Gabriel v. Brame
| Decision Date | 13 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | 36263. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | GABRIEL v. BRAME, Sheriff. |
Harold F. Crain and Cecil A. Rogers, both of Meridian, for appellant.
Greek L. Rice, Atty. Gen., and Geo. H. Ethridge Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
At the August 1945 Term of the circuit court of Lauderdale County appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of willful trespass. The penalty for this offense as fixed by Section 2406, Code 1942 is a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not longer than six months in the county jail or both--there being no prescription of a minimum sentence. Acting under the provisions of Section 2541, Code 1942, the court imposed the maximum penalty, but suspended all of it except ninety days in jail, conditioned that the convict would not violate the law in the future. After serving his ninety days, the convict was released under his bond.
On March 16, 1946, the district attorney filed with the court a petition in the nature of an information, under Section 2543, Code 1942, that since his release as aforesaid the convict had been guilty of burglary, and the court was requested to revoke the suspension and to require the remainder of the sentence as imposed to be put into execution. A hearing on this information was had in vacation at which hearing the convict was present, and an order was entered in accordance with the prayer of the information filed as aforesaid.
Upon his reincarceration under the order last mentioned, the convict presented to the court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Sections 2541 and 2543, Code 1942, commonly known as the suspension of sentence statutes, are unconstitutional as being an intrusion upon the pardoning power vested solely in the governor under Section 124, Constitution of 1890. The petition in habeas corpus was denied.
The question presented has been debated in a large number of cases in other states. In a considerable majority of the jurisdictions the contention here urged by appellant has been rejected, although there is a respectable minority to the contrary. The cases in an adequate number are cited or annotated under State v. Starwich, 119 Wash. 561 206 P. 29, 26 A.L.R. 393, 399, and Montgomery v State, 231 Ala. 1, 163 So. 365, 101 A.L.R. 1394, 1402. We concur in what has been held by the majority and that the challenged statutes are not in conflict with the Constitution. See particularly Richardson v Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 109 S.E. 460 and In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A. 24.
Two propositions are fundamental, as we think, the first of which is that punishment for crime has its basis solely in its effect as a deterrent as against future offenses--that punishment for the sake of punishment, or for vengeance alone, has no place in the processes of human tribunals. And as a deterrent, a present offender is as much within the object as others in general. And, secondly, that the authority to say what constitutes a crime, and what punishment shall be inflicted, is in its entirety a legislative question, save as to punishment which is cruel and inhuman, and being so, the law-making authority may prescribe not only the penalty but also such incidents and conditions as will in the judgment of the legislature best serve the general policy which is the basis of all criminal sentences.
Such being the plenary power of the law-making body, we suppose it will not be denied that it is within the legislative authority to provide that, in all except nonbailable cases, the court shall not be obliged to impose any sentence at all at the term during which the verdict or plea of guilty is pronounced, but may prescribe that the court, in its discretion, may continue the case to the next succeeding term and thence from term to term, sentence to be imposed at any later term to which the case has been continued for that purpose, at which later term the court may inquire into the conduct of the convict since the date of his conviction in order to furnish further light as to the proper sentence to be imposed.
It must follow, therefore, that inasmuch as the law-making power may authorize the deferment of the sentence in its entirety until a subsequent term, it may authorize the pronouncement of a part of the sentence at the conviction term, which deferment of the remainder, or what is the same thing in practical effect, that the court may pronounce what the trial judge considers is the maximum that he will adjudge in any event and...
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Russell v. State
...specified by statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, it will not be disturbed by the judiciary."); Gabriel v. Brame , 200 Miss. 767, 773, 28 So. 2d 581, 583 (1947) ("[T]he authority to say what constitutes a crime, and what punishment shall be inflicted, is in its entirety a legis......
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Jackson v. State
...and prescribe the punishment therefor is a legislative function. Justice Griffith, writing for this Court in Gabriel v. Brame, Sheriff, 200 Miss. 767, 28 So.2d 581 (1947), stated this truism as Two propositions are fundamental, as we think, the first of which is that punishment for crime ha......
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Wilson v. State
...state is vested entirely in our Legislature. Purely and simply, our Legislature fixes the punishments for crimes. Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss. 767, 773, 28 So.2d 581, 583 (1947) ; Howell v. State, 300 So.2d 774, 780 (Miss.1974) ; Upshaw v. State, 350 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Miss.1977). There can b......
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Meeks v. State
...well, are free to define crimes and prescribe punishments. See Upshaw v. State, 350 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Miss.1977); Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss. 767, 773, 28 So.2d 581, 582 (1947). It holds, however, that the courts may not impose for one de jure offense more than lawfully the prescribed punis......