Gaines v. Boston Herald, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 95-11946-NG.,CIV.A. 95-11946-NG.
• Citation: 998 F.Supp. 91
• Parties: David GAINES, Frank Poindexter, John T. Smith, and Edwin Torres, Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON HERALD, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

998 F.Supp. 91

David GAINES, Frank Poindexter, John T. Smith, and Edwin Torres, Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON HERALD, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 95-11946-NG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 30, 1998.

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Henry F. Owens, III, Samantha A. Moppett, Lane, Altman & Owens, Boston, MA, Anthony W. Neal, Boston, MA, for David Gaines, Frank Poindexter, John T. Smith, Edwin M. Torres, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs.

M. Robert Dushman, Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, Boston, MA, for Boston Herald Inc., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GERTNER, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER—MARCH 30, 1998
                I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 96
                  II. PROCEDURAL STANDARD ........................................................ 97
                      A. Motion for Summary Judgment ............................................. 97
                      B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification .............................. 97
                 III. BACKGROUND ................................................................. 98
                  IV. FACTS ...................................................................... 98
                      A. The Job of a Paperhandler ............................................... 98
                      B. The Nepotistic Policies in Place from 1989-1994 ......................... 98
                      C. When Did the Nepotism Policy End? ....................................... 99
                         1. Hires between April 1994 and July 1996 .............................. 100
                         2. September 2, 1994 Hiring ............................................ 100
                         3. The Late September and October 1994 Hiring .......................... 100
                         4. The July 15, 1995, Hiring ........................................... 101
                         5. The June 1996 Hiring ................................................ 103
                         6. Conclusion .......................................................... 103
                      D. Statistical Evidence ................................................... 104
                

                E. The Herald's Knowledge of the Race of Pressroom Applicants ............. 104
                   V. DISCUSSION OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ................. 104
                      A. Counts I & III: Disparate Impact ....................................... 104
                         1. Disparate Impact .................................................... 105
                         2. Identified Employment Practices that Fail to Make Out a Disparate
                Impact Claim ................................................................... 105
                            a. Practices That Could Not Have Affected these Plaintiffs .......... 105
                            b. The Defendant's Failure to Take Steps to Create a More
                Diverse Workforce ........................................................... 106
                         3. The Nepotism Claim .................................................. 106
                         4. Employment Practices Related to the Nepotism Scheme ................. 108
                         5. Conclusion as to the Disparate Impact Claims ........................ 108
                      B. Count IV: Inquiry About Race in the Application Process, in Violation
                of Massachusetts Law .............................................................. 108
                      C. Count V, Count VI, & Count VII: Intentional Discrimination ............. 110
                      D. Count II. Mixed Motive Discrimination .................................. 111
                      E. Count VIII: Violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93, § 102(2) ................ 111
                  VI. THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .............................. 111
                VII. THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION ............................. 112
                      A. The Typicality of Gaines' Claims ....................................... 112
                      B. Temporal Boundaries of the Class Claims ................................ 113
                         1. The Title VII Claims ................................................ 113
                         2. The 151B, § 4 Claims ................................................ 116
                         3. The Section 1981 Claim .............................................. 116
                      C. The Certified Class .................................................... 116
                VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................................ 116
                

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, three African American males and one Spanish-surnamed male, bring individual actions and a class action against the Boston Herald, Inc. ("the Herald"). Plaintiffs applied for entry-level jobs at the Herald and were not hired. They allege that the defendant engaged in a variety of discriminatory practices that prevented them, and others similarly situated, from being hired.

While the plaintiffs bring claims under a succession of related counts,¹ they allege essentially both disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of race. Disparate treatment is overt, intentional discrimination; disparate impact involves discrimination through ostensibly neutral rules and practices whose net effect is to discriminate.

The undisputed evidence in this case suggests that both kinds of discrimination went on in the Herald pressroom for some substantial period of time. From the moment they applied, applicants for pressroom jobs who were friends and relatives of existing Herald employees were given preference. They received longer, more detailed application forms than did outsiders, forms that invited them to list names of friends and relatives at the Herald. Only those who had friends and relatives were hired. Since existing employees were almost uniformly white, this procedure provided an opportunity for the Herald to discriminate on the basis of race. Statistics regarding the pressroom workforce suggest that intentionally or not, that opportunity was realized. The pressroom was, until quite recently, almost uniformly white.

The heart of the dispute between the parties is how long these policies continued, and whether they were ever applied to or affected these plaintiffs. The plaintiffs assert that these policies continue to this day. Moreover, even when they ended, their discriminatory effects continued; the defendant hired new employees from the applications kept on file under the nepotistic system. The defendant responds with evidence that the discriminatory policies ended in the spring of 1994, months before the first plaintiff applied.

A number of motions are currently before the Court, including plaintiffs' motion for class certification, defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Evidence suggests that the discriminatory system may well have continued into September 1994; during that month one of the plaintiffs applied to the Herald, and two positions were filled by white men who may have had contacts at the paper. Summary judgment to the defendant is accordingly DENIED IN PART and ALLOWED IN PART. Summary judgment to the plaintiffs is DENIED. A class will be certified as described below.

II. PROCEDURAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "material fact" is one which, if taken to be true, might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1995); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). However, where the moving party makes an initial showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may not rely merely on allegations or unsupported speculations to avoid summary judgment. Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1030 (1st Cir.1995); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1108, 115 S.Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995). It must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. As the parties in this case have both moved for summary judgment, I must review the evidence in the light most favorable to each in turn. I will address the defendant's motion first.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification

The plaintiffs have proposed a class consisting of:

(1) past and present Herald pressroom job applicants;

(2) those who will in future apply for employment in the Herald pressroom;

(3) applicants who seek to apply for Herald pressroom jobs and who have been deterred from applying because of the virtually all white racial composition of the Herald pressroom and its reputed and long-standing discriminatory recruitment, selection, and hiring policies and practices; and,

(4) would-be applicants who are deprived of information concerning Herald pressroom job vacancies and who are not recruited for such vacancies.

Rule 23 sets out four requirements for certification of a class: the class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all potential class members is impracticable; there exist questions of law or fact common to the class; the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class; and the named plaintiffs will adequately and fairly represent the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.

Both the typicality and the numerosity requirements will turn to some extent on the success of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. An evaluation of the typicality of the plaintiffs' claims is closely related to an evaluation of their individual claims. Harris v. White, 479 F.Supp. 996, 1008-09 (D.Mass.1979). Plaintiffs must...