Gallagher v. Metropolitan Dist. Commission

Decision Date06 January 1977
Citation371 Mass. 691,359 N.E.2d 36
Parties, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3175, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,075 Edward J. GALLAGHER v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION (and a companion case 1 ).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
1

Richard S. Daniels, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.

Garry J. Wooters, Boston (Frederick V. Casselman, Boston, with him), for Labor Relations Commission.

William A. Schroeder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Metropolitan District Commission.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff is the president of Local 1242 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Local 1242), which had for several years been the certified collective bargaining representative of approximately 1,800 employees of the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC). He commenced these two consolidated actions in the Superior Court seeking injunctive relief ordering the Commissioner of the MDC to bargain collectively with Local 1242 and ordering the Labor Relations Commission to cease their interference with the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Local 1242 and the MDC. Both actions were dismissed pursuant to motions to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), made by all defendants, and the plaintiff appeals from those dismissals. We conclude that there was no error and that the judgments of dismissal must be affirmed.

The dispute now before us concerns the status of Local 1242 under the recently enacted legislative overhaul of the statutory scheme regulating the collective bargaining rights of public employees. See G.L. c. 150E, inserted by St.1973, c. 1078, § 2. Statute 1973, c. 1078, § 1, repealed G.L. c. 149, §§ 178D, 178F--178N. The determination of that status hinges ultimately on whether MDC employees are State employees or whether they are employed by a 'district.' See G.L. c. 150E, § 1. If MDC employees are State employees, the MDC will no longer be a district bargaining unit under the new statutory and regulatory scheme, and Local 1242 will lose its certification as exclusive bargaining representative for MDC employees.

Local 1242 was certified as the collective bargaining representative of MDC employees pursuant to the provisions of G.L. c. 149, § 178F, repealed by St.1973, c. 1078, § 1, which was applicable only to employees of the Commonwealth. 2 Section 178F(1), as appearing in St.1967, c. 774, defined 'employee' as 'any employee of the commonwealth assigned to work in any department, board, commission or other agency thereof . . .' and defined 'employer' as 'the commonwealth, acting through a department or agency head as agent, or any person so designated by such department or agency head.' Section 178F(6) limited the scope of State employee collective bargaining to conditions of employment. Pursuant to § 178F, Local 1242 and the Commissioner of the MDC, the representative of the Commonwealth for the purposes of collective bargaining under § 178F(1), entered into a written contract covering working conditions of MDC employees.

Effective July 1, 1974, § 178F was superseded by G.L. c. 150E, which established a uniform collective bargaining scheme for all public employees and expanded the scope of collective bargaining to include 'wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment.' G.L. c. 150E, § 6. General Laws c. 150E, § 1, altered the definition of the Commonwealth as employer by designating the Commissioner of Administration as the sole authorized representative of the Commonwealth for collective bargaining purposes. Thus, under G.L. c. 150E, the 'employer' for the purposes of collective bargaining for all State employees is the Commissioner of Administration rather than the head of the department or agency which comprised the bargaining unit under the former statute. However, the 'employer' under G.L. c. 150E, § 1, for employees of a district is the chief executive officer of the political subdivision.

Under the former statute, G.L. c. 149, § 178F(3), the designation of the appropriate bargaining unit for State employees was a matter determined by mutual agreement of the employee organization and the appropriate department head, based on considerations of community of interest, including such factors as similar working conditions, common supervision, and common physical location, and subject to the approval of the director of personnel and standardization. The new statutory provision, G.L. c. 150E, § 3, commands the Labor Relations Commission to 'prescribe rules and regulations and establish procedures for the determination of appropriate bargaining units which shall be consistent with the purposes of providing for stable and continuing labor relations, giving due regard to such criteria as community of interest, efficiency of operations and effective dealings, and to safeguarding the rights of employees to effective representation.'

The Labor Relations Commission, under the authority vested in it by G.L. c. 23, § 9R, as amended by St.1973, c. 1078, § 2A, and by G.L. c. 150E, § 3, issued on July 1, 1974, its Rules and Regulations Relating to the Administration of an Act Providing for Collective Bargaining for Public Employees. Article 2 of those regulations covers all proceedings with respect to questions of representation under G.L. c. 150E, § 4, which provides in part that '(p)ublic employers may recognize an employee organization designated by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit as the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining' (emphasis added) and which sets out procedures by which the bargaining representative for that unit may be certified. 3 The Labor Relations Commission filed an amendment to art. 2 which provides that '(w)ith respect to employees of the Commonwealth . . . no petition filed under the provisions of Section 4 of the Law shall be entertained, except in extraordinary circumstances, where the petition seeks certification in a bargaining unit not in substantial accordance with the provisions of this subsection. Bargaining units shall be established on a statewide basis, with one unit for each of the following occupational groups . . ..' 4

Subsequent to the promulgation of the amended regulations, pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 4, petitions were filed by an alliance of two unions, State Council #41, AFSCME, and Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, seeking to represent the State employees classified by the amended regulations as Unit Two and Three employees, which could include MDC employees if they were properly categorized as State employees. On March 31, 1975, the plaintiff demanded that the Commissioner of the MDC bargain with Local 1242 over the new subjects of bargaining opened up by G.L. c. 150E. The Commissioner refused to bargain with Local 1242 in light of the new regulations. On April 7, 1975, the plaintiff commenced the first of these two actions, seeking an injunction ordering the Commissioner of the MDC to negotiate with Local 1242. On April 24, 1975, the Labor Relations Commission notified the plaintiff by letter that conferences would be held on the representation question on May 14 and 19, 1975. The plaintiff thereupon commenced the second of these two actions on May 6, 1975, naming as defendants the MDC Commissioner, the chairman and members of the Labor Relations Commission, and the Secretary of Administration, seeking to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the status of Local 1242 as the exclusive bargaining representative for MDC employees.

The actions were consolidated for trial, and the Labor Relations Commission was granted leave to intervene in the first action pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 24, 365 Mass. 769 (1974). The Labor Relations Commission moved to dismiss both actions on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) that the Labor Relations Commission had exclusive primary jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. The plaintiff requested a ruling by the court that the employer of the members of Local 1242 for the purposes of G.L. c. 150E is the Commissioner of the MDC. The court denied this request and ruled that as matter of law the G.L. c. 150E employer was the Commonwealth acting through the Secretary of Administration and that the MDC was not a 'district' within the meaning of G.L. c. 150E, § 1. The plaintiff's actions were thereupon dismissed.

We conclude that there was no error. The court below was correct in ruling as matter of law that the employer of the members of Local 1242 for the purposes of G.L. c. 150E is the Commonwealth acting through the Commissioner of Administration.

The plaintiff argues that the MDC is a 'district' within the meaning of G.L. c. 150E, § 1, rather than a department of the State government and that, therefore, the 'employer' for the purposes of collective bargaining is the Commissioner of the MDC, as the chief executive officer of the district, rather than the Commonwealth acting through the Commissioner of Administration. The resolution of this question is determinative as to the designation of the appropriate bargaining unit for the MDC employees now represented by Local 1242. If the MDC is a 'district,' the existing bargaining unit may continue to be appropriate under G.L. c. 150E, § 3, while if the MDC is a department of the State government, its employees may be properly categorized by the Labor Relations Commission in one or more of the ten designated units.

While there appears to have been no practical difficulty in categorizing MDC employees as State employees under the former collective bargaining statute, whatever other ambiguity may have existed regarding the precise nature of the MDC and the type of political entity it is has been...

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