counties where a majority of the voters who cast their ballots in favor of the suspension of the law, the operation of the statute would be suspended. No one doubts that it was competent for the Legislature to bring about such a result by the passage of a general law; but it was not permissible to accomplish this result by a special law which would have the effect of arresting the uniform operation throughout the state of the existing general law. And it only remains for us to inquire whether or not the act of August 12, 1903, is a general or a special law.

If the act of August 12, 1903, had been a law providing for the suspension of the alternative road law as contained in the Code, of uniform operation throughout the state, it would have been a general law and efficacious in its purpose of providing a system for suspending that law where it had been put in operation by the recommendation of a grand jury. But if in its nature it is a special law, it would not be given this effect under the provisions of our Constitution stated above. In the case of Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S.E. 1018, it was said: "You cannot make a general statute cease to be general otherwise than by another statute repealing it; that is, under the Constitution of 1877, you cannot repeal a general law in part by a local law, for, in the eye of the Constitution, every local law is special relatively to a general law. A law once territorially general must remain so until it is wholly repealed, however its provisions may be otherwise varied by subsequent legislation. One and the same law for the whole state must be a general law; and a general law must, while it exists, have a general nature, whether its subject-matter be of a general or a local nature. In the light of the present Constitution it would be absurd to say of any valid general law that it is not a law of a general nature, though it might be quite correct to say of some general laws that the nature of their subject-matter is local. But no general law, whatever be its nature, can, under that Constitution, be put aside by a subsequent special law. If at any time there is upon the statute book,...