G.K. v. State, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02–1711–JV–2540
Citation | 104 N.E.3d 598 |
Decision Date | 30 May 2018 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02–1711–JV–2540 |
Parties | G.K., Appellant–Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Petitioner |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Attorney for Appellant: Deborah Markisohn, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Appellate Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] G.K. appeals true findings for conduct constituting level 6 felony receiving stolen auto parts and level 6 felony theft if committed by an adult. He argues that these true findings violate his federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy because he had been previously acquitted of these counts. We agree, and therefore we vacate the true findings and remand for resentencing.
[2] On June 9, 2017, the State filed, and the trial court subsequently approved, a delinquency petition, alleging that on or about June 8, 2017, G.K. committed acts that would constitute the following offenses if committed by an adult: Count 1, level 6 felony receiving stolen auto parts by knowingly or intentionally receiving John Schott's motor vehicle, which had been the subject of theft; Count 2, level 6 felony theft by knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over Schott's vehicle safety seats; and Count 3, class A misdemeanor criminal trespass by knowingly or intentionally interfering with the possession or use of Schott's property without his consent.
[3] On the morning of August 17, 2017, Magistrate Gaither presided over a denial hearing for G.K. and two other juveniles, D.W. and N.M., who faced the same three delinquency allegations. After the presentation of evidence, Magistrate Gaither ruled as follows:
[A]s to [G.K.], I'm gonna enter a true finding as to the sole count of criminal trespass. [A]s to [D.W.], I'm going to enter a true finding as to receiving stolen auto parts, theft, and criminal trespass. [A]s to [N.M.] true finding as to receiving stolen auto parts, theft, and criminal trespass.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 33. When the trial court asked the State whether there was anything else, the deputy prosecutor answered, "No, Your Honor." Id. at 34.
[4] That afternoon, the trial court issued two orders. One order, the "Order on Fact Finding Hearing," designated "Not True" findings for Counts 1 and 2 and a "True" finding for Count 3. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61. Consistent with this order, an entry in the chronological case summary ("CCS") provides, "3—Criminal Trespass ( I.C. 35–43–2–2(b)(4) ), a Class A Misdemeanor, Petition 170608040 Found True by Trial." Id. at 11. The other order issued by the trial court was the "Clarification Order on Fact Finding" ("Clarification Order"), which provided, "The Court orders this matter scheduled for ruling hearing as to fact finding to clarify the court's order on true findings of Counts 1 and 2." Id. at 59. Both orders were recommended and signed by Magistrate Gaither and approved, ordered, and signed by the judge pro tem who was sitting for the presiding trial court judge. Id. at 59, 61. Also, both orders were recorded in the CCS. Id. at 11. While the record is not clear as to the sequence of the execution of the two orders, the only logical conclusion is that the Order on Fact Finding Hearing was entered before the Clarification Order. This is because it is logically inconceivable to set a hearing to clarify an order that has not been entered. In other words, if the acquittals had never been entered, a clarification hearing would not have been necessary.
[5] On August 24, 2017, Magistrate Gaither held the ruling hearing, which he began by announcing, Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. He then made the following statement:
[6] On October 5, 2017, the trial court issued a dispositional order designating true findings for all three counts, imposing a suspended commitment to the Department of Correction, placing G.K. on probation with forty hours of community service. This appeal ensued.
[7] G.K. argues that the true findings on Counts 1 and 2 violate the protections against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. "Both the United States and Indiana constitutions prohibit a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense." Wilcox v. State , 748 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is ‘based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.’ " Evans v. Michigan , 568 U.S. 313, 318, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013) (quoting Fong Foo v. United States , 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962) ). Whether the true findings on Counts 1 and 2 violate double jeopardy principles is a question of law, which we review de novo. Grabarczyk v. State , 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[8] According to G.K., he was acquitted of Counts 1 and 2 at the denial hearing as reflected in the Order on Fact Finding Hearing, and it is of no moment that the acquittal was erroneous. The State "does not disagree that if an accused has been acquitted, that verdict is final and he cannot thereafter be convicted of that offense, even if the acquittal is legally erroneous." Appellee's Br. at 8. However, the State asserts that the trial court did not acquit G.K. of Counts 1 and 2 because it was silent as to those counts when it pronounced its ruling on criminal trespass. The State further contends that the entry of "Not True" findings on the Order on Fact Finding Hearing does not reflect what happened at the denial hearing; the State argues that this constitutes "a clear clerical error," which is not what "the caselaw means by an ‘erroneous’ acquittal," and that the order should have no preclusive effect. Id. at 10–11.
[9] The threshold question is whether G.K. was acquitted of Counts 1 and 2. After the evidence was presented at the denial hearing, the court ruled that it would enter a "true finding as to the sole count of criminal trespass." Tr. Vol. 2 at 33. When the court addressed G.K.'s co-respondents, it found true findings for "receiving stolen auto parts, theft, and criminal trespass." Id. The clear implication of the court's ruling as to G.K. was that it was entering not true findings for receiving stolen auto parts and theft. Even if there was any ambiguity in the court's ruling, it was resolved by the issuance of the Order on Fact...
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