Gage v. Chapin Motors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 August 1932
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GAGE v. CHAPIN MOTORS, Inc.

162 A. 17

115 Conn. 546

GAGE v. CHAPIN MOTORS, Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 16, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Litchfield County; Arthur F. Ells Judge.

Action by Daniel Gage against the Chapin Motors, Incorporated, to recover damages for personal injuries and for damage to plaintiff's car alleged to have been caused by negligence of defendant's servant or agent. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

No error.

John F. Chatfield, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Raymond L. Carmody, of Winsted, for appellee.

CORNELL, J.

On the morning of August 15, 1931, plaintiff's car, an Essex sedan, while being driven by him from Otis, Mass., to Winsted, Conn., developed a defect in its steering mechanism called a " shimmy." Defendant conducts a garage at Winsted where the repair of Essex automobiles is specialized in. Upon arriving at Winsted plaintiff drove his car to defendant's garage and, after informing the party then in charge of the presence of such " shimmy" and the speed at which it occurred, contracted with defendant to repair it for the purpose of eliminating the defect. Defendant undertook to make such repairs, and one of its employees, a skillful and experienced mechanic, worked on the steering mechanism for more than an hour. A " shimmy" may be caused by any one or more of a number of conditions. When defendant's employee had completed the repairs he deemed necessary to correct the defect, and while defendant still, retained possession and control of the car, he requested plaintiff, who had remained at the garage while the work was being done, to accompany him while he drove the car in a " road test." The purpose of this was to satisfy both defendant's mechanic and the plaintiff that the " shimmy" had been eliminated. Plaintiff accordingly entered the car which defendant's mechanic employee drove from the garage. Defendant's mechanic, in exclusive control of the car, operated it nearly a half mile west on Main street, stopping at plaintiff's request so that he could perform a brief errand at a bank, and after traversing some other streets entered North Main street. After traveling on a downgrade on North Main street, during which the speed of the car was increased, they came to a straight stretch of hard paved road. Plaintiff had informed defendant's agents that the car had " shimmied" when he was driving it himself when it attained a speed of forty miles per hour. On entering the stretch of road at the foot of the incline, defendant's mechanic increased the speed of the car to bring it up to that of forty miles per hour. The car had, however, attained a speed of forty-five miles per hour when it suddenly veered to the left in the direction of an automobile which was parked on the left-hand side of the street. The driver immediately applied the brakes, causing the automobile to skid. It left the road, went over an embankment, and turned over. At the point where the accident occurred the paved portion of the road was twenty feet wide; there was no traffic proceeding in either direction and no cars in sight except that standing on the left side of the road; it was raining and the road was wet.

From these facts the trial court concluded that the driver of plaintiff's car, defendant's mechanic, was negligent in that he failed to keep a proper lookout, control, and speed, under all the circumstances. In its second reason of appeal the defendant attacks this conclusion, claiming that the court erred in the application of the standard of care by which it measured the conduct of defendant's mechanic in operating the car at the time of the accident. It supports this contention by insisting that, since the car had " shimmied" before it had been repaired at a speed of forty miles per hour, a " road test" at the same speed was necessary to determine whether the defect had in fact been corrected and that the degree of care to be applied was therefore that of a reasonably prudent man in performing a test of the same kind under the same conditions. It is not necessary to examine this claim, since it does not appear from the finding of facts that any recurrence of the " shimmy" occurred, or exerted any influence upon the operation of the car or the course which it took immediately before or after the application of the brakes. It is the jamming on of the brakes which, it is found, caused the car to skid and leave the road, and that this occurred because the operator failed to maintain a proper lookout, control, and speed under the circumstances, one of which circumstances was that of a wet pavement.

Similar observations apply to defendant's claim of error in the trial court's failure to find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in voluntarily becoming an occupant of the car while charged with the knowledge that it had developed a " shimmy" with a resulting tendency to leave the road when it was uncertain whether the adjustments made had corrected the defect, and knowing that, in order to determine whether they had, the car would have to be driven at a high rate of speed on a wet road. The finding is devoid of any suggestion that a repetition of the " shimmy" played any part in producing the accident, but establishes, on the contrary, that the accident resulted from defendant's mechanic's negligent operation of the automobile. The determination of the facts showing the conduct of the parties, and whether that conduct measured up to the standard of care, being one peculiarly within the province of the trial court, its conclusions present no occasion for review, Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 143 A. 881; Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co., 99 Conn. 711, 122 A. 717, 37 A.L.R. 582; Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. Co., 60 Conn....